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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The federal government, through various transportation acts, such as the Intermodal 
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), the Transportation Equity Act for the 
21st Century (TEA-21), and, more recently, the Safe, Affordable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act—A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), has reinforced the need 
for integration of land use and transportation and the provision of public transit. Other 
federal programs, such as the Livable Communities Program and the New Starts Program, 
have provided additional impetus to public transit. At the state and regional level, the past 
three decades have seen increased provision of public transit. However, the public transit 
systems typically require significant operating and capital subsidies—75 percent of transit 
funding is provided by local and state governments.1 With all levels of government under 
significant fiscal stress, new transit funding mechanisms are welcome. Value capture (VC) 
is once such mechanism.
This report examines five VC mechanisms in depth: tax-increment financing (TIF), special 
assessment districts (SADs), transit impact fees, joint developments, and air rights.
WHAT IS VALUE CAPTURE? 
Simply put, VC is the identification and capture of the increase in land value resulting from 
public investment in infrastructure. Normatively, VC is based upon the “benefits received” 
principle—i.e., those who benefit from a particular infrastructure or service should also 
pay for it. In the context of public transit, provision of or enhancements to public transit 
systems accrue accessibility-related benefits to the neighboring properties. These benefits 
are positively capitalized into higher land values. Since the properties benefit from the 
public transit systems, they should contribute toward funding the systems.2
The increased land value can be captured through various mechanisms, including 
increased property tax revenues, the sale or joint development of public land in proximity 
to the transit system, lease or sale of air rights above transit stations, levy of special 
assessments, imposition of public transit impact fees, land-value taxation, and capture of 
property tax increments through TIF. 
Any of these VC mechanisms could potentially be used to fund transit. However, the actual 
use of one or a combination of them depends upon factors such as:
• The enabling environment: Does state-level enabling legislation allow the use of TIF 
for public transportation?
• Stakeholder support: Would the local developer community oppose transit impact 
fees? 
• Institutional capacity: Does the local government have the financial, administrative, 
and technical capacity to undertake joint development?
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• Revenue yield: Would transit impact fees yield adequate revenues, or would joint 
development be a better option? Could both be used?
• Horizontal and vertical equity: Would impact fees reduce vertical equity by increasing 
housing prices? Do the properties that pay special assessment fees benefit from 
the infrastructure funded through the fees in proportion to the fees paid? In other 
words, is the special assessment horizontally equitable? The beneficiary-to-pay 
(BTP) principle operationalizes the horizontal-equity rule in public finance. The 
underlying principle behind the popularity of user fees, impact fees, TIF, and special 
assessments, BTP calls for those benefiting from a public infrastructure or service 
to pay for it in proportion to the benefit derived. Operationalized through the ability-
to-pay principle, vertical equity has its roots in welfare economics. In public finance, 
the vertical-equity rule calls for the rich to pay more than the poor for government-
provided goods and services.  
• The chances of voter approval for any new tax.
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
While the literature has extensively demonstrated the impacts of transit investments on 
property value and has empirically simulated the potential magnitude of VC revenues 
for financing transit facilities, very little research documents and analyzes project-specific 
application of VC mechanisms. In fact, Smith and Gehring note that “it is now time for 
transit/land-use research to move from hypothesis testing to practical applications of value 
capture” (emphasis added).3 
The recent step in this direction was taken in 2009, when a study at the Center for 
Transportation Studies, University of Minnesota, reviewed the suitability of several VC 
mechanisms for that state.4 While it described the VC mechanisms in great detail and 
assessed their suitability at the macro level, the study did not include in-depth feasibility 
analysis of individual-project-level VC mechanisms. For example, practitioners who would 
like to know whether a state allows the use of a SAD to fund public transportation would 
also be interested in details such as:
• The studies conducted prior to the SAD formation 
• The stakeholders who supported SAD, those who opposed it, and how the local 
government addressed stakeholder concerns
• The proportion of project cost funded by the SAD
• The horizontal- and vertical-equity considerations addressed in the design and 
implementation of the SAD assessment calculation methodology 
This study provides such details for 14 case studies of VC mechanisms in practice.
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY
Objective
Our overall research objective is to assist practitioners in gauging the legal, financial, and 
administrative suitability of VC mechanisms for meeting project-specific requirements. To 
meet this objective, the study identifies and analyzes applications of five mechanisms and 
develops a decision-support framework to ascertain their suitability.
Methodology
Our methodology consisted of four steps. First, five VC mechanisms were chosen for study. 
Then, transit systems in which each mechanism is used were selected and analyzed. Finally, 
findings of the case analyses were documented, and a decision-support framework (DSF) 
was developed. The DSF systematically assesses each VC mechanism’s performance on 
a set of decision criteria that local governments and transit agencies should consider prior 
to employing that mechanism. 
A few cases use multiple mechanisms. For example, both TIF and joint development are 
used to fund Contra Costa Centre Transit Village in Contra Costa County, CA. 
For each case, the state- and local-level VC environment is analyzed, focusing on the 
legal and policy framework enabling use of the VC mechanism. The local government’s 
institutional capacity to design and administer the VC mechanism is then examined. This is 
followed by investigation into the stakeholder support for or opposition to the mechanism. 
Each case also examines the VC mechanism’s impact on horizontal and vertical equity. 
Wherever possible, ways to address equity concerns are recommended.
Finally, the project-specific economic environment is analyzed by examining the impact of 
local real estate and economic conditions prevalent at the time of the VC mechanisms’ use. 
For each case, the revenue generated by the mechanism is documented, and comments 
on the revenue stream’s stability and growth are presented.
VALUE CAPTURE MECHANISMS AND FINDINGS FROM CASE ANALYSES
Impact Fees 
Impact fees are a type of development exaction. A development exaction requires real 
estate developers to contribute public facilities, infrastructure, and/or services, either 
financially or in-kind (for example, through land donation).5 The term impact fee is used 
specifically to describe financial exaction.6 
Our review of the use of impact fees for transit nationally and our analyses of four cases (San 
Francisco Transit Impact Development Fee, San Francisco, CA; Portland Transportation 
System Development Charges, Portland, OR; Aventura Transportation Impact Mitigation 
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Fee, Aventura, FL; and Broward County Transportation Concurrency Fee, Broward County, 
FL) find the following: 
• Only a few states allow transit impact fees. State- and local-level enabling legislation 
are critical for their use. 
• Significant institutional capacity is required to design, implement, and charge impact 
fees. A robust nexus study helps defend the fees from legal challenges. 
• In the four cases, the local governments faced moderate opposition to impact fees, 
primarily from the developer community. 
• Impact fees met a low to moderate proportion of the transit funding needs, often not 
exceeding 25 percent.
• The impact-fee revenues displayed low to moderate stability. Jurisdictions with 
consistently strong real estate markets and ample green-field or in-fill development 
opportunities are likely to see strong revenue growth and low revenue volatility.
• Impact fees have low to moderate impact on horizontal and vertical equity.
Tax Increment Financing
TIF is implemented by creating a geographic district administered by a TIF authority, 
usually a redevelopment agency.7 After the district is created, the assessed property value 
is frozen for a period of time, usually from 10 to 25 years.8 As new funds are invested, the 
property values in the district increase, and so do the property tax revenues. The property-
tax increment (new property tax minus the property tax on the frozen property values) is 
diverted to the TIF authority rather than to the agencies that would normally receive it, e.g., 
the city, the county, and school districts. The tax increment is reinvested in the TIF district.
Our review of TIF use for transit nationally and our analyses of four projects developed 
using TIF funds (Contra Costa Centre Transit Village, Contra Costa County, CA; Wilson 
Yard Station, Chicago, IL; Cedar Rapids Ground Transportation Center, Cedar Rapids, IA; 
and Portland Streetcar, Portland, OR) find the following:
• All the states except Arizona have state-level TIF-enabling legislation.9 TIF is most 
commonly used to revitalize blighted urban areas. However, the condition of blight 
is interpreted more liberally in some states than in others. Vermont, with the most 
liberal legislation, allows TIF to be used for development, job creation, or even 
simply to increase tax revenue. 
• State-level TIF-enabling legislation should be closely examined to ascertain whether 
it lists specific uses for TIF funds and/or whether it lists uses barred from TIF funding. 
If such lists exist, it is important to ascertain whether transit is permissible or barred. 
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• Significant institutional capacity is required to plan, create, and manage a TIF district. 
Institutional capacity may also be required to garner the support of the community 
and other public agencies at the time of the district formation.  
• In the four cases, local governments faced low to moderate stakeholder opposition 
to TIF, generally from residents and other public agencies.
• TIF funded a moderate proportion—one-sixth to one-half—of transit project costs. 
• TIF revenues displayed a moderate to high degree of stability. TIF revenues depend 
on property-tax increases. In turn, tax increases are impacted by real estate market 
conditions, the intensity of redevelopment of the TIF district, and the effectiveness 
of the redevelopment projects in improving the quality of the district.
• The potential for horizontal inequity is low, as TIF revenues are spent on projects 
that benefit the property owners within the district.
• The use of TIF for transit enhances vertical equity to the extent that lower-income 
persons are more likely to use public transit than higher-income persons. 
Special Assessment Districts
SADs are a subset of special districts that charge property owners mandatory fees, called 
assessments, in exchange for the benefits provided to them.10  
Our review of the use of SADs for transit nationally and our analyses of four projects 
developed using SAD funds (Seattle Streetcar, Seattle, WA; Portland Streetcar, Portland, 
OR; Los Angeles Red Line Segment 1, Los Angeles, CA; and New York Avenue Metro 
Station, Washington, DC) find the following:
• A robust legal enabling environment is required for SAD formation. Usually state-
level enabling legislation and a local SAD authorizing ordinance constitute the legal 
environment. 
• While the institutional capacity required to form and manage SADs may not be 
as great as that required for TIF, it is still substantial. Furthermore, significant 
institutional capacity may be required to garner community support at the time of 
SAD formation. 
• Several states require the vote of the majority of property owners for SAD formation. 
Therefore, local governments considering a SAD as a transit funding source must 
examine their state and local legislation for the majority-vote requirement. If such a 
vote is required, the local government can decide (a) to not use a SAD in a largely 
residential neighborhood, (b) to conduct extensive community outreach to gauge the 
popular resident sentiment toward the SAD, or (c) to exempt residential properties 
from assessments. However, equity considerations and project funding needs 
should be considered when deciding to exempt properties from assessments. 
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• In the four cases, the SADs generated large sums of revenue for bus or light-rail 
transit systems. However, the revenues funded a small proportion of a higher-cost 
heavy-rail project, Los Angeles Red Line Segment 1.
• SAD revenues are highly stable. Usually fixed at the time of SAD formation, the 
assessments are collected either up front or annually. 
• Ideally, all properties that benefit from the transit infrastructure should pay 
assessments. Furthermore, the benefit should be estimated for each property 
separately, and the assessment should be directly proportional to the benefit. Less-
sophisticated methodologies leave room for horizontal inequities.
• The potential for vertical inequity is low to moderate. Users with low ability to pay 
(such as low-income households) are often exempt from paying assessments. 
Smaller properties are also often exempt. This exemption enhances vertical equity 
to the extent that the owners of smaller properties have lower ability to pay than the 
owners of larger properties. Furthermore, property owners may have the option to 
pay assessments over time and at a reasonable interest rate. The interest rate is 
often equal to the rate of interest paid by local governments on long-term borrowing. 
Joint Development and Air Rights 
A joint development involves cooperation between private and public entities—for example, 
a real estate developer and a transit agency or local government—to develop a project. 
Rights to build over an existing structure, such as a transit stop, are called air rights.
Our review of joint development and air rights to fund transit nationally and our analyses 
of five projects (Bethesda Metro joint development, Bethesda, MD; Dadeland South joint 
development, Miami, FL; Contra Costa Centre Transit Village, Contra Costa County, CA; 
Cedar Rapids Ground Transportation Center, Cedar Rapids, IA; and Resurgens Plaza, 
Atlanta, GA) find the following:
• While state- or local-level enabling legislation may not be required for undertaking 
joint development, a clear policy framework is helpful. At a minimum, a disposition 
and development agreement (DDA) forms the legal basis for a joint development.
• Significant local government/transit agency institutional capacity is required to 
conceptualize, plan, develop, and manage joint developments. Expertise in project 
finance and real estate development is critical for negotiating joint development 
terms, especially the lease structure. 
• Our five case studies faced low to moderate stakeholder opposition, most of it from 
neighborhood residents who feared increased traffic congestion, air/noise pollution, 
and changes to the character of the neighborhood. 
• The case study projects’ revenue yield varied widely, ranging from a high of several 
million dollars annually to a low of few hundred thousand dollars. The developments 
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also highlight the need for careful negotiations and structuring of the lease revenue 
agreements by public agencies. Furthermore, consideration should be given to 
other objectives, such as revitalization of blighted neighborhoods and generating 
transit ridership.
• The public agency typically receives minimum guaranteed revenue (such as in 
Bethesda, Dadeland South, and Contra Costa Centre Transit Village) or receives 
a fixed revenue adjusted by the consumer price index (as in Resurgens Plaza). 
Furthermore, in two of the cases (Bethesda and Dadeland South), the transit agency 
also shares a percentage of gross revenue. The lease revenue stream depends on 
the economic conditions in such cases and hence is likely to be somewhat volatile. 
• The horizontal-equity concern for joint development projects primarily revolves 
around whether the involved parties benefit in proportion to their stake and risk 
in the development. Clear joint development policy guidelines and objectives help 
reduce the potential for horizontal inequities.
• Since joint development is the result of a voluntary agreement between a public 
agency and a private developer, these entities are likely to enter only into a vertically 
equitable agreement.
CONCLUSION
The performance of the five VC mechanisms in our case studies is evaluated based on the 
criteria that transit providers should consider when designing and implementing a funding 
mechanism: the enabling legal environment, stakeholder support, institutional capacity, 
revenue yield, revenue stability, and equity. Using these criteria, we develop a decision-
support matrix that should help policymakers, local governments, and transit agencies 
assess the suitability of these mechanisms.
Key findings that should benefit those planning to use these VC mechanisms include the 
following:
• TIF and SADs are the mechanisms likely to yield the highest revenue. 
• Local governments may use a combination of VC mechanisms. For example, TIF and 
SADs fund the Portland, OR, Central Streetcar Project. TIF and joint development 
fund Contra Costa Centre Transit Village in Contra Costa County, CA, and the 
Ground Transportation Center in Cedar Rapids, IA.
• The use of TIF requires significant institutional capacity, community support, and 
agreement among taxing agencies. 
• The use of transit impact fees is rare. It benefits from state- and local-level enabling 
legislation, robust nexus studies, a strong real estate market, and developer support. 
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• Transit impact fees and SADs must be carefully designed and implemented to 
minimize inequities. 
• Strong real estate markets, significant institutional capacity, and clear policy 
guidelines are needed to undertake joint development.
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NEED FOR VALUE CAPTURE MECHANISMS TO FUND TRANSIT
The federal government, through various transportation acts, such as the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century 
(TEA-21), and, more recently, the Safe, Affordable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity 
Act–A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), has reinforced the need for integration of land 
use and transportation and the provision of public transit. Other federal programs, such as 
the Livable Communities Program and the New Starts Program, have provided additional 
impetus to public transit. At the state and regional level, the past three decades have seen 
increased provision of public transit. However, the public transit systems typically require 
significant operating and capital subsidies—75 percent of transit funding is provided by 
local and state governments.11 With all levels of governments under significant fiscal 
stress, new transit funding mechanisms are welcome. Value capture (VC) is once such 
mechanism.
WHAT IS VALUE CAPTURE? 
Simply put, VC is the identification and capture of the increase in land value resulting from 
public investment in infrastructure. Normatively, VC is based upon the “benefits received” 
principle—i.e., those who benefit from a particular infrastructure or service should also 
pay for it. In the context of public transit, provision of or enhancements to public transit 
systems accrue accessibility-related benefits to the neighboring properties. These benefits 
are positively capitalized into higher land values. Since the properties benefit from the 
public transit systems, they should contribute toward funding the systems.12
The increased land value can be captured through various mechanisms, including 
increased property-tax revenues, the sale or joint development of public land in proximity 
to the transit system, lease or sale of air rights above transit stations, levy of special 
assessments, imposition of public transit impact fees, land-value taxation, and capture of 
property-tax increments through tax increment financing (TIF). 
Any one of these VC mechanisms could potentially be used to fund transit. However, the 
actual use of one or a combination of them depends on several factors such as:
• The enabling environment: Does the state-level enabling legislation allow the use of 
TIF for public transportation?
• Stakeholder support: Would the local developer community oppose transit impact 
fees?
• Institutional capacity: Does the local government have the financial, administrative, 
and technical capacity to undertake joint development? 
• Revenue yield: Would transit impact fees yield adequate revenues, or would joint 
development be a better option? Could both be used?
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• Horizontal and vertical equity: Would impact fees reduce vertical equity by increasing 
housing prices? Do the properties that pay special assessment fees benefit from 
the infrastructure funded through the fees in proportion to the fees paid? In other 
words, is the special assessment fee horizontally equitable? The beneficiary-to-
pay (BTP) principle operationalizes the horizontal-equity rule in public finance. 
The underlying principle behind the popularity of user fees, impact fees, TIF, and 
special assessments, BTP calls for those benefiting from a public infrastructure or 
service to pay for it in proportion to the benefit derived. Operationalized through the 
ability-to-pay (ATP) principle, vertical equity has its roots in welfare economics. In 
public finance, the vertical-equity rule calls for the rich to pay more than the poor for 
government-provided goods and services. 
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
While the literature has extensively demonstrated the impacts of transit investments on 
property value13 and has empirically simulated the potential magnitude of VC revenues for 
financing transit facilities,14 very little research documents and analyzes project-specific 
application of VC mechanisms. In fact, Smith and Gehring (p. 751) note that “it is now time 
for transit/land-use research to move from hypothesis testing to practical applications of 
value capture”15 (emphasis added).
A recent step in this direction was taken in 2009, when a study at the Center for 
Transportation Studies, University of Minnesota, reviewed the suitability of several VC 
mechanisms for that state.16 While it described the VC mechanisms in great detail and 
assessed their suitability at the macro level, the study did not include in-depth feasibility 
analysis of individual-project-level VC mechanisms. For example, practitioners who would 
like to know whether a state allows use of a special assessment district (SAD) to fund 
public transportation would also be interested in details such as:
• The technical and financial feasibility studies conducted prior to the SAD formation 
• The stakeholders who supported the SAD, those who opposed it, and how the local 
government addressed stakeholder concerns
• The proportion of project cost funded by the SAD
• The horizontal- and vertical-equity considerations addressed in the design and 
implementation of the SAD assessment calculation methodology
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY
Objective
Our overall research objective is to assist practitioners in gauging the technical, financial, 
and administrative suitability of VC mechanisms for meeting project-specific requirements. 
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To meet this objective, the study identifies and analyzes applications of five mechanisms 
and develops a decision-support framework to ascertain their suitability.
This research should serve as a reference guide for practitioners who can review the 
project-specific analyses and the attendant decision-support framework (DSF) to assist in 
choosing the VC mechanism that would best suit their needs. 
Methodology
Our methodology consisted of four steps. First, five VC mechanisms were chosen for 
study. Then, transit systems in which each mechanism is used were selected for in-
depth analysis. Finally, findings of the case analyses were documented, and a DSF was 
developed. The DSF systematically assesses each VC mechanism’s performance on a 
set of decision criteria that local governments and transit agencies should consider prior to 
employing that mechanism. 
A review of literature indicates the existence of six major VC mechanisms:
• sale or joint development of public land that is in proximity to a transit system
• lease or sale of air rights above transit stations 
• SADs
• transit impact fees
• TIF
• land value taxation (LVT)
LVT is employed primarily by a few cities in Pennsylvania. Given this limited use, the study 
focuses on the first five mechanisms.
Next, we identified cases of the use of each VC mechanism for in-depth study. The criteria 
for choosing the cases are detailed in the sections of the report that provide overviews of 
these mechanisms. However, in general, the following criteria were applied:
• The mechanism must be used to directly fund transit infrastructure (as opposed to 
funding only transit-oriented developments)
• The mechanism must already be in use (as opposed merely being considered for 
use by local governments)
• Sufficient data must be available
• The cases must be recent, insofar as possible
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• The mechanisms must generate significant revenues
The cases are listed in Table 1. A few cases use multiple mechanisms. For example, both 
TIF and joint development are used to fund Contra Costa Centre (CCC) Transit Village in 
Contra Costa County, CA. A total of 14 cases are examined. 
Table 1. List of Cases and VC Mechanisms Used
Case
Land VC Mechanism Used
Impact 
Fee SAD TIF
Joint 
Development Air Rights
Transit impact development fee, San Francisco, CA x
Transportation mitigation impact fee, Aventura, FL x
Transportation system development charges, Portland, OR x
Transit concurrency fee, Broward County, FL x
South Lake Union streetcar, Seattle, WA x
Metro Red Line benefit assessment district, Los Angeles, CA x
New York Avenue Metro Station, Washington DC x
Contra Costa Center Transit Village, Pleasant Hill, CA x x
Central Streetcar Project, Portland, OR x x
Wilson Station, Chicago, IL x
Ground Transportation Center, Cedar Rapids, IA x x x
Bethesda Metro joint development, Bethesda, MD x x
Dadeland South joint development, Miami, FL x x
Resurgens Plaza, Atlanta, GA x
 
For each case, the state- and the local-level VC environment is analyzed, focusing on the 
legal and policy framework enabling use of the VC mechanism. The local government’s 
institutional capacity to design and administer the mechanism is then examined. This is 
followed by investigation into the stakeholder support for or opposition to each mechanism. 
Each case also examines the VC mechanism’s impact on horizontal and vertical equity. 
Wherever possible, ways to address equity concerns are recommended.
Finally, the project-specific economic environment is analyzed by examining the impact 
of local real estate and economic conditions prevalent at the time of the mechanisms’ 
use and by identifying factors that might have limited or expanded the local governments’ 
options while designing, developing, adopting, and administering the mechanisms. For 
each case, the revenue generated by the mechanism is documented, and comments on 
the revenue stream’s stability and growth are presented.
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REPORT STRUCTURE
The report is organized into chapters describing each of the VC mechanisms and case 
studies of their use, and a concluding chapter synthesizes the study findings and develops 
a decision-support framework.
Overviews introduce the mechanisms, discuss their use nationally (especially to fund public 
transportation), outline the major considerations for using them to fund public transit, and 
describe the case selection process. 
The case studies of specific projects (or in the case of impact fees, specific jurisdictions) 
illustrate the actual use of the mechanisms and also discuss various aspects of each, 
including the enabling legal environment, stakeholder support, horizontal- and vertical-
equity considerations, and revenue yield, stability, and growth.
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OVERVIEW 
Over the past several decades, the cost of providing new infrastructure and services has 
outpaced the available federal, state, and local funds.17 Many local governments have 
employed innovative financing tools, such as impact fees, to close this gap.18 
An impact fee is a type of development exaction. A development exaction requires real 
estate developers to contribute public facilities, infrastructure, and/or services either 
financially or in-kind (for example, through land donation).19 The term impact fee is used 
specifically to describe financial exactions. 20 
Standardized rather than negotiated,21 an impact fee is charged to recoup the capital costs 
of providing services and infrastructure.22 The fee has various names depending upon 
its purpose; for example, it may be called a “capacity fee,” a “facility fee,” an “impact 
development fee,” or a “utility connection fee.” However, the basic principle behind all types 
of impact fees is the same—the developer pays money to the local government for and 
prior to the development of infrastructure and services that will serve a new development. 
What Are Impact Fees Used For?
Impact fees are used to fund a wide variety of public infrastructure and services. Projects 
providing potable water and sanitary sewer facilities are the most common uses of impact 
fees, followed by transportation projects, such as roads and highways.23 Impact fees are 
also used to fund libraries, parks, schools, police and fire facilities, and emergency medical 
facilities.24
How Widespread is the Use of Impact Fees Nationally?
Several nationwide trends over the past several decades have contributed to the increasing 
use of impact fees: the rapid rise in inflation beginning in the 1970s and early 1980s, which 
diminished the effectiveness of fixed-base taxes, such as the motor fuel tax, for funding 
transport infrastructure; the reduction in federal funds for infrastructure that began in the 
early 1980s; and property owners’ opposition to property taxes.25 In addition, Americans 
have come to expect a level of service that is higher than ever before, raising the cost of 
providing services.  
These changes have shifted the fiscal burden of providing infrastructure away from the 
federal and state governments to local governments.26 As a result, alternative funding 
mechanisms, such as impact fees, have become popular. 
Impact fees are found in all 50 states.27 Their use is not evenly distributed, however. They 
are used most heavily in the South and West and less commonly in the Northeast and 
Midwest.28 State-level enabling legislation is not a prerequisite for charging impact fees. In 
fact, only half of the states have passed such legislation.  
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How Widespread are Transit Impact Fees?
While the use of impact fees is common for automobile-related transportation projects 
such as roads, highways, and bridges, such fees are not commonly used for public 
transportation.29 At least 14 states prohibit transit impact fees (see Appendix A), while 20 
states have adopted legislation explicitly allowing them.30 
There are few instances of the actual use of transit impact fees. A 2008 study31 noted 
two main reasons for their infrequent use. First, some state laws limit the use of impact 
fees to the funding of capital expenditures and prohibit their use for operations. Grants 
from the Federal Transit Administration may fund up to eighty percent of transit capital 
expenditures. Therefore, transit agencies often see little use for impact fees. Second, the 
entity responsible for charging impact fees is often separate from the entity providing the 
transit.32 While impact fees are collected by the municipal government or county as part of 
the permitting or zoning approval process, many transit investments fall under the purview 
of a separate authority run by a state or local agency. This organizational separation of 
powers can complicate the appropriation of impact fees funds for transit.33 Furthermore, 
close coordination is required between the municipal government and the transit agency 
to charge impact fees, and such coordination is rare.34  
Legal Framework for Charging Impact Fees
From a legal standpoint, an impact fee is not a tax.35  Furthermore, while local jurisdictions 
may not have the power to tax without voter consent,36 they have broad power to protect 
public health, safety, and welfare under the “police power.” Hence, they have relied on 
their police power to legally justify the use of impact fees. 37
Characterizing an impact fee as a fee rather than a tax requires that the service for which 
the developer pays the fee have a direct relationship to the development. In legal terms, 
a fee must have a “rational nexus” and “rough proportionality” to the use for which it is 
assessed.38 Two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, popularly known as Nolan and 
Dolan, held that exactions (of which impact fees are a special case) must be related to the 
land development (the “nexus” requirement) and that there must be “rough proportionality” 
between the exaction and the land-development impacts.39 
Major Considerations for Use of Impact Fees
Political Acceptability 
Impact fees may not always be politically feasible. For example, jurisdictions with low or 
negative population growth may view impact fees as obstacles to growth, because they 
increase land-development costs.40 However, rapidly growing jurisdictions may increase 
existing fee rates or charge new fees to provide new growth-serving infrastructure and 
services without increasing the existing property owners’ tax burden. 41  
Critics have also questioned the constitutionality of impact fees, especially where state-
level enabling statutes do not exist. They claim that charging an impact fee is an abuse of 
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local governments’ police power42 and that impact fees are discriminatory, violate equal-
protection principles, and infringe on property rights.43
Real Estate Market Conditions and Growth Rate 
Impact fees are suitable for rapidly growing jurisdictions with strong real estate demand.44 
In such jurisdictions, the demands for public services and infrastructure may outstrip the 
local government’s fiscal capacity.45 Impact fees can facilitate growth by providing an 
additional revenue source for local governments.46 
Jurisdictions in some states have relaxed or halted the imposition of fees as an incentive 
to developers to restart the real estate market in the current tough economic environment. 
Institutional Capacity 
Impact-fee-enabling legislation varies considerably among states. Many states lack clear 
guidance regarding the uses eligible for impact-fee funding,47 and courts have struck down 
many local impact-fee ordinances, holding jurisdictions responsible for refunding them.48 
Impact fees can thus be risky for local governments in the absence of clear state legislation. 
Furthermore, the fees may require significant administrative and technical expertise to 
institute and manage.49 
Equity Considerations 
Impact fees are widely used for single-family residential development, and several studies 
have found that they increase housing prices.50 In King County, WA, impact fees were 
shown to raise the price of new housing by 166 percent of the amount of the fees. They 
were found to raise the price of existing housing by 60 percent in Miami-Dade County, 
FL.51 In California, where the fees are the highest in the nation, a 2008 study found that 
the average non-utility impact fee per single-family home was $19,536, significantly higher 
than the nationwide average of $11,276.52 
Pointing out impact fees’ negative impact on horizontal equity, critics note that the fees can 
disproportionately affect certain land uses and types of development.53 For example, in 
one jurisdiction, the school impact fee per apartment was the same as the fee per single-
family home, even though the apartments housed far fewer school-going children.54 
Furthermore, in some cases, the criteria for determining impact fees may be horizontally 
inequitable.55 For example, many jurisdictions charge a park impact fee per dwelling unit, 
even though smaller homes have lower values and tend to house fewer people than larger 
homes. This tends to put a greater burden on smaller homes. To the extent that lower-
income households own smaller homes, impact fees also worsen vertical inequity.56
Finally, impact fees are often charged without adequate consideration of the ripple 
effects of the development that pays them. For example, a new office development 
may be charged an impact fee. The development may lead to an influx of construction 
workers and eventually of people who will work in the office buildings. In the absence of 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
18 Impact Fees
an adequate housing supply, impact-fees-enabled rapid office growth can create a job-
housing mismatch, requiring workers to live far from their jobs.57 Courts have allowed the 
use of impact fees to pay for attendant housing needs and other “soft” services under the 
“rational nexus” principle,58 which calls for use of the fee to mitigate the impacts caused by 
the fee-paying developments.
Case Study Selection Process
As mentioned earlier, impact fees are widely used to fund automobile-related transportation 
projects, but there are few instances of transit impact fees. This paucity of cases made 
the case study selection process rather simple. Recent research documents five major 
instances of transit impact fees (or variants of them): Portland, OR (transportation system 
development charge), Broward County, FL (concurrency fee), Aventura, FL (transportation 
mitigation impact fee), San Francisco, CA (transportation impact development fee), and 
Seattle, WA (transportation-mitigation payment).59 Seattle’s program is voluntary, and thus 
it is furthest removed from a traditional impact fee. Hence, we selected the remaining four 
examples as transit-impact-fee case studies.  
At this time it is important to make a distinction between impact fees, SADs, and TIF. 
Although all three charge the user directly, they are implemented quite differently. While 
impact fees are charged only to new growth, SADs can be formed for existing areas (not 
limited to new development) based on the benefit the areas’ property owners receive from 
a new investment (for example, a road-widening project). Furthermore, while impact fees 
are levied once, usually during the permitting process, SADs may charge fees more than 
once, such as annually. TIF is similar to both impact fees and SADs in that a particular 
benefit area is defined. However, TIF money is collected through traditional property-tax 
system, rather than as a fee.   
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CHARGE, PORTLAND, OR
Overview 
Portland’s transportation system development charge (TSDC) is levied on new 
developments and on property-use changes.60 The fee helps mitigate the transportation 
impacts of new developments or property use by augmenting the transportation-system 
capacity.61 The fee is due at the time a building permit is issued.62
The TSDC is used to fund a variety of transportation projects, including transit projects.63 
Unlike San Francisco’s transit improvement development fee and Aventura’s transportation 
mitigation impact fee, the TSDC may be used only for capital expenditures, not for ongoing 
operation and maintenance expenses.64 The city is required to spend TSDC revenues 
within ten years.65
TSDC Time Line
Several small cities in Oregon and other states began charging transportation impact fees 
in the 1990s. This trend led Portland to follow suit.66 While other cities charge the fees for 
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roads, Portland is probably the first city in the country to charge a multimodal fee.67 The city 
built public support for the TSDC by including residents and business leaders in the early 
stages of fee development. Stakeholder interviews were conducted, and business leaders 
and interest-group representatives were appointed to the Policy Advisory Committee. The 
city also held community meetings to explain the TSDC, answer questions, and address 
residents’ concerns.68 The Policy Advisory Committee was committed to equity with regard 
to funding multiple transportation modes and to ensuring that all areas within the city would 
benefit from the charges.69 The fee was implemented in 1997.70 
Organizations Involved in Approving the Fee and its Revisions
The TSDC is one of four system-development charges (SDCs)—transportation, water and 
sewer, drainage, and parks and recreation—levied by the city.71 The Portland Bureau of 
Development Services assesses the fee at the time a building permit is granted. The 
rates charged for all SDCs must be approved by the City Council. Fee revenues are 
used by four city bureaus—Environmental Services, Parks and Recreation, Water, and 
Transportation—to fund projects under their purview.72 
Revenues collected from the TSDC are placed in an SDC account and are used only 
for qualified projects that are in the city’s Capital Improvement Plan (CIP). The Portland 
Bureau of Transportation (PBOT) uses TSDC funds to finance transportation projects 
included in the CIP.73 
What are the Current Charges?
The current TSDC rate varies by development type and also by the number of dwelling 
units (or beds for nursing homes), the square feet of floor area, the number of rooms for 
hotels, and such other criteria. The rate list and the units of measure are shown in Table 2.74
Table 2. Portland’s Citywide TSDC Rates: July 10, 2010 - June 30, 2011
Type of Development Unit of Measure TSDC Per Unit ($)
Residential
Single family (1 to 3 units) Dwelling                                     2,566 
Multifamily (4 or more units) Dwelling                                     1,836 
Senior housing Dwelling                                        890 
Accessory dwelling unit Dwelling                                     1,284 
Rowhouse/townhouse/condo Dwelling                                     1,604 
Nursing home Dwelling                                        540 
Congregate care/assisted living Dwelling                                        461 
Commercial-services
Bank sq. ft./GFA                                     22.21 
Day care student                                        227 
Library sq. ft./GFA                                       8.24 
Post office sq. ft./GFA                                     15.86 
Hotel/motel room                                     2,355 
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Service station/gasoline sales                       VFP 13,182
Movie theater screen  28,635
Carwash wash stall  13,442
Health club sq. ft./GFA      7.48
Marina                       acre      671 
Commercial-institutional
School, K-12 student     265 
University/college student     530 
Church sq. ft./GFA    2.39 
Hospital sq. ft./GFA    4.61 
Park acre     444 
Commercial-restaurant
Restaurant sq. ft./GFA   17.81 
Quick-service restaurant (drive-through) sq. ft./GFA   41.20 
Commercial-retail
Miscellaneous retail sq. ft./GFA     4.33 
Shopping center sq. ft./GFA     5.45 
Supermarket sq. ft./GFA   12.99 
Convenience market sq. ft./GFA   46.33 
Free-standing discount store sq. ft./GFA     8.48 
Car sales new/used sq. ft./GFA     8.33 
Commercial-office
Administrative office sq. ft./GFA     3.30 
Medical office/clinic sq. ft./GFA     8.69 
Industrial
Light industrial/manufacturing sq. ft./GFA     2.08 
Warehousing/storage sq. ft./GFA     1.07 
Self-storage sq. ft./GFA     0.79 
Truck terminal acre 27,244 
Source: Portland Bureau of Transportation, http://www.portlandonline.com/transportation/index.
cfm?c=46210&a=386073 (accessed April 4, 2011).  
TSDC-Funded Projects 
Oregon’s SDC legislation and Portland’s laws require that SDCs be used only for projects 
that are included in a CIP and that “increase the capacity of the city’s transportation 
system.”75 The following purposes are listed in the TSDC Code as eligible uses for TSDC 
funds:
• project development, design, and construction plan preparation
• permitting
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• right-of-way acquisition, including any costs of acquisition or condemnation
• construction of new through lanes for vehicular, transit, or bicycle use
• construction of turn lanes
• construction of bridges
• construction of drainage and storm water treatment facilities in conjunction with new 
roadway construction
• purchase and installation of traffic signs and signals
• construction of curbs, medians, and shoulders
• relocating utilities to accommodate new roadway construction
• construction management and inspection
• surveying and soils and material testing
• construction of accessways, bicycle facilities, pedestrian connections, and walkways
• landscaping
• bus pullouts, transit shelters, fixed-rail transit systems and appurtenances
• demolition that is part of the construction of any of the improvements on this list
• payment of principal and interest, necessary reserves, and costs of issuance under 
any bonds or other indebtedness issued by the city to provide money to construct or 
acquire transportation facilities
• direct costs of complying with the provisions of ORS [Oregon Revised Statutes] 
223.297 to 223.314, including the costs of developing system development charges 
methodologies and providing an annual accounting of system development charges 
expenditures76
The following uses are not permitted:
• any expenditure that would be classified as a maintenance or repair expense
• costs associated with the construction of administrative office facilities that are more 
than an incidental part of other capital improvements
• costs associated with acquisition or maintenance of rolling stock77
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Revenue Raised from the TSDC
Gross revenues of more than $66 million have been raised since the TSDC’s inception in 
1997. Annual revenues reached a maximum of a little over $9 million in 2006–2007 (just 
before the economic recession) before falling to $2.5 million in 2009–2010. See Table 3 
for the annual revenue yield.
Table 3. Annual Gross TSDC Revenues, 1997–2010 
Fiscal Year Annual Gross TSDC Revenues ($)
Original 10-year rate study and project list
1997–1999 5,263,262
1999–2000 3,870,427
2000–2001 4,892,759
2001–2002 4,395,590
2002–2003 5,197,901
2003–2004 5,284,517
2004–2005 5,052,866
2005–2006 6,209,059
2006–2007 9,582,352
2007–2008 5,661,570
Renewed 10-year rate study and project list
2007–2008 2,542,883
2008–2009 5,690,991
2009–2010 2,537,101
Total Gross revenue 1997-2010 66,181,278
 
Source: Katherine Levine, Project Controls Manager, email communication, February 18, 2011.
Between 1999 and 2007, a total of 37 transportation projects were partially funded by 
the TSDC. (The projects are listed in Appendix B.78) About 25 percent of the cost of the 
projects on the current CIP list is expected to be funded by the TSDC,79 along with 100 
percent of cost attributed to new growth.80 TSDC funds have also been used to leverage 
federal, state, and other funding.81  
The TSDC is not the main funding source for Portland’s public-transportation capital 
expenditures. Rather, it is used to fill the gaps that remain after securing funds from the 
federal and state governments and from the assessment districts.82 For example, the TSDC 
funded only about 4 percent of the Eastside Portland Streetcar Loop Project (funding 
sources for the project are listed in Table 4). Similarly, the TSDC funded a little more than 
3.5 percent, or $2 million, of the $55 million Central City Streetcar Project.83 The proportion 
of funding for the city’s light-rail projects has also been small, with a little more than 3.5 
percent, or $55 million, earmarked for the $1.49 billion projects.84 
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Table 4. Funding Sources for Eastside Portland Streetcar Loop Extension
Funding Source Amount of Funding ($ millions)
Federal Transit Administration 75.00 
Local improvement district 15.50 
Portland Development Commission 27.68 
Regional funds 3.62 
SDC/other city funds 6.11 
Stimulus funds 0.36 
Total federal project 128.27 
Vehicles from state of Oregon 20.00 
Total project cost 148.27 
 
Source: The Portland Streetcar Loop: Facts at a Glance, http://www.portlandstreetcar.org/pdf/loop_fact_sheet_and_
map_201005.pdf (accessed August 4, 2011).
Who Pays the Fee?
Application of the TSDC is simple. The fee is charged on all new developments and 
property-use changes within the city, with a few exceptions, including affordable residential 
housing developments, which are exempted to facilitate the availability of affordable 
housing. However, the housing developments must meet the following criteria to qualify 
for exemption:85
For affordable rental projects:
• Developments must serve households earning at or below 60 percent of the median 
family income (MFI) adjusted for household size with a maximum debt burden of 30 
percent for a 60-year period.
• If a proposed rental housing development has units that do not meet the above 
requirements or include a commercial component, the actual exemptions will be 
prorated as applicable to the residential portion of the development subject to the 
affordable-housing restrictions.
For affordable homeownership projects:
• Developments must serve households at or below 100 percent of the MFI for a 
family of four—$71,200 in 2011 and adjusted annually. This limit is adjusted upward 
for households of more than four people.
• Units must sell for less than the price cap provided by City Code, Section 3.102.090 
D—currently $275,000. 
• Units must sell to homebuyers who will occupy the homes as the initial occupants. 
Properties receiving homeownership exemptions may not be rented.
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Other exemptions include the following:
• Temporary uses, which are fully exempt as long as the use or structure proposed 
in the new development is not used more than 180 days in a single calendar year.
• New development that will not generate more than 15 percent more vehicle trips 
than the previous use.
An exemption for transit-oriented development was phased out at the end of 2010 and is 
no longer on the list of exempted land uses.86
How is the Fee Calculated? 
Three transportation modes are considered in TSDC calculations: motorized, transit, and 
non-motorized.87 The TSDC rate for each transportation mode is based on (1) the cost 
per trip—the amount of money the city needs to expend over the next 10 years to build 
transportation-system capacity to accommodate the new-growth-related trips—and (2) the 
number of trips generated by the new development—the projected amount of growth in 
households and employment over the next 10 years.88  
To determine the fee for each project, the TSDC rate is multiplied by the number of trips 
a proposed land use generates, based on nationally compiled statistics from the Institute 
of Transportation Engineers’ Trip Generation 7th Edition.89  The trip-generation rates for 
the existing and proposed uses are added together. The TSDC is not charged if the use 
generated by the proposed new development is within 15 percent (above or below) of the 
previous use of the property. However, if the TSDC for the new development is more than 
115 percent of the previous property use, the applicant must pay the difference between 
the new TSDC and the previous TSDC. The applicant is eligible for reimbursement if the 
difference is less than 85 percent.90 In such cases, the applicant must formally request the 
refund within 180 days of issuance of the building permit. The refund is granted promptly 
once the request is approved.91 
Credits can be given for projects whose developer has contributed to a project that meets 
certain criteria for improving the transportation system.92 Additionally, an alternative 
methodology can be proposed if an applicant disagrees with the trip-generation rates 
proposed by the city. If the city accepts the new methodology, the revised trip-generation 
rates are applied to the project.93 
Every two years, the Bureau of Transportation reviews the amount of TSDC money 
collected and used. On the basis of this review, the city determines whether sufficient 
funds are available to finance the projects that would increase transportation capacity, and 
the rates are adjusted if needed. The new rates must be adopted by the City Council.94 
Refinements Made to the TSDC
The city has refined the TSDC a few times. For example, small neighborhood restaurants 
are a “hot button” issue in Portland.95 Because the fee tended to place a significant burden 
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on small restaurants, all restaurants with areas of less than 3,000 square feet were treated 
as retail, effectively reducing the fee rate from $17.81 per square foot of gross leasable 
area (GLA) to $4.33. Affordable-housing exemptions were also refined, placing closer 
scrutiny on the buyer and builder qualifications.96 
The addition of the North Macadam Transportation System Development Charge Overlay 
Program was another significant change. Effective in 2009,97 the Overlay Program 
allowed an additional fee to be charged in the North Macadam urban renewal area (URA). 
A former central city industrial area, the North Macadam URA is in need of substantial 
investment.98 The Overlay Program was created to address concerns that the city would 
use a disproportionately large amount of the TSDC revenues there, essentially requiring 
the entire city to pay for investments in one specific neighborhood. An additional fee was 
placed on the North Macadam URA to address this potential horizontal inequity. Funds 
from the overlay fee can be used only within the URA. Thus, the program secures needed 
investments without draining funds from the other parts of the city. 
Case Analysis 
Enabling Legal Environment 
Oregon’s impact-fee-enabling legislation is one of the key contributors to the success of 
the TSDC. The legislation clearly allows the TSDC to be used for public transportation, 
putting Portland on solid legal ground to charge the fee.
More specifically, the Oregon legislation for SDCs has a clear purpose statement of intent 
to facilitate growth. It reads, “The purpose of ORS 223.297 to 223.314 [the code on system 
development charges] is to provide a uniform framework for the imposition of system 
development charges by local governments, to provide equitable funding for orderly growth 
and development in Oregon’s communities and to establish that the charges may be used 
only for capital improvements.”99 The legislation goes on to define capital improvements, 
including public transportation, as uses eligible for SDC funds.100 
Stakeholder Support 
Community participation also played a key role in the success of the TSDC. The city 
consulted the community, businesses leaders, and interest groups while developing it, 
and this broad-based community participation incorporated and balanced the interests of a 
large variety of stakeholder groups and improved geographical and modal equity (making 
funding for each mode equitable).101 
Institutional Capacity 
On a day-to-day basis, the fee does not require additional administrative and technical 
capacity. However, significant resources were required when the fee was first implemented 
and again in 2007, when it was revised.102
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Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The TSDC design is sensitive to equity issues. Addressing vertical equity (ATP concerns), 
the fee allows exemptions for affordable housing. It not only accommodates low-income 
residents but makes exemptions for middle-income households as well. For example, a 
homeownership project qualifies for an exemption if it serves those at or below the MFI, 
which was $71,200 for a family of four in 2011.103
The fee seems to be horizontally equitable as well. It is charged throughout the city rather 
than only in specific sections. Furthermore, almost all property types pay it. The fee amount 
is reasonable—impact fees in other states, such as California, are considerably higher. 
Finally, the fee treats developers fairly. It allows for credits when the developers contribute 
to transportation-related projects.
The TSDC could be made more equitable for residential properties if it were charged on 
a per-bedroom basis rather than on a per-unit basis.  Currently, all residential units are 
charged at the same rate regardless of size or the number of residents. The fee structure 
unfairly impacts smaller homes with few residents by charging them the same rate as 
larger homes that may have many residents. 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
As discussed earlier, the revenue from the fee declined significantly in recent years 
because of the economic recession’s negative impact on real estate development. The 
decline shows that the yield and growth of TSDC revenues are dependent upon real estate 
market conditions. Furthermore, used primarily as a gap financing tool, the fee funds only 
a small portion of total project costs, although it covers all of the costs associated with new 
growth.
TRANSIT CONCURRENCY FEE, BROWARD COUNTY, FL
Overview
Florida state law requires the provision of a basic level of service and facilities “concurrent” 
with growth.104 Amendments to the law in 2011 made transportation concurrency optional; 
before that, transportation was one of the services that had to be concurrently provided in 
order for municipalities or counties to approve new development.105,106 Cities and counties 
in Florida must now adopt comprehensive plans that comply with the state law.
Broward County charges a transit concurrency fee to mitigate the impact of new 
developments on its transit system. Most of the county roads are built out, and very little 
unused land is available for new construction. Therefore, the fee is transit-focused.107 It 
was adopted by the County Commission in 2005 as a way for new developments to pay 
their “fair share.”108 Fee revenues are used to pay for capital expenses and for three years 
of operating costs of transit projects within a new development’s local district.109 The county 
is divided into ten districts, which fall into two categories—standard concurrency districts 
and transit-oriented concurrency districts (Figure 1):110
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1. Standard concurrency districts include areas that lack significant transit infrastructure. 
Roads are the dominant form of transportation in these districts, and roadway 
improvements are the main form of concurrency-revenue-funded improvements. 
Two of the ten districts are in this category.
2. Transit-oriented concurrency districts include parts of the county characterized 
as “compact geographic area(s) with an existing network of roads where multiple, 
viable alternative travel paths or modes are available for common trips.”111 Eight of 
the ten districts are classified as transit-oriented.
For transit-oriented concurrency districts, revenues from the fee are used to ensure that 
the desired transit level of service is maintained. The county enhances the level of service 
by reducing transit headways, developing neighborhood transit centers, and adding new 
bus routes.112 
Organizations Involved in Levying the Fee
The Development Management Division of Broward County assesses the concurrency 
fee at the beginning of the development process. Broward County Transit (BCT) spends 
most of the fee revenue. The fee is levied before the jurisdictions within the county can 
begin processing building-permit applications. An applicant must receive a Transportation 
Concurrency Satisfaction Certificate from the Broward County Development Management 
Division to move forward with the permitting process.113 
Who Pays the Fee?
Any development within the eight transit-oriented concurrency districts that is new, 
changes use, or changes floor area is required to pay the fee.114  Since the fee is due at 
the beginning of the development process, the property developer has the legal obligation 
to pay it. The eight districts cover all parts of the county except the two standard districts. 
No land uses within the transit-oriented districts are exempt from paying the fee.115
Current Fee Amount 
As shown in Appendix C, the fee varies, based on land use and development size. 
Residential uses are charged on per-dwelling-unit basis. The fee varies from $129 to $482 
per unit. Other uses, including commercial uses, are charged on per-square-foot basis. 
The fees range from $521 to $1,636 per 1,000 square feet. 
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Figure 1. Transportation Concurrency Districts, Broward County
Source: http://www.broward.org/Regulation/Development/Pages/impactfees.aspx (accessed February 9, 2011).
How Is the Fee Determined? 
The fee is calculated as “total peak-hour trip generation of the proposed development, 
multiplied by a constant (for each year) dollar figure for each district that represents the 
cost per trip of all the enhancements in that district listed in the County Transit Program.”116 
These enhancements include the construction of bus bays, the purchase of buses, and 
pedestrian improvements near the transit stations. The funds are spent within the district 
on projects included in the County Transit Program.117 
How Has the Fee Changed over Time?
Fee collection began in April 2005. More than $28 million was collected between April 2005 
and January 2011.118 As shown in Figure 2, the fee revenue has decreased dramatically 
since its peak in fiscal year (FY) 2007 (note that FY 2005 includes only six months). 
This revenue decline resulted from the decrease in new projects due to the housing and 
economic crisis.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
29
Impact Fees
Figure 2. Broward County, FL, Transit Concurrency Fee Revenue from April 2005 
to January 2011
Source: Transit Concurrency Fee revenue data received from Broward County.
Between 2005 and 2010, a substantial portion of the concurrency fee was spent on 
operating expenses in newly growing areas with low transit ridership. This focus on newly 
developing areas strained the county financially, as fare-box revenues were very low in 
these areas. Going forward, the county will expend transit-concurrency-fee revenues 
primarily on the existing transit system by funding capital facilities, such as buses, bus 
stops, and transit-station improvements.119
Use of the Fee to Fund Transit Projects
The majority of the concurrency fee is spent in two areas: capital improvements and 
operations.120 For FY 2011, BCT expected that $4.9 million would be transferred from the 
concurrency fund to the capital budget.121 This represents about 17 percent of BCT’s FY 
2011 capital budget.122 The agency expects to use only $604,000 of the concurrency-fee 
revenue for its operating budget; the concurrency-fund contribution is approximately 0.5 
percent of that budget.123  
Between 2006 and 2010, the fee helped fund numerous capital projects and BCT operations 
throughout the county, including the following:124
• Upgrade of 125 bus stops 
• Purchase of 10 small buses 
• Three neighborhood transit centers 
• Pedestrian improvements near transit stations
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• 40 bus bays 
• Operating costs to reduce headways along numerous routes
• Expansion of several routes 
• Administrative and management expenses
Legal Basis for Charging the Fee
In 1985, Florida passed statewide growth management legislation called the Local 
Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act.125 This 
legislation laid the foundation for Broward County’s transit concurrency fee. The Act 
mandated infrastructure concurrency, requiring services to be provided concurrently with 
development.126 
In 1974, Broward County residents granted land use authority to the county.127 Under 
its charter, the Broward County Council is the authority responsible for local land use 
planning and traffic-way plans.128 Unlike many counties, where land use decisions rest with 
individual municipalities, Broward County is able to make countywide land use decisions 
that apply to each and every municipality within it. 
Concurrency Fees as a Variant of Impact Fees
Concurrency fees essentially function in the same manner as impact fees. However, 
in Florida, the legislation authorizing concurrency fees is different from the impact-fees 
legislation. Broward County, for example, charges impact fees as well as concurrency 
fees. Its concurrency fees are based on Florida’s growth-management concurrency 
law, whereas the impact fees are based on state-level impact-fee-enabling legislation. 
Because of their similarity, “transit impact fees” and “transit-oriented concurrency fees” 
are sometimes used interchangeably. Broward County has several impact fees but does 
not charge a transit impact fee.129 Furthermore, jurisdictions that fall in the concurrency 
exception areas cannot charge concurrency fees, although they can charge impact fees.
Florida’s concurrency law allows use of concurrency fees for transportation capital 
expenditures as well as for operations and maintenance expenses. Many states allow 
such fees for capital expenses only,130 But Florida, along with California, is an exception 
to this practice.131 
Case Analysis
Enabling Legal Environment 
Florida’s growth management act provides the legal framework for Broward County’s 
transit concurrency fee. Furthermore, the county government has land use authority over 
the entire county area.  This authority enables the county to implement the fee without 
going through the arduous process of seeking each municipality’s formal approval. 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
31
Impact Fees
Stakeholder Support 
Stakeholder support was not a concern for Broward County. In fact, developers have 
welcomed the fee, which is transparent and known ahead of time.132
Institutional Capacity 
Until the 2011 amendments, Florida’s concurrency requirements essentially forced the 
imposition of transportation concurrency fees. The institutional capacity to charge the fees 
was thus in place—the county was already charging a variety of concurrency fees. 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The concurrency fee enhances vertical equity to the extent that transit users have lower 
income than automobile users.133 
The fee also promotes horizontally equity. The revenue from it must be spent within a 
localized area, so those who pay the fee benefit from it. The county did not impose it on 
the two districts where transit was deemed unsuitable.
However, the fee assessment methodology could be made more equitable. While other 
uses are assessed a fee based on their square footage, number of acres, or beds, all 
residential uses are assessed the concurrency fee on a per-unit basis. Although those uses 
are broken down into different types that have some correspondence with their size and 
households’ ability to pay the fee,134 e.g., apartments or mobile homes, a more equitable 
assessment methodology would base the fee on square footage or number of bedrooms. 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
The economic recession and real estate downturn caused the transit concurrency fee to 
run into trouble shortly after its 2005 inception. Broward County faced a $40 million to $110 
million budget shortfall.135  As revenue from the fee and the fare-box fell, the county had 
to find other revenue sources to keep the transit system running. It is now using a more 
strategic approach wherein the fee dollars are used in the areas that have higher ridership 
and that can generate more fare-box revenue.136
TRANSPORTATION-MITIGATION IMPACT FEE, AVENTURA, FL
Overview
Aventura is located in Miami-Dade County, on the southern tip of the Florida peninsula. The 
city recently started charging a transportation mitigation impact fee to fund the expansion, 
operation, and maintenance of its public bus system, the Aventura Express.137 The fee was 
approved by the City Council on September 30, 2009.138 
While Broward County has enacted a transportation concurrency fee, the state law prohibits 
the Aventura from doing the same. When Florida’s concurrency law was passed in 1985, 
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the state recognized that the concurrency fee would not be logical for all locations. The 
entire city of Aventura falls within a transportation concurrency exception area (TCEA), and 
jurisdictions within a TCEA do not have to follow the concurrency requirement. However, 
the state law requires any jurisdiction within a TCEA to demonstrate strategies to support 
and fund mobility in order to maintain the exception. This requirement, along with the 
inability to charge concurrency fees, prompted Aventura to charge impact fees.139,140
Who Collects the Fee? 
Aventura’s Community Development Department is responsible for collecting the impact 
fee. The revenues from the fee are deposited in the Transportation and Street Maintenance 
Fund established by the city and can be expended only on the Aventura Express. The City 
Manager is required to review the fee details every three years, and the City Commission 
reviews and adopts the City Manager’s proposals.141
Who Pays the Fee?
The fee applies to new developments and changes of use, as well as to the redevelopment, 
expansion, or modification of existing uses.142 It is assessed on almost all the developments 
within the city limits.143 Exempt uses include government offices, police and fire stations, 
airports, seaports, parking facilities, equipment yards, sanitation facilities, water control 
structures, schools, parks, and other similar facilities used for government operations.144 
In addition, some accessory buildings that serve the same function as the primary building 
and have negligible impact on the transportation system are exempt. Finally, parking 
garages are also exempt.145 
What Is the Current Fee? 
A study was conducted by a private consultant to examine ways to maintain the city’s 
level of transportation service without expanding the roads and highways. Since Aventura 
Express was the only public transportation solution in the city, the study recommended 
a transit impact fee to support it. The fee is “based on the cost required to serve the 
increased demand for use of the Circulator System resulting from the proposed new 
Development Activity.”146 In addition to the current fee schedule, shown in Table 5, a 3 
percent administrative fee is charged.147 for six types of development—residential, office, 
retail, tourist accommodation, industrial, and institutional. The impact of each development 
type on the transit infrastructure is measured by calculating the number of persons using 
that type. For example, Table 5 suggests that 2.175 persons per 1,000 square feet of retail 
space are assumed to use the city’s transit system. As noted earlier, the fee revenues are 
spent solely on Aventura Express operations, maintenance, and capital expenditures.148 
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Table 5. Transportation Mitigation Impact Fee in Aventura, FL
Land Use (Unit of Measure) Persons per Unit of Measure Fee per Unit of Measure ($)
Residence (per dwelling unit) 0.972   803.05
Office (per 1,000 sq ft) 1.557 1,286.59
Retail (per 1,000 sq ft) 2.175 1,797.33
Tourist accommodation (per 1,000 sq ft) 2.720 2,247.22
Industrial (per 1,000 sq ft) 1.319 1,089.35
Institutional (per 1,000 sq ft) 2.312 1,910.09
Source: City of Aventura, Memorandum to the City Commissioner, http://www.cityofaventura.com/clerk/agendas/lpa01-
13-2009/lpa01-13-2009-4A.pdf (accessed February 9, 2011).
 
How Has the Fee Changed over Time?
Adopted in 2009, the fee is relatively new. Therefore, it has not undergone many changes. 
However, some changes were made at the time it was first proposed, when it met with strong 
real estate developer resistance. The original fee was $1,320 for new residential dwellings 
and $2,115 for every 1,000 square feet of new commercial space. After negotiations with 
the developers, the city slashed the fee by 40 percent. The current fee is $803 per dwelling 
unit and $1,286 for every 1,000 square feet of commercial space. The fee revenues are 
also restricted to being used only for the expansion of Aventura’s free shuttle service. 
Permitted uses include adding new buses and extending shuttle service operation hours.149 
Fee Revenue Amount
The fee is levied at the time building permits are issued. Florida allows the use of impact 
fees to fund capital expenses, as well as operations and maintenance expenses. Therefore, 
Aventura is able to use the fee for administrative expenses as well.150 As of the writing of 
this report, the impact fee had been paid only one time. The developer of a 126,000-square-
foot office building paid an impact fee of $47,604 on May 27, 2011.151
Case Analysis
Enabling Legal Environment 
Florida’s impact-fee-enabling legislation (Florida Statute 163.31801), which allows impact 
fees to fund transit, including transit operations and maintenance expenses, made the 
Aventura transportation-mitigation impact fee possible.152 Most states allow impact fees to 
fund only transit capital expenditures, and many states prohibit the use of the fees to fund 
transit at all.153 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
The city proposed the fee in the midst of the worst real estate market and economic 
conditions since the Great Depression. The developers were therefore successful in 
having the fee reduced by almost half, delaying its implementation by several months and 
limiting its use.154 The city might have encountered less developer opposition if the fee had 
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been proposed when the South Florida real estate market was booming or if it had waited 
until the real estate market improved. 
Impact fees run the risk of burdening a transit system with unused or underutilized projects 
when the real estate market is not consistently strong. The risk is greater in states where 
impact-fee revenues can fund only capital expenditures. For example, a jurisdiction could 
be burdened with significant operations and maintenance costs if new routes are developed 
using impact-fee revenue. Furthermore, transit-system expansion may not occur according 
to plan if the impact-fee revenues abruptly decline due to a sudden weakening of the real 
estate market. 
Stakeholder Support 
Opposed to the fee from its very inception, developers were able to get it reduced. It may be 
difficult to garner the support of all the stakeholders in automobile-oriented cities, such as 
Aventura, where public transit accounts for a small portion of transportation. Stakeholder 
support is especially difficult to obtain during tough economic times.   
Institutional Capacity 
Like Broward County’s concurrency fee, charging Aventura’s impact fee requires moderate 
institutional capacity, which is paid for by the 3 percent administrative fee that is added 
onto the impact fee. 
The opposition to the fee probably stretched local government resources in terms of staff 
time and salary spent addressing the developers’ concerns.
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The fee is horizontally equitable, as it is assessed on the basis of the development type and 
its transportation impacts. Furthermore, the assessment is based on the development’s 
additional impacts on the Aventura Express. The nexus study seems to have fairly based 
the fee on an area or per-unit basis, making it vertically equitable—the larger the office 
space, the higher the fee. Therefore, the fee is vertically equitable to the extent that the 
developer’s ability to pay increases with the development size. 
The fee’s horizontal and vertical equity could be further enhanced if the residential impact 
fees were charged on per-bedroom basis (or a per-square-foot-of-living-space basis) 
instead of the current per-dwelling-unit basis.
TRANSIT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT FEE, SAN FRANCISCO, CA
Overview
A transit impact development fee (TIDF) is levied by the city and county of San Francisco 
to help mitigate the impacts of new non-residential developments on the city’s public 
transportation system.155 The TIDF was initially established in 1981 in response to a 
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significant rise in downtown office development in the 1970s. This office growth was 
expected to bring an increase in the demand for transportation, necessitating greater 
emphasis on alternatives to automobile travel. It was estimated that this shift in travel 
behavior would put substantial new demand on the public transportation system,156 and 
the TDIF would help finance the increase in capacity required to meet this demand. While 
the initial TIDF accommodated some growth, it was strictly limited to financing peak-hour 
growth in transit demand on the transit lines passing through the downtown district. 
While San Francisco usually pays for its transit from the city’s general fund, providing 
transit to accommodate the new buildings would have exhausted the funds and strained 
taxpayers.157 The city therefore looked to alternative mechanisms to fund transit.158 The 
TIDF was retroactively applied to include office developments built after 1979.  Furthermore, 
it was expanded after a 2001 study concluded that developments outside of the original 
downtown district required the municipal railway, called Muni, to maintain and expand 
service; purchase, maintain, and repair rolling stock; install new lines; and service existing 
lines.159
All impact fees in San Francisco are collected by the Department of Building Inspection 
before building permits are issued.160 The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency 
(SFMTA) manages and spends the TIDF revenue.161
With more than 5,000 employees, the SFMTA is the seventh largest transit system in the 
United States. It is responsible for overseeing all forms of surface transportation, as well 
as parking and taxi regulation, in San Francisco. Formed in 1912, Muni is run under the 
authority of the SFMTA.  It serves the city and county of San Francisco, with 63 bus routes, 
seven light-rail lines, the historic streetcar F Line, and three cable car lines.162
What Is the Fee Used For?
The TIDF is intended to meet “a portion of the demand for additional Muni service and 
capital improvements for the city caused by new non-residential development.”163
Toward that aim, the fee can be used for capital and operating expenses as the SFMTA 
sees fit to maintain the base level of service.164 The official ordinance lists the following 
permitted uses (the list is not exhaustive, and other uses, such as payment of salaries, 
may also be permitted):165
• “Capital costs associated with establishing new transit routes, expanding transit 
routes, and increasing service on existing transit routes, including, but not limited to
• Procurement of related items such as rolling stock, and 
• Design and construction of bus shelters, stations, tracks, and overhead wires
• Operation and maintenance of rolling stock associated with new or expanded transit 
routes or increases in service on existing routes
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• Capital or operating costs required to add revenue service hours to existing routes, 
and related overhead costs”166
Who Pays the Fee?
The TIDF is assessed on all new non-residential land uses within San Francisco with areas 
of more than 3,000 square feet.167 It is computed and charged prior to the issuance of the 
building or site permit for any new development168 and is paid before permits are issued 
or, with the inclusion of a surcharge, at the time a certificate of occupancy is issued.169 
Effective through June 2013, a fee deferral program was set up in 2010 in response to the 
economic recession to help development continue through hard times. The deferral allows 
developers to defer 80 percent of the fee until just prior to the issuance of a certificate of 
occupancy, an estimated delay of 10 to 30 months.170 
Payment of the TIDF is not required for:171
• Property owned by the city, the state, or the federal government or their agencies
• Any development in parts of the city where the TIDF is inconsistent with the 
redevelopment plan, including Mission Bay North or South
In addition, the following non-residential uses do not have to pay the TIDF:172
• Public facilities/utilities
• Open recreation/horticulture, including private non-commercial recreation use
• Vehicle storage and access
• Automotive services
• Wholesale storage of materials and equipment
What Is the Current Fee?
The assessed fee, depending on the type of land use, was $8 to $10 per gross square foot 
in 2010.173 The land uses and corresponding fees are listed in Table 6.174
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Table 6. TIDF Charge Based on Land Use as of 2010
Economic Activity Category TIDF Per Gross Square Foot of Development ($)
Cultural/institution/education              10 
Management, information, and professional services              10 
Medical and health services              10 
Production/distribution/repair               8 
Retail/entertainment              10 
Visitor services               8 
Source: City of San Francisco, Ordinance 108-10: Development Impact and In-Lieu Fees (May 3, 2010), p. 59.
How Is the Fee Calculated? 
Before the adoption of the TIDF in 1981, the city’s Public Utilities Commission conducted a 
study to demonstrate the cost of providing transit for a new office development. The study 
found that the cost was $9.18 per square foot of new office space.175 In 1983, a private 
accounting firm, Touche-Ross, conducted a cost analysis to defend the ordinance from 
a legal challenge and found that the cost of providing the service was $8.36 per square 
foot.176 A study conducted in 2001 by the city-hired private transportation-planning firm 
Nelson/Nygaard (with substantial input from the city agencies) to determine whether the 
fee should be expanded from the downtown area to the entire city concluded that new and 
future non-residential uses would have enough impact on the transit system to warrant 
citywide application of the TIDF.177 While the original TIDF was assessed only for office 
space, the new TIDF was expanded to include all non-residential land uses (with the 
exception of those mentioned earlier).178
The TIDF is based on the number of square feet of a new development.179 “Whenever 
any new development or series of new developments cumulatively creates more than 
3,000 gross square feet of covered use within a structure, the TIDF shall be imposed on 
every square foot of such covered use (including any portion that was part of prior new 
development below the 3,000-square-foot threshold).”180
After extensive research and discussion, it was agreed that the $8-per-square-foot fee 
would adequately cover land uses generating 6.60 trips per 1,000 square feet, and the 
$10-per-square-foot fee would cover land uses generating 8.25 trips per 1,000 square 
feet. Figure 3 outlines the methodology used to arrive at the $10 fee. The principal steps 
in this process are the following:
1. The total daily unlinked auto and transit trips are calculated from a travel demand 
model.
2. The total daily hours of transit service and the daily cost of providing transit are 
identified.
3. The total daily trips divided by the total cost of the trip provide the annual cost per 
trip ($36.32 per trip). 
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4. The $10-per-square-foot fee is estimated to correspond to a 45-year annuity of 
$299.76 (using 3.5-percent inflation and a 4.93-percent rate of return). The 45-year 
term corresponds to the useful life of the non-residential development that pays the 
fee.
5. The $299.76 annuity divided by the annual cost per trip ($36.32) yields 8.25 daily 
trips. 
6. The trips generated by various land uses are estimated. Uses expected to generate 
at least 8.25 trips are assessed a fee of $10 per square foot.
Figure 3. Illustrative Calculation of the Transit Impact Fee
Source: SFMTA, Background Documentation Transit Impact Fee, June 2004.
The fee is adjusted annually by the two-year-average change in the consumer price index 
(CPI) for the San Francisco/San José Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA).181 
Additionally, every five years, the Director of Transportation at the SFMTA, in coordination 
with the Director of Planning, is required to prepare a report detailing whether the TIDF 
should be adjusted for each economic activity.182 The Director of Transportation must also 
update other information pertinent to calculating the fee, such as the base service standard, 
cost per revenue service hour, and placement of particular land uses in economic-activity 
categories.183 The report is subject to public hearings.184
The amount collected by the TIDF cannot exceed the capital and operating costs required 
to maintain the base level of service over the 45-year useful life of the development.185 The 
funds are placed in a trust overseen by the Treasurer and are used for a variety of capital 
and operating expenses.186
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How Has the Fee Changed over Time?
The TIDF has gone through significant changes in its 30-year history. It has expanded to 
include the participation of more agencies and has become more comprehensive in size 
and scope.187 The original fee, which was implemented in May 1981, was $5 per square 
foot of office space,188 was charged only for a small downtown district, and was assessed 
only for office buildings.189 
Twenty years after the TIDF was established, a study conducted to explore the possibility 
of expanding its size and scope found that new developments throughout the city had 
significant impacts on the transit system and should therefore be incorporated. In 2004, 
the citywide TIDF was approved by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and went into 
effect for new non-residential uses (with some exclusions).190
In 2009, four agencies—the San Francisco County Transportation Authority, the San 
Francisco Planning Department, the Office of Economic and Workforce Development, 
and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority—entered into a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) to expand the scope of the fee. A new nexus study was commissioned 
to expand the TIDF into the Comprehensive Transportation Impact Development Fee 
(CTIDF). The nexus study comprises three parts, as defined in a memorandum from the 
San Francisco County Transportation Authority: “Part One of the Study would develop 
a legal basis for continued collection of the existing TIDF and would be managed and 
funded solely by the MTA [Metropolitan Transportation Authority]. Part Two of the Study 
would develop a legal basis for the potential future adoption of a new Comprehensive 
Transportation Impact Development Fee (CTIDF) that would expand upon the existing TIDF 
to address the effects of new development on the entire City transportation system. This 
part of the Study would be jointly reviewed by all four parties to this agreement but funded 
entirely by the MTA. Part Three of the Study would develop a legal basis for the potential 
adoption of a new auto trip mitigation fee that would mitigate significant transportation-
related environmental effects identified pursuant to the California Environmental Quality 
Act. This part of the study would be jointly reviewed by all four parties to the agreement 
and funded by all four agencies pursuant to the cost sharing provisions described in the 
MOU.”191
Case Analysis
Enabling Legal Environment 
California’s impact-fee-enabling legislation, called the California Mitigation Fee Act, was 
passed in 1989, several years after San Francisco’s TIDF was implemented.192 The 
legislation was passed with the intention of codifying existing “constitutional and decisional 
law” regarding impact fees and exactions, meaning that it codified previous court decisions 
that had already shaped California law.193  The legislation is broad in its language, allowing 
for impact fees to be used on projects that are reasonably related to increased demand 
for facilities. It also specifically allows the use of impact fees for transit- and transportation-
related improvements, consistent with the San Francisco TIDF.194
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The TIDF was originally enabled by a local ordinance passed by the County Board of 
Supervisors. The ordinance is now covered in Article 4 of the San Francisco Planning 
Code.195 It passed without the benefit of the state-level enabling legislation and was 
therefore vulnerable to legal challenges. The challenge described below came shortly 
after it was passed. The ordinance was successfully defended, and the courts upheld the 
fee. 
The legal basis for charging the TIDF hinges on the fee’s classification as an impact fee 
rather than a tax.196 To be classified as a fee, the TIDF must pass the rational nexus test, 
meaning there must be a rational nexus, or link, between the fee and the service provided. 
In 1981, a class action lawsuit entitled Russ Building Partnership v. City and County of 
San Francisco was filed against the city for imposing the fee. The Court of Appeals and 
the Supreme Court of California upheld the TIDF, noting that it is not a tax but a legitimate 
development fee, and that there is in fact a rational nexus for it.197 
The plaintiff argued that the $5-per-square-foot fee was unreasonable and exceeded the 
cost of increased transit service, hence was a “special tax,” subject to two-thirds vote, and 
that it violated California Constitution articles XIII A and B, which place restrictions upon 
the imposition of such taxes.198 The plaintiff further argued that the fee unfairly burdened 
office buildings built after 1979, while exempting retail stores, claiming that differential 
treatment of new office buildings was a violation of the equal-protection clause. It was 
additionally alleged that the methods used and the assumptions made to arrive at the fee 
amount were unsound.  Another plaintiff in the case argued that the retroactive application 
of the fee was illegal and alleged that the fee violated the city charter.199
The courts, however, disagreed with all of these opinions and found the fee legal. They 
sided with the city on all counts and stated in their findings, “In summary, we hold that the 
transit fee was a lawful development fee which is not governed by California Constitution 
articles XIII A or XIII B, and it does not interfere with plaintiffs’ due process and equal 
protection rights. The fee is not a double tax and does not violate section 3.598 of the city’s 
charter. Any error in calculating the fee was harmless, and the judgment in favor of the 
city and against Russ Building plaintiff is affirmed.”200 The argument about the exemption 
of retail stores was rejected on the grounds that retail uses do not exert added strain 
on the transit system during peak traffic hours, while the offices do. Therefore, office 
developments require Muni to provide additional service.201
Stakeholder Support 
Apart from the earlier challenges to the legality of the fee and continued rumblings from the 
developer community, stakeholder support for the TIDF is strong within the city’s political 
leadership and staff. This support is evidenced by the fee expansion in 2004 and by recent 
discussions regarding its further expansion. San Francisco adopted the fee deferral 
program in 2010 to ease the fee’s impact on the developers.
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Institutional Capacity 
The TIDF requires significant administrative and technical capacity—it has placed added 
administrative burden on the SFMTA and added costs for consultants and attorneys. 
Consulting firms were hired to conduct nexus studies, and the SFMTA presumably hired 
attorneys to defend the TIDF during the 1981 lawsuit.   
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The fee is fairly equitable for all parties involved. The transportation system in San 
Francisco is such that large new developments’ transportation needs can be met only 
with public transit. Many of San Francisco’s transit lines run at capacity during the peak 
commuting hours, requiring expanded service during those times. 
The fee is also horizontally equitable. It is applied to all non-residential developments of 
over 3,000 square feet. Furthermore, there is some variation in the fee, depending on the 
amount of transit service needed by the type of land use. Smaller developments, which 
place less burden on the transit system and are also less likely to afford the fee, are 
excluded.
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
Despite the relative strength of the San Francisco real estate market,202 the recent downturn 
impacted fee revenues, which declined from a traditional annual average of between $4 
million and $5 million to $2 million.203 On a positive note, the TIDF has built-in stability 
measures. The fee is CPI-adjusted, which keeps it abreast with inflation. Furthermore, the 
fee may be reviewed and revised every five years.
The TIDF represents a small but significant component of the SFMTA revenues (see Table 
7). For example, for FY 2007, the SFMTA budgeted $10.16 million of its revenue to come 
from the TIDF. This was 1.5 percent of the entire $678.68 million budget.204  While a small 
percentage of the entire budget, the TIDF provides a much-needed stream of steady 
revenue. Furthermore, the percentage is likely to be higher if the transit costs associated 
with only new growth are considered.
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Table 7. TIDF Revenues in 2004–2009
Fiscal Year
FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09
Revenue from TIDF 
($millions) 9.88 12.80
10.19
(approved)
10.16 
(proposed) 8.4 10.34
Source
http://www.
sfmta.com/
cms/cmta/
documents/
FY2006Pro-
posedBud-
get2-28-2005_
v5.pdf
http://www.
sfmta.com/
cms/rbudget/
documents/
FY2007Ap-
provedBud-
getBook_
v5.pdf
http://www.
sfmta.com/
cms/rbudget/
documents/
FY2007Ap-
provedBud-
getBook_
v5.pdf
http://www.
sfmta.com/
cms/rbudget/
documents/
FY2007Ap-
provedBud-
getBook_
v5.pdf
http://www.
sfmta.com/
cms/rbudget/
documents/
FY2009-
FY2010A-
MENDED-
BUDGET-
BOOKopti-
mized.pdf
http://www.
sfmta.com/
cms/rbudget/
documents/
FY2011AND-
FY2012BUD-
GETBOOK.
pdf
Page number 16 72 72 72 25 15
Source: SFMTA, Adopted Budgets FY 2004–2010. http://www.sfmta.com/cms/rbudget/budgindx.htm#fy20112012 
(accessed September 18, 2011).
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III. SPECIAL ASSESSMENT DISTRICTS
OVERVIEW
A special district is a government entity that provides one or more services but is not 
necessarily administered by a general governing body, such as a city or county.205 A special 
district employs a cost recovery system based on the benefits-received principle.206 For 
example, a water district can charge user fees; a library district can receive a portion of 
property taxes; and a transportation-benefit district can levy assessments. 
Uses of Special Districts 
Special districts have long been used to provide a variety of services and infrastructure.207 
However, their use is limited by state law, which varies significantly from state to state.208 
The most common use of special districts is for environmental and housing services, 
followed by provision of water and sewage services and fire protection.209 Most special 
districts provide service and infrastructure in one of the following six areas: electric power, 
transportation, hospitals, housing and community development, water, and sewers.210 
Growth of Special Districts
States have used special districts since the mid-19th century, and currently all 50 states 
do so.211 Beginning in the early 20th century, special districts became popular as a result 
of rapid urbanization and the attendant need to build new infrastructure.212 During the 
Great Depression, many special districts became insolvent due to falling property values. 
However, their use increased as the depression ended and has been growing ever since.213 
Special districts have been particularly popular in fast-urbanizing, hitherto unserviced rural 
areas.214
Special Assessment Districts: A Subset of Special Districts
SADs are a subset of special districts that charge property owners fees, called assessments, 
for the benefits provided to them by the SADs.215 Like private financing, SADs are structured 
so that those who benefit from the improvements pay for them.216 
Use of SADs to Fund Public Transportation
The use of SADs to fund public transportation has grown in recent decades. In the 1980s, 
several metropolitan areas, including Los Angeles, CA, and Washington, DC, started using 
SADs to finance new rail projects.217 Other cities, including Seattle, WA, and Portland, OR, 
have used them to finance transit infrastructure, such as streetcars and light-rail systems, 
while Charlotte, NC, and Atlanta, GA, plan to use them to finance local transit projects.218
Properties within SADs are assessed fees based on attributes such as property value, 
parcel size, street frontage, and use.219 Street-front footage, or the length of the property 
along the transit infrastructure, is the traditional measure of benefit in a SAD. However, 
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new methods of assessment are becoming more popular, as the frontage method has 
proven to be inequitable.220 These new methods include the following:
• The benefits assessed, or increased value, method, which determines the increase 
in property value to arrive at the assessment amount.
• The zone method, which uses the proximity to the relevant amenity to determine the 
assessment amount. For example, properties may be divided into zones depending 
on their proximity to the transit infrastructure, with the fee rate increasing with 
proximity.
• The area method, in which assessments are proportional to the size of the land 
parcel on which the property is located.221
The infrastructure and services within a SAD can be financed using the “pay as you go” 
method, that is, by spending funds only as they are collected, or the “pay as you use” 
method, in which SAD-revenue-backed bonds (commonly called special assessment 
bonds) fund the project.222 Special assessment bonds cover the expensive up-front costs 
of building infrastructure.223 They are more politically feasible than general obligation bonds 
in some states, including California, where a simple majority is needed to approve them, 
rather than the two-thirds super-majority required for general obligation bonds.224
The Enabling Legal Framework 
The state’s legal requirements impact SAD formation,225 which generally must be 
supported by the majority of property owners.226 After the property owners vote in favor of 
the SAD, a preliminary study outlining the project details is conducted, and a city or county 
government votes to approve or deny SAD formation.227 Next, each property within the 
SAD is assessed a fee. Property owners are given the option to appeal the fee, and if an 
appeal is upheld, the fee is reassessed.228
Other Considerations for Use
Political Acceptability 
Unlike exactions and impact fees, which apply only to new developments, SADs can also 
affect existing developments.229 Therefore, some states require that SADs be contiguous 
and include already developed properties, a requirement that makes SADs politically 
unpopular with current residents.230 To reduce voter opposition, the exclusion of existing 
developments is becoming the norm in states that do not require contiguous application 
of a SAD.231 Exempting residential properties is also a commonly used strategy to avoid 
resident opposition to SADs. 
Government Fragmentation 
The proliferation of special districts leads to multiple government agencies serving the 
same population, often performing similar or related services. This functional overlap 
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complicates coordinated service provision.232 Furthermore, the overlap may reduce the 
efficiency of service provision.233 For example, special districts have enabled the creation 
of “phantom cities” in California. These cities’ residents use SADs to provide essential 
services that are typically provided by a city, thereby obviating the need to become part 
of a city. Critics argue that the proliferation of special districts puts a burden on nearby 
cities as well. The residents of “phantom cities” are often unwilling to contribute to regional 
initiatives, and the cities often provide a low level of service (such as poor police protection 
or few parks), leading to negative spillover effects.234 
Quasi-governmental Entities with Less Public Oversight 
Highlighting the undemocratic nature of special districts, critics note that voting privileges 
are sometimes determined based on property qualifications rather than residency.235 
Additionally, special districts can fly under the public radar, as residents often assume 
that they are a part of the local city or county government.236,237 The resulting lack of public 
oversight may decrease transparency in the workings of the special districts.238,239
A Way to Bypass Bond-issuance Limits 
Special districts are more likely to be created when states restrict local governments’ 
taxing or borrowing powers, e.g., by placing limits on issuing bonds.240 In such situations, 
fiscally constrained local governments may have trouble meeting their constituents’ service 
demands.241 Debt raised by special districts does not qualify as traditional municipal debt, 
so special districts can be formed to fund infrastructure and services that would normally 
be the local government’s responsibility. 
Impact of Real Estate Market Conditions 
SADs need a strong real estate market to thrive. The impact of the real estate market can 
be particularly significant on SADs formed to fund newly urbanizing areas. These SADs 
typically rely on future growth, and existing property owners can bear a heavy assessment 
burden if the anticipated growth does not materialize.242,243
Equity Considerations 
If not structured carefully, SADs can negatively impact vertical equity by putting a high 
burden on those with low ability to pay.244 Many assessments are regressive and do not 
take into consideration the property owner’s income level, placing a financial burden on 
lower-income property owners.245 
Furthermore, assessments can reduce horizontal equity if certain properties, such as 
residences, are exempt from paying assessments or pay lower assessments, even though 
they benefit from the assessment-funded infrastructure or service.
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Case Study Selection Criteria
The selection criteria for our SAD case studies include the following: 
• Must be used to fund the construction, operation, or maintenance of public 
transportation infrastructure, such as stations, rail lines, and rolling stock
• Assessments must be a major revenue source
• A variety of transportation modes must be involved 
• Data must be available
The following cases were selected for analysis: Seattle South Lake Union Streetcar, 
Seattle, WA; New York Avenue Metro Station, Washington, DC; and Los Angeles Metro Red 
Line Benefit Assessment District, Los Angeles, CA. The fourth case, Portland Streetcar, 
Portland, OR, uses both SAD and TIF. It is discussed among the TIF cases.
SOUTH LAKE UNION STREETCAR, SEATTLE, WA
Overview 
With a population of about 608,000, Seattle is the largest city in the Seattle–Tacoma–
Bellevue metropolitan statistical area.246 The city has a relatively well-developed and diverse 
public transportation system, including an extensive bus system, light rail, streetcars, and 
monorail.247 
Like many cities in the United States, Seattle had a streetcar system in place in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, but the system was abandoned with the advent of the 
automobile. In recent decades, streetcars have made a resurgence across the country, 
and Seattle joined this trend with the completion of the Seattle South Lake Union Streetcar 
(referred to in this discussion simply as the streetcar) in 2007.248
The streetcar operates between Seattle’s downtown and South Lake Union neighborhood. 
It serves the Denny Triangle and Belltown neighborhoods as well.249 With 11 stops along 
a 2.6-mile route (see Figure 4), it connects with Seattle’s other local and regional public 
transit systems, including the Metrobus, Sound Transit buses, trains and light rail, and the 
monorail at the Westlake Hub/Pacific Place Station.250 The streetcar line was approved by 
the City Council as part of a larger investment intended to revitalize the South Lake Union 
neighborhood.251 
Discussions about bringing a streetcar to the neighborhood had been under way since the 
early 2000s.252 The city of Seattle conducted several preliminary studies, including one 
of local improvement district (LID) assessment methodology (SADs are officially called 
LIDs in the state of Washington). After property owners approved the LID in 2005, the City 
Council approved funding for the project and formation of the LID.253 The streetcar began 
operating in 2007.254
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Figure 4. Route Map of the Seattle Lake Union Streetcar
Source: City of Seattle, “Streetcar Route Map,” http://www.seattlestreetcar.org/map/ (accessed July 13, 2011).
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Assessment Methodology and Revenue Generated
The LID funded more than half of the streetcar project. The city issued bonds to pay up 
front for the capital costs. The bonds are being paid back through the LID assessments.255 
For the purposes of calculating assessments, each parcel was considered on an individual 
basis as if owned “fee simple,” i.e., they were assessed as if the property was owned 
outright.256 
The assessments are based on the estimated increase in the property value resulting from 
the introduction of the streetcar system.257 They assume that traffic congestion would have 
prohibited certain properties from developing to their highest and best use if the streetcar 
had not been built.258 That is, by building the streetcar, the city was essentially allowing 
property owners to use their property to the fullest extent, thereby increasing its value.259 
The property appraisal was conducted in 2004 and published in 2006.260 The 760 parcels 
considered261 were classified into the following major groups:262
• Land or vacant/interim uses
• Apartments
• Condominiums
• Hotels
• Retail
• Industrial
• Office
• Other263
Vacant properties and interim-use properties (not developed to their highest and best 
use) were estimated to benefit most from the streetcar (see Table 8).264 Apartments, 
condominiums, hotels, and retail uses were expected to be the next-highest beneficiaries, 
and properties already developed to their highest and best use (industries, offices, and 
other) were expected to benefit the least.265 
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Table 8. Projected Percentage Increase in Valuation Resulting from Introduction 
of the Seattle Streetcar
Analysis Area Apartment Condo Hotel Retail Land Industrial Office
A 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 8.00 1.50 1.50
B 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 6.00 1.00 1.00
C 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 4.00 0.75 0.75
D 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.50 0.50
E 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00
 
Source: Deborah A. Foreman and Matthew C. Sloan, “Seattle CBD to South Lake Union Streetcar Final Special 
Benefits Study” (May 2006).
The amount of the assessment fee for each property was based on proximity to the 
streetcar line. The analysis areas were grouped (see Figure 5) as follows: 
• Area A: frontage on the streetcar, north of the central business district (CBD) core
• Area B: one block from the streetcar or with frontage near the south terminus
• Area C: two to three blocks from the streetcar, north of Denny Way
• Area D: two to three blocks from the streetcar, south of Denny Way
• Area E: four or five blocks from the streetcar266
The special assessment fee provided $25.7 million (52 percent of the total project cost). 
The rest of the project funding came from federal and state grants (see Table 9). As of 
2007, nearly $17 million in assessment fees had been paid.267 
Table 9. Seattle Streetcar Project Funding Sources
Funding Source Amount Total ($) Percent of Total Project Cost
LID assessments (net) 25,700,000 51.71
Federal/state grants 18,500,000 37.22
Maintenance base 2,200,000 4.43
Property sale 3,300,000 6.64
Total 49,700,000 100.00
Source: Allen Brackett Shedd, “Final Special Benefits Study for South Lake Union Streetcar,” p. 4.
Property owners were provided the opportunity to seek amendments to the fee, and 
some assessments were successfully amended because mistakes were found in the 
assessment process. Among the largest reductions, the Pacific Place assessment was 
reduced by $209,235 (54 percent), the Seattle Times assessment was reduced by 
$156,853 (68 percent), and the Comprise Venture assessment was reduced by $141,897 
(52 percent).268,269
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Property owners were given the option of paying the fee up front or over 18 years at an 
interest rate of 4.4 percent. If a property is sold before the full fee is paid, the entire balance 
is payable at the time of closing. The 18-year payment option and the associated interest 
rate reflect the tenure and interest rate associated with the city-issued general obligation 
bonds that funded the up-front costs of the streetcar project.270
Figure 5. Analysis Areas in Seattle’s South Lake Union District
Source: Allen Brackett Shedd, “Final Special Benefits Study for South Lake Union Streetcar,” p. 15.
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Case Analysis
Enabling Environment 
Like Oregon, Washington has clear LID-enabling legislation that allows the use of LIDs for 
transportation. Without such legislation, the 12 property owners who were opposed to the 
LID might have had a better chance of winning a lawsuit and might have decided to go 
ahead with the legal challenges. The enabling legislation put the city on solid legal ground.
Stakeholder Support 
LIDs require property-owner buy-in. LIDs are “personal,” in that while most construction 
projects can disrupt traffic and inconvenience people, LIDs ask that the owners put up with 
the disruptions and directly fund the disruption-causing projects. Therefore, LIDs have the 
potential to be very unpopular.271
However, the Seattle Streetcar project was very popular among property owners, 98 
percent of whom agreed to finance more than half of the total project cost through a 
LID. The streetcar was backed by few major players, including Microsoft co-founder Paul 
Allen’s company, Vulcan; the Mayor; and the City Council. 
The city was able to resolve disputes and complaints from unhappy property owners. The 
12 property owners who objected to the assessment represented ownership of only 1.5 
percent of the assessed value of the properties within the LID.272 Property owners were 
given a chance to review their assessments with the appraisers, and most of the issues 
were resolved at this stage. The few still unsatisfied property owners were referred to a 
hearing examiner. The property owners agreed with the examiner’s rulings.273 Moreover, 
those who threatened to sue the city did not carry out their threat because of prohibitive 
legal costs.274
Real Estate Market 
The fee was assessed in 2004 and approved in 2005. The streetcar began operating in 
2007, just months before the housing crisis and the economic recession deepened. Had 
the LID formation process begun during the recession, say in 2009, the outcome of the 
entire project might have been much different. The property owners would probably have 
lost some of their equity during the recession and might have been less enthusiastic about 
paying assessments. 
Institutional Capacity 
Significant institutional capacity may be needed to form, implement, and manage LIDs. 
Specifically, capacity is required to conduct the benefit study, secure property owner buy-
in, obtain City Council approval, and levy the fee.275 
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Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The large variety of property types within the Seattle LID required the city to devise a 
transparent and equitable benefit assessment calculation methodology, one that is bit more 
complex than one simply based on street frontage or parcel size. The city successfully 
developed a calculation methodology, basing assessments on the increase in property 
value if the property is developed to its highest and best use and the property’s proximity to 
the streetcar. As each property had to be individually assessed, this methodology required 
much more work than simpler methodologies. However, it was viewed by property owners 
as bringing a sense of fairness and probably minimized opposition to the LID. 
Even with a fair methodology, LIDs have the potential to adversely impact lower-income 
or fixed-income property owners, such as low-income senior citizens. Therefore, Chapter 
84.38 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) and RCW 35.43.250 and 35.54.100 of 
the Washington legislation allow indefinite deferment of LID payments for certain qualifying 
senior citizens. In addition, economically disadvantaged individuals may defer payments 
for up to five years. 
The LID assessment calculation methodology is also horizontally equitable—the amount 
each property pays is in proportion to the estimated financial benefit received. 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
Because assessments are determined at the time a LID is established, the assessment 
revenues can be very reliably estimated for an already developed area. The balance 
assessments are due when the property is sold, so revenues can be reliably estimated 
even when the property owners pay over a long period.  
In summary, the Seattle Streetcar case shows that even after accounting for the risk of 
public opposition or legal action, SADs are a low-risk financing option when used in an 
established urban area with a strong real estate market.
NEW YORK AVENUE METRO STATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Overview of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) was created in 1967 to build 
a regional transit system in the Washington, DC, area.276  WMATA operates the regional 
bus and Metrorail system (see Figure 6). It acquired four bus systems in 1973, and the first 
Metrorail line became operational in 1976. The bus system has more than 300 routes, and 
the Metrorail has five lines, 84 stations, and 103 miles of track.277 The Metrorail routes and 
opening dates are listed in Table 10.
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Table 10. WMATA Metrorail Routes and Opening Dates
Name Began Operating Route
Red Line 1976 Shady Grove – Glenmont
Orange Line 1978 Vienna/Fairfax – New Carrollton
Blue Line 1977 Franconia-Springfield – Largo Town Center
Yellow Line 1983 Huntington-Fort Totten/Mount Vernon Square/7th Street – Convention Center
Green Line 1991 Branch Avenue – Greenbelt
Silver Line (planned) 2016 (planned) Route 772 – Stadium Armory
Source: WMATA, “Metro Facts,” http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/docs/metrofacts.pdf (accessed July 27, 2011).
Figure 6. WMATA Metrorail System Map 
Source: WMATA, “Route Map,” http://www.wmata.com/rail/docs/colormap_lettersize.pdf (accessed July 27, 2011). 
New York Avenue Metro Station
The New York Avenue Metro Station was developed as a result of a partnership between 
the local landowners; the Washington, DC, government; the federal government; and 
WMATA.278 The station is located in the north of Massachusetts, or NoMa, area on the Red 
Line between the Union Station and Rhode Island Ave–Brentwood stations (see Figure 7). 
The Red Line was in use for almost three decades before the New York Avenue Station 
opened in 2004. 
During the 1990s, NoMa was an underdeveloped neighborhood with freight rail yards, 
abandoned buildings, warehouses, and vacant lots.279 The station site was identified by the 
Washington, DC, planners as a prime redevelopment opportunity due to its location near 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
54 Special Assessment Districts
the downtown area.280 However, as the NoMa area was already congested, the station 
was considered a prerequisite for the further redevelopment of the neighborhood. 281
Figure 7. WMATA Metrorail System Map: New York Avenue Metro Station
Source: “WMATA Route Map,” http://www.wmata.com/rail/docs/colormap_lettersize.pdf (accessed July 27, 2011).
Construction of the New York Avenue Station began in 2002, and the station opened in 2004 
(see Table 11 for the time line).282 The construction funds came from a variety of sources—the 
landowners; the Washington, DC, government; and the federal government. The property 
owners supported the station construction and agreed to pay assessments for 30 years to 
raise funds for it because they understood the benefits the station would bring to the local 
community, including significant investment from the federal government. 283,284
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Table 11. Time Line of Development and Construction of the New York Avenue 
Metro Station 
1997–1998 District completes a strategic plan that identifies NoMa as a strategic investment area and identifies the need for an infill Metro station
1997–1998 Negotiations with private landowners
March 1998 DC government funds a feasibility study to explore whether an infill station could be built in the NoMa area
November 1998 The new Metro station becomes an important part of DC’s strategic economic development plan
December 1998 Private landowners agree to contribute $25 million
1999 WMATA conducts a feasibility study for the station
June 1999 DC agrees to contribute $34 million to the station
October 2000 Congress commits $25 million to the project 
Fall 2000 Preliminary engineering completed
Fall 2000 Design approved by the Nation Capitol Planning Commission and the Commission of Fine Arts
December 2000 Groundbreaking on the project site
November 2002 Groundbreaking on the station
November 2004 Station opens
 
Source: PB Consult, “New York Avenue-Florida Avenue-Galludet University Metro Station: A Case Study,” p. 6.
Reasons for Landowners’ Willingness to Fund the Station Costs
Prior to the station’s development, several owners of the NoMa neighborhood’s brown-
field industrial land parcels had sought the city government’s permission to develop offices 
on their land. Traffic on the local roads was at capacity, so the government determined that 
land development was possible only if a Metro station was built. Heeding the government’s 
advice, the landowners petitioned for Metro station construction.285 However, as public 
funds were scarce, the director of the DC Department of Transportation suggested that 
the NoMa property owners share the cost. The city government administration thought 
that this suggestion would not be well received by the property owners, but much to its 
surprise, the property owners expressed their willingness to contribute $25 million toward 
the construction costs. The Mayor’s office was so pleased with the proposal that it simply 
accepted the deal without negotiating with the property owners.286
Building the station was logistically difficult. It had to be constructed without disrupting 
the already busy Red Line, which added to the project’s complexity and expense. The 
WMATA approached key U.S. Congress representatives with a request for additional 
funds. The representatives expressed interest in the proposal, primarily because the 
federal government needed a site for relocating the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (ATF) headquarters from its existing location by 2003–2004, and the 
representatives liked the idea of locating it in the vicinity of the New York Avenue Station. 
Therefore, Congress struck a deal with WMATA. Both parties agreed on the 2003–2004 
construction completion deadline.287 
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Given the deadline, the Washington, DC, Council needed to minimize property-owner 
opposition in order to quickly set up a SAD. As the owners of residential properties 
were very likely to oppose paying assessments, these properties were exempted. This 
exemption allowed the process to move forward quickly and enabled the construction to 
be completed before the 2003–2004 deadline.288
Stakeholder Participation Process
The supporters of the Metropolitan Branch Trail initially opposed the station construction, 
since it interfered with their plans to build a trail through the neighborhood that would be 
part of the larger eight-mile Metropolitan Branch Trail. WMATA addressed the concerns of 
the trail supporters by building a bridge over the railroad track to accommodate the trail.289 
The DC Department of Housing and Community Development New York Avenue Task 
Force, later called Action 29, was also instrumental in garnering support for the station 
construction.290 Overall, the project received wide community support. 
Securing the landowners’ financial support was a bit more difficult.291 The landowners were 
initially willing to pay the assessment fee in exchange for credit on future property taxes. 
They felt they would be “double-billed” if they were required to pay assessments as well 
as taxes on their properties’ increased value. However, the Washington, DC, government 
argued that a tax credit would defeat the purpose of the assessment fee. Therefore, the 
government hired a professional economist to investigate the landowners’ double-billing 
claim. The economist found that the land-value gain would be more than 100 times the 
station cost. This finding led the landowners to abandon the double-billing charge292 and 
agree to fund $25 million of the project through a SAD without receiving property tax 
credits.293   
Total Station Cost 
The station cost a total of $109.9 million.294 Table 12 provides a breakdown of the project 
funding sources.
Table 12. Funding Sources for the New York Avenue Metro Station
Amount of Funding ($ millions) Share of Total Cost (%) Source
53.4 48 DC government (for station)
6.5 6 DC government (for Metropolitan Branch bicycle trail)
25.0 23 SAD private landowners
25.0 23 Federal government
 
Source: WMATA, “Metro’s New York Ave-Florida Ave-Gallaudet U Metrorail station opens today on the Red Line,” 
http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/news/PressReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=3182 (accessed December 10, 
2011); WMATA, “Project Overview Relative to a Proposed New Station at Potomac Yards.” http://www.scribd.com/
doc/3424590/Potomac-Yard-Metro-presentations-080527 (accessed December 10, 2011).
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
57
Special Assessment Districts
A SAD was created to pay for a portion of the station cost, and the city issued general 
obligation bonds to cover the up-front capital costs. 
The SAD was set up with the following criteria:295
• The assessment amount would be based on the current value of the property and 
would not change over time.296
• Properties assessed must be within one-half mile of the station but not within 1,250 
feet (one-quarter mile) of the Union Station. Properties served by the Union Station 
would be deemed to receive no benefit from the New York Avenue Station.297
• Properties must be zoned as commercial.298
• Property owners must own more than 10,000 contiguous square feet of land.299
• Assessments would be retroactive to December 2000.300
• Residential properties would not pay assessments.301
• Properties exempt from paying property taxes (for example, churches and hospitals) 
would also be excluded from paying assessments. 302
The assessments are collected over a 30-year period, with the annual amount being 
1/30th of the total amount.303 The assessments are calculated by multiplying a special-
assessment factor (SAF) with the total assessed value for each land parcel in 2000.304 
The SAF is determined by dividing the annual special-assessment amount by the aggregate 
assessed value of the properties.305 In other words, each property pays in proportion to 
its year 2000 value.  The SAF can be adjusted to meet the annual special-assessment 
collection target.306  
Some of the owners of station-adjacent land parcels donated their land temporarily for 
construction staging and storage, and some donated part of their land permanently for 
station access.307 These landowners greatly benefited from these strategic donations, 
since their land would be close to, or in some cases, right at the station entrances.308
The DC government issued general obligation bonds and paid $25 million from the bond 
proceeds to WMATA. In exchange, WMATA pledged 30 years of assessment revenues to 
the government.309 
Lessons Learned
The New York Avenue Metro Station case shows that property owners’ commitment to pay 
part of a project cost can help leverage federal funds. In this case, the federal investment 
also brought the local landowners on board. The federal government agreed to match their 
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contribution and to build a new ATF headquarters, which would employ 1,100 workers. 
This federal commitment made the landowners confident of the station’s success.310
The station has been successful in attracting investment in the NoMa neighborhood. More 
than $1.5 billion in private investment has been planned within walking distance of the 
station,311 and ridership more than doubled between 2004 and 2009 (see Table 13). The 
total property value in the 35-block area around the station increased more than four times 
in six years, from $535 million in 2001 to $2.3 billion in 2007.312 
Table 13. New York Avenue Station Monthly Ridership
Dates Monthly Ridership
November 2004 to October 2005                          55,863
November 2005 to October 2006                          71,970
November 2006 to October 2007                          85,701
November 2007 to October 2008                         104,404
November 2008 to October 2009                         121,298
 
Source: WMATA, “Metro’s New York Ave-Florida Ave-Gallaudet U Metrorail station opens today on the Red Line.”
Case Analysis
Enabling Legal Environment 
The New York Avenue Metro Station construction was made possible by the New York 
Avenue Metro Special Assessment Authorization Emergency Act of 2001.313 While the 
Washington, DC, government had the authority to create SADs, the Act operationalized 
the use of this authority.314 
Institutional Capacity 
The Action 29 campaign to gain local support was an expensive endeavor. The group 
held numerous meetings with neighborhood and community members and went through 
an elaborate negotiation process with the landowners. Action 29 was able to secure a 
$100,000 grant from the city government and raised $140,000 in private funds.315 Apart 
from Action 29’s capacity to gain local support, the institutional capacity of the other major 
stakeholders—the DC government and WMATA—also must be considered. WMATA has 
a long-standing reputation of delivering joint development projects and has an entire 
department dedicated to them. However, the DC government’s capacity to undertake such 
projects seems limited. This lack of capacity is evident in its hasty acceptance of the 
landowners’ offer to contribute $25 million. A government-sponsored economic study later 
found that the land-value gain would be more than 100 times the station cost, reinforcing 
the notion that the landowners should have contributed a larger proportion of the costs. 
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Stakeholder Support 
Stakeholder support was key to the New York Avenue Station construction. The landowner 
contribution paid for nearly a quarter of the total project cost. 
Furthermore, the government acknowledged the standing of a broad spectrum of 
stakeholders and worked closely with those initially opposed to the station.  In particular, 
the $6.5 million dedicated to building the trail bridge demonstrated WMATA’s commitment 
to working with the community. 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The assessment calculation methodology is very simple: the property owners pay 
assessments in proportion to their properties’ year 2000 assessed value. Only large 
commercial properties (more than 10,000 square feet in area) within walking distance of 
the station pay assessments. 
The assessment methodology is vertically equitable, as smaller commercial properties do 
not pay assessments. The methodology is also horizontally equitable, as only properties 
likely to benefit from the station pay assessments. The sphere of benefits is defined as a 
radius of a quarter-mile from the station.
Horizontal equity could be further strengthened by requiring all the properties that benefit 
from the station to pay assessments. However, residential properties were deliberately 
excluded to expedite the project. 
Furthermore, the assessments are based on the assessed property values in 2000, not on 
the estimated future benefits. The assessment calculation methodology reduces horizontal 
equity to the extent the 2000 property values are not a good indicator of future station-
related benefits. 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
The proceeds of a general obligation bond provided $25 million for the station construction. 
The assessment-fee revenues will repay the bonds. The revenue yield is predetermined, 
does not need to grow over time as it is amortized over 30 years (much like a home 
mortgage), and there is no reason to believe that the landowners would oppose paying the 
annual assessments in the future.
LOS ANGELES METRO RED LINE BENEFIT ASSESSMENT DISTRICT, LOS 
ANGELES, CA
Overview
The Los Angeles Metrorail system is a combination of heavy- and light-rail systems 
operating in Los Angeles County, CA. With nearly 10 million residents, Los Angeles County 
is one of the largest counties in the United States.316 The Metrorail system is operated by 
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the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (LACMTA), also known as Metro. 
LACMTA was created from a 1993 merger of the Southern California Rapid Transit District 
(SCRTD) and the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC).317
Metrorail Time Line
The Metrorail’s five currently operational lines opened during the 1990s and early 2000s 
(see Table 14 for the chronology, description, and routes). Red Line Segment 1, which is 
the focus of this case study, was the second segment to open, after the Blue Line, and was 
the only segment financed partially through a SAD.
Table 14. Metro Rail Lines in Los Angeles County
Line Name Opened Rail Type Route
Blue Line 1990 Light rail Downtown LA–Long Beach
Red Line Segment 1 1993 Heavy rail (subway) Downtown LA Union Station–MacArthur Park
Red Line Segment 2a 1996 Heavy rail (subway) MacArthur Park–Vermont
Red Line Segment 2b 1999 Heavy rail (subway) Vermont–Hollywood/Vine
Red Line Segment 3 2000 Heavy rail (subway) Hollywood/Vine–North Hollywood
Purple Line 1993 Heavy rail (subway) Downtown LA–Mid-Wilshire District
Green Line 1995 Light rail Redondo Beach–Norwalk and LAX
Gold Line 2003 Light rail East LA–Pasadena via downtown
 
Source: LACMTA, “Past Visions of L.A.’s Transportation Future,” http://www.metro.net/about/library/archives/visions-
studies/mass-rapid-transit-concept-maps/ (accessed October 6, 2011); Robert P. Sechler, “The Seven Eras of Rapid 
Transit Planning in Los Angeles” Southern California Scenic Railway Association, January 1999, http://www.scsra.org/
library/rapid-transit-history/ (accessed October 6, 2011).
Red Line Segment 1 is a heavy-rail transit system that operates in downtown Los Angeles.318 
The Red Line and the Purple Line are the only Metrorail lines that operate completely 
within the city limits of Los Angeles—the Red Line runs from downtown Los Angeles to 
North Hollywood. The Red and Purple are also the only heavy-rail lines in the county; the 
other three lines are light-rail lines. Red Line Segment 1 cost $1.42 billion, of which $130 
million, or nine percent, was paid for by two benefit assessment districts (BADs) (SADs 
are called benefit assessment districts in Los Angeles), Districts A1 and A2.319 District A1 
includes four Red Line stations: Union, Tom Bradley/Civic Center, Pershing Square, and 
7th Street Metro. District A2 includes one Red Line station, Westlake/MacArthur Park (see 
Figure 8).320
Assessment Calculation Methodology 
Districts A1 and A2 supported two bonds, also called A1 and A2, which were passed in 
1992. In 2001, two new bonds were issued to partially pay off the 1992 bonds. A1 generated 
$123.7 million, and A2 generated $6.5 million, to fund capital improvements.321  
A number of other BADs were planned for subsequent segments of the Red Line, but 
they never materialized because of the passage of CA Proposition 218 in 1996, which 
requires two-thirds-majority approval from property owners to form a BAD.322 This law has 
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made BAD formation next to impossible in California, especially since there is significant 
property-owner opposition in the already developed areas that have fragmented property 
ownership.
Commercial properties, including vacant land, offices, parking facilities, retail stores, 
hotels, and motels, have paid assessments. In District A1, properties within one-half mile 
of the rail stations (1,300 properties with a total area of 64 million square feet) paid the 
fee. District A2 is much smaller, having only 200 properties (with a total area of 3.5 million 
square feet) within one-third mile of the Westlake/Macarthur Station.323 
Figure 8. Districts A1 and A2 of Red Line Segment 1, Los Angeles, CA
Source: David Sikes, “Benefit Assessment Districts Program,” presented at It’s Time to Move LA Conference (1/10/08), 
http://www.movela.org/pptdocs/LACTFC_BenefitAssessment.ppt (accessed October 18, 2011).
Residential properties, religious institutions, and nonprofits were exempted from paying 
the fee, which was charged at a variable rate (up to $0.33) per square foot of the building 
or parcel, whichever is greater. Specifically, the rate was $0.17 for first five years (1992–
1997), $0.27 for the next five years (1997–2002), and $0.33 for the next seven years 
(2002–2009), for an average of $0.25 per square foot for the entire 17-year assessment 
period. 
Property owners were allowed to pay the fee over a 17-year period, over a five-year period, 
as a one-time payment in advance (with a discount), or as a one-time payment when the 
line opened. The fee is used to pay back the bonds that were sold to fund the up-front 
construction costs.324 
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The State Law Authorizing BADs for the Red Line 
California State Code 3300 authorized the use of BADs for the Red Line. Unlike the 
Oregon and Washington codes, which apply statewide, Code 3300 was specifically written 
for the SCRTD (now LACMTA).325 The code essentially gave the SCRTD the authority to 
create BADs with a two-thirds vote of the Board of Supervisors. The Code limits the use 
of assessment funds to rail transit stations and related facilities. Furthermore, it limits the 
bond issuance to 40 years and the interest rates on the bonds to 12 percent annually.326 
The Code has a special provision for also allowing creation of BADs through an election 
if 25 percent of the property owners petition for them. The property owners within a BAD 
can then vote for the BAD—only a simple majority is needed.327 Cast only by the property 
owners, one vote is allotted per $1,000 of property value. While the LACMTA assessed the 
fee, Los Angeles County was responsible for levying and collecting it.328 Districts A1 and 
A2 were created using the two-thirds board majority option.
Legal Challenges to the Los Angeles County BADs
There was at least one legal challenge to the Los Angeles County BADs. A challenge to 
their constitutionality was overruled by the California State Supreme Court in 1992. A state 
appellate court had previously struck down the BADs on the grounds that they violated the 
“one-person, one-vote” constitutional guarantee. Under CA State Code 3300, the property-
owner vote was based on property value, not on the “one-person, one-vote” rule. However, 
the California Supreme Court ruled that the Code did not violate the constitution, stating 
that a BAD does not exercise general government powers, and therefore the constitutional 
protection does not apply.329
Revenue Generated from the BADs
In 1992, the LACMTA issued two sets of bonds to fund the construction of the Red Line. 
The A1 bonds were issued to finance the section of the Red Line in the A1 BAD, while the 
A2 bonds were issued to finance the section in the A2 BAD (see Figure 8). A second pair 
of bonds was issued in 2001 to refinance the debt. Both sets of bonds were paid in full by 
FY 2010.
The BAD revenues increased steadily. By FY 2005, the BADs were generating more than 
$20 million per year (see Figure 9). Revenue from the BADs more than doubled between 
2001 and 2010.
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Figure 9. Los Angeles, CA, Districts A1 and A2 BAD Revenues for FY 1998 to FY 
2010
Note: FY 2002 revenue information was not available.
Source: Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, “Fiscal Years 1998-2010 Budgets.” Chart prepared by the 
authors.
Case Analysis 
Enabling Legal Environment 
A special state-level act was passed to enable BAD funding for the Los Angeles Metro. 
However, passage of Proposition 218 in California in 1996 has made the use of BADs for 
transit difficult. Property owners can now simply vote them down. In fact, the LACMTA 
did not even try to set up BADs for the Metro after the passage of Proposition 218, even 
though the initial plans included them for Segments 2 and 3 of the Red Line.
Institutional Capacity 
Significant institutional capacity is required to set up BADs, issue bonds, levy and collect 
assessments, and, if required, defend them in court. Like SADs in Seattle and Portland, 
implementation of BADs takes staff time and resources, especially in the beginning stages, 
when public outreach is needed to address property-owner concerns. In the Los Angeles 
case, further capacity was needed to defend the BADs in a lengthy court battle. 
Stakeholder Support 
While Portland and Seattle used assessments to fund a large portion of their streetcar 
systems, funding the line was not the main impetus for creating the Red Line BAD. 
The BAD revenues funded a small but significant portion of the construction costs, but 
demonstrating local support for the project to receive federal funding was perhaps the 
primary reason for the BAD formation.330 
While the Red Line BADs were successful in attracting federal funding, they met with some 
property-owner opposition. The Metro staff highlighted the importance of majority resident 
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support and unified private sector, local, state, and federal support for any assessment 
district’s success.331 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The Los Angeles BAD was assessed per square foot of the built-up area or the lot area. This 
calculation method may result in a fee that is not proportional to the benefit received. For 
example, a large hotel that operated at full capacity before the Red Line was constructed 
would have received little benefit but would have had to pay a very large assessment 
because of its sizable floor area. In contrast, a restaurant running below potential might 
have doubled its business, having paid only a very small assessment fee. In summary, the 
fee calculation methodology does not take actual benefits into account. It does not even 
try to account for the variations in the benefit received by different land uses but instead 
uses a one-size-fits-all approach. Furthermore, only commercial properties paid the fee. 
Residential properties benefited as well but were exempted from paying. 
The fee was vertically equitable to the extent that the owners of smaller properties have 
lower ability to pay than the owners of larger properties. The option to pay the assessments 
over time further enhanced vertical equity. 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
An assessment district in already developed urban areas, such as Los Angeles, typically 
has a predictable and stable revenue yield, because the number of assessment-paying 
properties is known at the time of the district formation. Furthermore, the agency in charge 
of establishing the assessment rate can, within predetermined limits, increase the rate in 
case of any revenue shortfall. 
In general, assessments are likely to pay for a relatively small portion of a large rail project 
such as Metrorail. The Segment 1 BADs funded nine percent of the project cost. For 
smaller projects, such as the Seattle and Portland Streetcar projects, assessment districts 
might be able to fund a larger proportion of the cost. In any case, as demonstrated in 
Portland, Seattle, and Washington, DC, local buy-in is critical for leveraging state and 
federal funding. Therefore, even when BADs can fund only a small portion of a project, 
they can still have a significant financial impact overall. 
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OVERVIEW
TIF is a funding mechanism primarily intended to remove physical blight and enable 
economic development. It is implemented by creating a geographic district administered 
by a TIF authority, usually a redevelopment agency.332 After the district is created, the 
assessed property value is frozen for a period of time, usually 10 to 25 years.333 As new 
funds are invested, the property values in the district increase, as do the property-tax 
revenues. The property-tax increment (the new property tax minus the property tax on the 
frozen property values) is diverted to the TIF authority rather than the agencies that would 
normally receive it, such as the city, the county, and the school districts. The tax increment 
is reinvested in the TIF district.
Under the TIF mechanism, there are two ways to raise funds for initial infrastructure 
development: a pay-as-you-go approach or a pay-as-you-use (sometimes called “rebate” 
or “up front”) approach.334 The pay-as-you-go approach can be a slow process, as the 
development is financed when the tax-increment revenue is generated.335 The pay-as-
you-use approach requires the TIF authority (or the local government) to issue bonds. 
Bond proceeds can be used immediately to finance development in the TIF district. This 
approach, while inherently riskier than the pay-as-you-go approach, is the one most 
commonly used, for the simple reason that TIF agencies often need money up front to 
kick-start capital projects.336 
For What Purposes is TIF Used? 
In most states, TIF districts can be created only to fight blight.337 Although definitions of blight 
vary among states,338 blighted areas are usually characterized by physical deterioration, 
unsanitary conditions, and a high rate of tax delinquency.339 Ideally, TIF removes severe 
blight, directs public funds to a community plan or policy, addresses environmental 
remediation, and finances infrastructure.340 
Although there is much debate about whether TIF should be used to develop areas that 
are not truly blighted,341 several states use it for this purpose. For example, TIF is used 
to promote economic development as well as to promote redevelopment in Connecticut, 
Delaware, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, and Vermont.342 Vermont has the most lenient 
legislation, allowing TIF to be used for development, job creation, or even simply to increase 
tax revenue for local jurisdictions.343
How Widespread is TIF Use Nationally? 
TIF was first used in California in 1952.344 By 1970, a few other western states and 
Ohio had TIF-enabling state legislation.345 Federal funding cuts in the 1970s, however, 
caused TIF use to spread quickly across the country as local governments sought ways 
to fill the financing void.346 By the late 1980s, few states lacked TIF-enabling legislation, 
and eventually, Washington, DC, and all of the states except Arizona had enacted such 
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legislation.347 However, some states, including California and Illinois, use TIF more than 
others.348 
TIF can be used to fund various types of public infrastructure projects, including sewer 
and storm drainage systems, streets, park improvements, streetscape improvements, 
landscaping, libraries, environmental remediation, emergency-service facilities, schools, 
and public transportation.349
Is TIF Used to Fund Public Transportation?
Although the use of TIF to fund transit projects is growing, it is not common. A 1985 study 
noted that the Embarcadero Station in San Francisco was the only known use of TIF 
for transit.350 Since then, several new instances of TIF use for public transit have been 
documented. A 2008 report identified four states in which TIF had been used to fund transit 
and transit-related projects—Georgia, Illinois, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.351 The TIF areas 
in these states are referred to as special taxing districts, development authority districts, 
community facilities districts, or community management districts.352 Several instances of 
TIF-funded transit-oriented developments (TODs) have also been noted.353
TIF can be used to fund transit or TODs in several ways. In the traditional way, a transit 
station or other transit infrastructure may fall completely within a TIF district. The funds 
collected from the district can be used to fund projects within the district, including transit 
projects. This is the case in Chicago, where TIF funds are being used to redevelop three 
transit stations.354 Alternatively, a special transit taxing district can be created whose funds 
are used to pay for transit or TOD. Funding transit-related projects is the sole purpose 
of this type of TIF district. In Pennsylvania, for example, transit revitalization investment 
districts (TRIDs) are created to fund TODs. These districts differ from SADs in that they 
use tax increments as the revenue source, whereas SADs assess fees.
The Legal Framework
Most states require that two criteria be met before a TIF district can be formed: a finding of 
blight and the “but for” requirement. The “but for” requirement consists of proving that the 
area would not develop “but for” the creation of the TIF district.355 Most states also require 
preliminary project plans, a redevelopment plan, public hearings, and plan approval by 
elected officials.356 
Other Considerations for TIF Use
Stakeholder Support 
Public buy-in is extremely important for TIF success. The neighborhood residents are often 
most affected by the TIF-produced changes. In many cases, TIF funds are used for high-
impact projects, such as building demolition and construction. While some stakeholders 
may find such demolition and rebuilding aesthetically desirable and economically beneficial, 
others may be concerned about resident displacement, destruction of historic buildings, 
and other changes to the neighborhood character.357 
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Buy-in from other government agencies and the business community is also necessary. 
The Council of Development Finance Agencies (CDFA) lists four groups that are critical 
for TIF success:358 
• Development authorities, used by cities to make key development decisions and 
administer TIF
• Finance agencies, which often lend money for TIF projects and set lending terms 
and conditions
• Chambers of Commerce, whose boards often comprise powerful business leaders 
who can provide essential support and broker TIF project deals
• Private and non-profit entities, such as energy providers, that can be key supporters 
as they have business interests in the TIF-funded development. Non-profit agencies 
are also important stakeholders. They often work closely with TIF developments (for 
example, TIF-aided affordable-housing developments) and can provide political and 
financial support
Real Estate Market Conditions 
The success of a TIF district hinges on the TIF-funded development project’s ability to 
raise property values within the district. If the property values fall, the district might face 
difficulty repaying the TIF-backed bonds. Therefore, the consistency of TIF revenue is 
important.359 Because of the financial risk involved in TIF-funded projects, it is necessary 
for local governments to conduct extensive financial viability analyses of TIF districts.360 
Such analyses must show steady and continuous growth in property values within the 
districts.361 In addition, it is essential that the redevelopment plan be accurate about the 
market conditions and carried out on schedule.362
Institutional Capacity 
Creating and maintaining a TIF district requires significant institutional capacity. TIF is 
complex, often requiring the expertise of municipal-bond financing experts, economic 
development experts, real estate appraisers, civil engineers, financial analysts, and 
consulting planners.363
Equity Considerations 
Housing prices in an area may rise due to TIF investment, pricing out many current 
residents. To the extent that these residents are likely to be low-income households (low-
income households are likely to be concentrated in the blighted neighborhoods targeted 
for TIF-funded redevelopment), TIF can negatively impact vertical equity. Some states, 
including California, have tried to address this problem by allotting a portion of TIF funds 
to affordable housing. However, demographic shifts can still occur.364
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TIF can also negatively impact horizontal equity. To the extent that property taxes would 
have increased without the use of TIF, the capture of the entire property-tax increment by 
the TIF district results in less tax revenues for other taxing agencies, such as the school 
district, county, or city. Therefore, TIF can negatively impact essential services such as 
schools or health care. It can be politically difficult to create TIF districts when tax-deprived 
school districts or hospital districts offer political resistance.365 Some states, again including 
California, have tried to address this situation by allowing other taxing districts to share the 
tax increment with the TIF authority.366
Case Study Selection Criteria 
The case study selection criteria include the following:
• TIF funding for transit projects. TIF must be used specifically to fund transit projects, 
such as stations or transit infrastructure, as opposed to funding only TODs.
• Geographic spread and intensity of use. The West and Midwest, especially California 
and Illinois, are the regions with the most TIF use. Therefore, deliberate efforts were 
made to include cases from these regions.
• The TIF districts must be already formed
• Data must be available
The following cases were selected: Contra Costa Centre Transit Village, Contra Costa 
County, CA; Wilson Station, Chicago, IL; and Portland Streetcar, Portland, OR. The 
fourth case, Ground Transportation Center, Cedar Rapids, IA, uses TIF as well as Joint 
Development and Air Rights. It is discussed among the Joint Development and Air Rights 
cases.
CONTRA COSTA CENTRE TRANSIT VILLAGE, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CA
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) Pleasant Hill Station is located in Contra Costa 
County, CA. The station is the site of a mixed-use TOD called the Contra Costa Centre 
(CCC) Transit Village. The village was financed through a variety of funding mechanisms, 
including TIF and cost-sharing agreements between the public agencies and private 
developers, under a public-private partnership (PPP) framework. The village facilities are 
all within one-quarter mile of the BART station fare gates and include the following land 
uses:367 
• 422 residential apartments (including 85 affordable units)
• 100 for-sale condominiums (planned but not yet built)
• 35,590 square feet of local-resident-serving retail space
• 19,400 square feet of business conference center space (planned but not yet built)
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• 270,000 square feet of office space (planned but not yet built)
• A 1,550-space parking garage (TIF-funded replacement parking for BART)368
BART Overview
BART is a heavy-rail-based transit system that began operating in 1972.369 Consisting of 
five lines that serve 44 stations, BART provides regional transit for San Francisco Bay 
Area residents and connects San Francisco with the cities to the east and south.370 With 
an average weekday ridership of more than 300,000, BART is one of the nation’s highest-
ridership rapid-transit systems.371  
The Pleasant Hill Station is near the end of the Pittsburgh/Bay Point—SFO-Millbrae Line 
in the East Bay (see Figure 10). 
PPP Overview
The CCC Transit Village is a product of a partnership between the Contra Costa County, 
the Contra Costa County Redevelopment Agency (RDA), BART, Avalon Bay Communities, 
Inc., and Millennium Partners.372 
A joint powers authority (JPA) was created to manage the property, with representatives 
from Contra Costa County, the Contra Costa County RDA, and BART on the board of 
directors. The JPA is called the Pleasant Hill BART Leasing Authority. BART has leased the 
property in the station area to the JPA, which in turn has subleased it to the developers—
Millennium Partners and Avalon Bay Communities—for 100 years. The ground-lease 
payments made by the developers to the JPA are shared by BART (25 percent) and the 
county (75 percent).373  The lease revenues over the 100-year lease period are estimated 
to be from approximately $700 million to $1 billion.374
All property in the CCC Transit Village is BART-owned except the for-sale condominiums 
(yet to be built). The land is leased to the developers, and three agencies have agreed 
to finance different portions of the project (the finance plan is summarized in Table 15):375
• The county issued $135 million in bonds to finance the residential portion.
• The RDA contributed $59.5 million toward the parking garage, station infrastructure, 
and various other improvements.
• The developers contributed $3.9 million toward the parking garage, $11.9 million 
toward the residential development, and $131 million toward the office space.376
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Figure 10. Map of the BART System
Source: Bay Area Rapid Transit, “Station List,” http://www.bart.gov/stations/index.aspx (accessed July 23, 2011).
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Table 15. Finance Plan for the CCC Transit Village 
Amount of Funding ($ millions)
Funding Source Phase I (Garage)
Phase II 
(Residential/Retail)
Phase III 
(Office) Total
Public  59.5
RDA BART parking 45.3
RDA backbone infrastructure   2.7
RDA place-making   9.0
RDA housing   2.5
Public/private 135.0
Tax-exempt MF bonds 135.0
Private 171.8
Backbone infrastructure  3.9  11.9 131.0
Total 49.2 186.1 131.0 366.3
 
Source: James Kennedy, “Building a Heart at Contra Costa Centre: Practices and Perspectives,” Summer 2008, p. 12, 
http://centrepoints.org/pdf/BuildingAHeart.pdf (accessed December 10, 2011).
The transit-village design is the result of a charrette process that began in 2001. The 
charrette involved the local community members, the county, BART, and Millennium 
Partners. It was an important part of the development process, as previous development 
efforts had failed to gain stakeholder acceptance. Championed by one redevelopment 
agency board member as a tool for creating a development proposal, the six-day design 
charrette produced the concept, design guidelines, and attendant zoning framework for 
the village.377 The plan was approved by the County Planning Commission in 2005.
The CCC Transit Village is being built in three phases: 
• Phase I: replacement BART parking garage (2006–2008)
• Phase II: residential/retail (2008–2011)
• Phase III: offices (construction not yet started)
Phase I is complete, and Phase II is partially complete. The rental residential units and 
retail space are complete, while the for-sale condominiums have not been built. Ground 
has not yet been broken for two blocks of office space scheduled to be built in Phase III. 
Phases II and III are victims of unfortunate timing. Housing bonds totaling $125 million 
were sold by the county in mid-July 2008 to pay for Phase II.378 However, the real estate 
market downturn halted the development of the 100 condominiums and the Phase III office 
space.379
In spite of the downturn, the developed portions of the CCC Transit Village have done 
reasonably well. The village accommodates more than 2,300 residents, 5,000 employees, 
and 6,000 BART riders per day. Although the retail space has not done very well, the rental 
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residential units are fully occupied.380 The village is projected to generate $8 million in TIF 
revenue annually.381 
Station-Area Development Funds
The Contra Costa County RDA contributed TIF funds for the construction of the transit 
village. The largest share of the RDA funds was spent on the parking garage that was 
constructed to replace the surface parking lot that was displaced by the development. 
Additional TIF funds were used for infrastructure development.382 
The TIF revenues came from the Contra Costa Centre redevelopment area—one of five 
redevelopment areas in Contra Costa County.383 The other four areas are the Bay Point 
redevelopment area, the North Richmond redevelopment area, the Rodeo redevelopment 
area, and Montalvin Manor. 
Contra Costa Centre Redevelopment Area
Located along the I-680 corridor and the BART line, the Contra Costa Centre redevelopment 
area includes 125 acres surrounding the Pleasant Hill BART Station. Created in 1984, 
the redevelopment area was planned to operate for 40 years, until 2024. The RDA was 
authorized to collect up to $90 million in tax increment, at which point it was required to 
either stop collecting the tax increment or amend the terms of the redevelopment-area 
formation through further legislation.384 Tax increment from the redevelopment area rose 
steadily between 1986 and 2011 (see Figure 11).385 
Figure 11. Annual Tax Increment Collected from the Contra Costa Centre 
Redevelopment Area 
Source: Contra Costa County RDA, “Contra Costa County Redevelopment Agency Tax Increment History - FY 86 to 
date” (2011).
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Historically, the redevelopment area was agricultural. However, rapid low-density suburban 
residential development followed soon after the beginning of BART service in 1973. 
Higher-density land uses started replacing single-family homes near the station in the late 
1970s to take advantage of BART access.386 A 1975 plan sought to bring some order and 
cohesion to the station-area development, which had been a medley of low- and high-
density developments. The plan established a three-acre minimum parcel size, but several 
forces worked against it, including private-developer opposition and local transportation 
circulation problems. Therefore, the plan was scrapped,387 and an amended plan was 
agreed upon by Contra Costa County, BART, the city of Pleasant Hill, and the city of 
Walnut Creek.388 The plan was later re-examined and updated and was approved by the 
County Board of Supervisors in 1998.389
The updated plan’s overall goals are to (1) allow high-intensity land uses with the station 
area as a focal point, (2) develop higher-density housing in the area north of the station 
(north of Las Juntas), and (3) maintain low-intensity uses in the Buskirk frontage area, 
which has access limitations (see Figure 12).390 The plan seeks to redevelop the areas 
within three main categories: land use and development, transportation and circulation, 
and urban design. Some of the main goals and objectives for each category are listed 
below:391
1. Land use and development 
• Increase the density of office, retail, housing, and institutional uses
• Integrate housing into the station area
• Develop retail, commercial, and other public services in the station area and 
nearby
• Provide opportunities for mixed land uses
• Prohibit low-density development where inappropriate
• Develop cooperatively with BART and the private sector to maximize station-area 
resources392
2. Transportation and circulation
• Maximize the use of public transit for residents and businesses
• Improve local transit service to and from the station area, including automobile 
access
• Improve bicycle and pedestrian amenities and safety
• Replace parking that is displaced by the station-area development 393
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3. Urban design
• Create a positive station appearance and an image with local identity
• Protect native oaks and incorporate them into the design
• Provide a network of open spaces
• Promote good design for functionality and personal safety
• Create a pedestrian-friendly environment through good design features394
Figure 12. Pleasant Hill BART Station Redevelopment Area
Source: Contra Costa County, “Amended Pleasant Hill BART Station Area Specific Plan,” (October 6, 1998), p. 9, 
www.ccreach.org/ccc_redevelopment/PHB%20Specific%20Plan.pdf (accessed July 25, 2011).
Details of TIF for the Transit Village
Garage construction was one of the obstacles to the BART-station-area development 
because of BART’s one-to-one parking replacement policy, which effectively requires 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
75
Tax Increment Financing
that any development that displaces BART parking must replace it with an equal amount 
of parking. This policy often requires construction of very expensive structured parking 
(i.e., a garage).395 The requirement came about after a 2002 decision by BART board to 
provide paid parking for commuters.396 Thus, the parking garage was a prerequisite for the 
development of the CCC Transit Village. 
The RDA originally agreed to pay $27 million for the parking garage.397 Construction began 
in 2006 at an estimated cost of $35 million.398 By the time the garage was completed in 
2008, the cost had escalated to $52 million. The RDA increased its contribution to $47 
million.399 Construction of the CCC Transit Centre began soon after the completion of the 
garage.400
Additional RDA funds paid for the backbone infrastructure, beautification, and place-
making around the station:401
• $2.5 million was used for the backbone infrastructure.
• $4 million was used for beautification of the station to match the colors and accents 
of the transit village.
• $9 million was used for place-making projects, such as the plaza, street furniture, 
and public art.402
Case Analysis 
Enabling Legal Environment for TIF Use 
California redevelopment law allowed the use of TIF funds for station-area development.403 
Redevelopment in California began after the passage of the California Community 
Redevelopment Act of 1945,404 which was intended to help cities and counties ameliorate 
urban blight. Redevelopment in California was shaped by a series of laws passed in the 
next few years, including a 1951 amendment to the tax code that laid the groundwork for 
TIF by allowing future taxes to pay for redevelopment projects.405 In 1952, the California 
Community Redevelopment Law was enacted, allowing the distribution of tax increment to 
agencies, making California the first state to allow TIF.406 
There were 397 active RDAs in California in 2011.407 However, effective February 1, 2012, 
the RDAs were dissolved. Successor agencies are managing the RDAs’ liabilities and 
disposing of their assets. 
Typical redevelopment projects include:408
• Affordable housing
• Roads, water and drainage systems, and public works and infrastructure
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• Community centers, parks, libraries, public-safety buildings, and other community 
facilities
• Investment in small businesses and revitalization of downtown shopping districts
• Revitalization of run-down, blighted neighborhoods to reduce crime
• Landscaping, street improvements, and greenbelt creation409
Enabling Environment for Joint Development 
A disposition and development agreement (DDA) and the JPA created the enabling 
framework for the CCC Transit Centre joint development. California state law Chapter 5, 
Division 7, Title 1 allows for the creation of JPAs and also allows multiple agencies to act 
as a single entity with a single board of directors.410 The JPA manages the transit village 
and distributes revenues between its partners according to the terms of the DDA. 
Stakeholder Support 
Garnering stakeholder support, especially from the community, was critical for the joint 
development construction. Previous attempts to develop the property had failed to gain 
community support. For example, one proposal for high-density office space around the 
station was swiftly rejected by the community, as well as by BART and developers.411 
Community involvement in the CCC Transit Village design ensured that the local community 
was satisfied.
The project has attracted some community opposition, although not a significant amount. 
Citing RDA indebtedness and opposition from neighborhood residents as the primary 
reasons, a 2002–2003 Grand Jury report recommended that the RDA not get involved 
in the project. The Grand Jury noted that the RDA is interpreting its powers “liberally” by 
working with BART to pay for the garage.412
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
The strength of the real estate market has influenced this development. Its plans were 
amended or delayed because of economic slowdowns at several points in its 40-year 
history. As of 2011, the real estate market was sluggish in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
especially in outlying areas, such as Walnut Creek and Pleasant Hill.413 This softness 
in real estate demand, especially office-space demand, has delayed Phase III of the 
development.414 The Phase II construction of 100 condominiums was also delayed because 
of poor housing demand. 
Despite these shortcomings, the CCC Transit Village is a stable investment for the county, 
the RDA, and BART. TIF revenues have increased from $6 million in 2007, before the 
village was built, to more than $8 million in 2011 (see Figure 11). The county expects to 
receive a 7 percent return on its investment in the long term. Guaranteed to receive 25 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
77
Tax Increment Financing
percent of the lease payments, a new garage, and increased revenue from additional fare-
box collection,415 BART has found a stable revenue source without taking significant risk.
The lease payments allow the public agencies (the county and BART) to share future 
profits. They include minimum guaranteed rent (a fixed annual rent), percentage rent (a 
proportion of the adjusted gross income [AGI]), bonus rent (a proportion of the AGI, after 
the AGI reaches a minimum threshold), and participation rent (a portion of the net proceeds 
from the sale of condominiums).416
Institutional Capacity 
The institutional capacity needed to set up and administer a TIF district is likely to be a 
major factor in a jurisdiction’s ability to use TIF funding for transportation projects. The 
administrative costs for the CCC redevelopment area were about $0.5 million annually 
between FY 2005 and FY 2010 (see Table 16). Contra Costa County already had an RDA 
to form and administer the TIF district, but jurisdictions that do not have such an agency 
may need additional staff and resources. 
Table 16. Administrative Costs for the CCC Redevelopment Area, FY 2005 to FY 
2010
Fiscal Year
 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10
Administrative expenditures ($ millions) 443,070 542,895 451,059 524,537 510,753 407,340
Source: Contra Costa County Redevelopment Agency, RDA Expenditures 2005–2010.
In addition to the administrative capacity needed for the TIF district, the joint-development 
portion of the project also required considerable administrative capacity to form the JPA 
and develop and administer the DDA.
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
Overall, the CCC Transit Centre Village has been horizontally equitable for the parties 
involved. The RDA receives 75 percent of the lease revenue, and BART receives the other 
25 percent, along with other benefits, including increased transit ridership. Additionally, 
BART retains land ownership.417 While the county’s large share of the lease revenue may 
seem inequitable, it is fair because the county took all of the initial financial risk. Between 
2008 and 2011, the county received around $1.8 million in lease revenue418 and will 
continue to receive revenue over the entire course of the lease period.
The RDA benefits from the dramatically increased tax increment. As shown in Figure 11, 
the revenues have increased to more than $8 million annually. This number will only go up 
with the development of the rest of the village. Furthermore, the development has been 
equitable for the community residents as well. 
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Finally, the CCC Transit Village Centre is vertically equitable for the community, as 20 
percent of the condominiums are affordable-housing units, a proportion secured by the 
RDA in its negotiations with the developers. 
WILSON YARD STATION, CHICAGO, IL
Overview 
Illinois is one of the nation’s leading users of TIF. Its TIF-enabling legislation, called the 
Illinois Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act, was passed in January 1977. As of 
2006, there were nearly a thousand TIF districts in the state, about 16 percent of them in 
Chicago.419
Several conditions must be met in order to create a TIF district in Illinois (see Appendix 
D for the list of conditions). Blight-related requirements must be met, or the area must be 
designated as a conservation area (for buildings over 35 years old) or an industrial park 
conservation area. The presence of certain land uses, such as mines and quarries, may 
also qualify an area for TIF.420 The “but for test” must also be met—the municipality must 
demonstrate that the conditions would not improve without the creation of a TIF district.421 
Once the requirements are met, a detailed project-area redevelopment plan must be 
prepared and made available for public input. Finally, the TIF proposal must be approved 
by the City Council or the relevant governing body.422
TIF Funding for Public Transportation
Illinois does not specifically prohibit the use of TIF for public transportation. Although the 
list of eligible uses does not include public transportation, funds have been used for transit-
station redevelopment, but not for the rolling stock. 
Eligible uses of TIF include the following:
• Property acquisition
• Rehabilitation or renovation of existing public or private buildings
• Construction of public works or improvements
• Job retraining programs
• Relocation
• Financing costs, including interest assistance
• Studies, surveys, and plans
• Professional services such as architectural, engineering, legal, property marketing, 
and financial planning
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• Demolition and site preparation
• Day-care services423
TIF in Chicago 
TIF has been used extensively in Chicago, where there were 166 active TIF areas as of 
June, 2011. Chicago is subdivided into seven districts, each with several TIF areas. These 
TIF areas cover a large proportion of the land within the districts (some cover more than 
half of the district area). The Housing and Economic Development Department is in charge 
of overseeing TIF in the city.424  
Chicago’s long history of successful TIF implementation includes working with local 
industries to create jobs. In fact, the Housing and Economic Development Department’s 
stated objective is to “help local companies expand and create employment opportunities 
for Chicago residents.”425 Several TIF-funded programs—including TIFworks and the Small 
Business Improvement Fund—have provided non-repayable grants for local businesses 
to train employees, create new jobs, and improve buildings.426  Recently, the city worked 
with a local business, Accretive Health, to create 650 new entry-level jobs in addition to 
retaining 175 current positions in exchange for $6 million in TIF funds. The funds were 
used to refurbish the company’s headquarters. Without them, the company might have 
relocated its headquarters elsewhere. 
Public Transit in Chicago, the Red Line, and Wilson Station
The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) operates the second-largest public transportation 
system in the United States. The system serves the city of Chicago and 40 surrounding 
suburbs.427
Chicago is famous for its L, or elevated, trains, which have been in operation since the late 
19th century. The L is a heavy-rail system that runs partly on elevated tracks and partly 
underground. The L system was formerly run by several competing private companies, 
which unified in 1924 but remained privately run. In 1947, the CTA took over operation of 
the L system. It then consolidated the system and streamlined its operations in order to 
make the system competitive with the automobile.428 
The CTA’s costs rose rapidly throughout the 1970s. The task of providing transit became 
increasingly difficult with rapid auto-dependent, low-density suburbanization. The CTA 
system ridership was at its lowest level in the 1980s and 1990s, and service was cut 
drastically. Several new efficiencies were introduced in the late 1990s, including the use of 
magnetic swipe cards and one-person train operations. These efficiencies reduced costs 
significantly, leading to a fiscal surplus for the first time in decades. As a result, the CTA 
restarted previously cut services, including night and weekend services, on some lines.429
Today, with 140 bus routes and eight rail lines, the CTA is the dominant bus and rapid-transit 
service operator in the greater Chicago area. It has one of the highest overall riderships 
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in the country, with about 1 million daily weekday bus riders and almost 700,000 weekday 
rail riders, for a combined weekday ridership of 1.7 million.430
The Red Line
Running North-South through the greater Chicago area, the Red Line is the Chicago’s main 
and busiest transit line.431 Serving 167,000 customers on weekdays and approximately 
130,000 on Saturdays, the Red Line connects several popular destinations, including the 
major universities, sports stadiums, and the downtown loop area.432 
Wilson Station
Wilson Station is on the Chicago L Red Line. In addition to serving the Red Line, it serves 
four bus connections.433  Constructed in 1900, the station over time earned a notorious 
reputation as one of the worst CTA-run rail stations. A 2009 article gave Wilson Station the 
dubious distinction of being Chicago’s “crustiest and most rotten” station.434 Undoubtedly, 
it was in dire need of redevelopment. 
Wilson Yard TIF District 
Authorized for 25 years, the Wilson Yard TIF district was created in 2001. A 144-acre site 
located in the Uptown neighborhood, the area is a mix of commercial, institutional (Truman 
College and the CTA-owned Wilson Yard), and residential uses.435
The Uptown neighborhood is home to several ethnic groups who moved in the 1970s and 
1980s. By 1990, about one-third of the residents were foreign-born436 and low-income. The 
1990 MFI was about half the citywide average. However, in recent years, the neighborhood 
has gentrified, and real estate prices have risen.
Redeveloping the Wilson Yard site is one of the TIF district’s primary goals.437 The district 
suffered from deteriorating buildings and traffic congestion,438 and the site was used by the 
CTA for maintenance purposes. Part of the redevelopment plan for the TIF district involves 
moving Wilson Station from its original location north of Wilson Avenue to the Wilson Yard 
site. 
A study in 2000 found the Wilson Yard area eligible for TIF funding.439 Eighty-five percent 
of the 289 buildings in the area were more than 35 years old. The study found that several 
buildings were dilapidated, were below code standards, had inadequate facilities, and 
lacked property-value growth.440 
The redevelopment-plan objectives included the following:441
• Preserve existing cultural diversity and preserve residences and businesses 
• Facilitate development of vacant and underutilized land
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• Redevelop the Wilson Yard site in a way that enhances the neighborhood’s 
attractiveness 
• Support Wilson Station relocation
• Improve major thoroughfares’ physical condition (i.e., building conditions, 
streetscaping, and walkability) 
• Preserve and encourage retail, commercial, and institutional uses and historically 
significant buildings
• Create distinctive streetscaping and landscaping that creates a cohesive 
neighborhood feel and support improvements in accessibility for persons with 
disabilities
• Encourage opportunities for women and minority-owned businesses; support locally 
owned businesses and jobs and training programs
Totaling close to $7 million in 2010, the TIF revenues are substantial and have funded 
several projects in the district (see Table 17). 
After earlier attempts to renovate the station had failed, TIF funds maintenance and 
improvements were authorized in February 2010 through an intergovernmental agreement 
between the CTA and the city of Chicago. The main improvements to the station are 
interior and exterior repairs to the Gerber building, which houses the station and the retail 
concession area.442 Other improvements include replacing the roof on the Gerber building, 
the electrical system, the plumbing, and the heating and cooling system.443 Additional 
improvements include asbestos and lead-paint remediation, relocation of the customer 
assistance booth and turnstiles from the mezzanine to a first-floor location closer to the 
station entrance, addition of new turnstiles, light-emitting diode (LED) illumination on the 
exterior of the station building, new floor tiles, and walls and passageway clean-up.
The total TIF funding for these improvements cannot exceed $3 million (see line 13 in 
Table 17).444 The renovations began in 2010 and are currently under way.445 An additional 
$6 million in federal funds was granted in October 2011 for exterior rehabilitation and 
installation of a new elevator.446
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Table 17. Projected TIF Balances for the Wilson Yard District, 2009–2011
 Year Status Project Amount ($) Balance ($)
  1. FY beginning cash balance 2009 Appropriated 11,447,451 11,447,451 
  2. Pre-acquisition account increase 2009 Appropriated (50,000) 11,397,451 
  3. Professional services account increase 2009 Appropriated (62,208) 11,335,243 
  4. Truman College IGA annual payment 2009 Committed (1,135,660) 10,199,583 
  5. Annual debt service payment Wilson Yard 
      notes—March 2009 2009 Committed (3,327,457) 6,872,126 
  6. Broadway streetscape, widening of 
      Broadway (Montrose to Wilson) construction 2009 Committed (3,750,000) 3,122,126 
  7. Estimated incremental property-tax revenue 2010 Committed 5,164,319 8,286,445 
  8. Administrative costs 2010 Committed (96,500) 8,189,945 
  9. Truman College IGA annual payment 2010 Committed (1,135,660) 7,054,286 
10. Arai School facility improvements and 
      parking lot 2010 Committed (1,491,173) 5,563,113 
11. Annual debt service payment Wilson Yard 
      notes—March 2010 2010 Committed (3,572,867) 1,990,246 
12. Clifton/Magnolia Apts. annual payment 2010 Pending (375,000) 1,615,246 
13. CTA Wilson Stop improvements 2010 Proposed (3,000,000) (1,384,754)
14. Estimated incremental property-tax 
      revenue 2011 Committed 5,164,319 3,779,565 
15. Administrative costs 2011 Committed (96,500) 3,683,065 
16. Truman College IGA annual payment 2011 Committed (1,135,660) 2,547,406 
17. Annual debt service payment Wilson Yard 
      notes—March 2011 2011 Committed (3,572,867) (1,025,462)
18. Clifton/Magnolia Apts. annual payment 2011 Pending (375,000) (1,400,462)
 
Source: City of Chicago, “Projected TIF Balances 2009–2011,” http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/
dcd/general/ProjectedTIFFundBalances2009_2011.pdf (accessed December 10, 2011).
Case Analysis 
Enabling Environment 
The Illinois Redevelopment Act does not prohibit TIF funding for transit projects. 
Furthermore, Wilson Station was clearly eligible for TIF funding because it was blighted 
and a conservation site. 
Institutional Capacity 
Significant institutional capacity is needed to form and administer a TIF district. As shown 
in line 8 of Table 17, $96,500 was spent to administer the district in 2011. While this may 
seem small compared to the TIF district’s annual revenue, the amount would probably 
be much higher for a city that lacks Chicago’s experience and qualified personnel to 
administer the TIF.  
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Stakeholder Support 
The city is divided into 50 wards, each represented by one alderman. The past and present 
aldermen and the CTA approached the city with the station redevelopment proposal. There 
was no significant public opposition to using TIF for station redevelopment.447
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
Wilson Station is an important feature of the Wilson Yard TIF district. Since TIF funds were 
clearly needed to refurbish the station, their use was equitable and probably welcomed by 
most residents and stakeholders in the neighborhood. 
Furthermore, use of TIF revenues for public transportation is horizontally equitable, 
as it improves accessibility for all neighborhood residents. By improving access to the 
neighborhood and by providing more transportation options, the refurbished Wilson 
Station has helped other groups as well. For example, businesses should benefit from the 
increased foot traffic, and the college students and faculty benefit from safe and improved 
access to their campuses. These indirect benefits are in addition to the direct benefits that 
automobile users and pedestrians will receive from the improved TIF-funded roadways 
and streetscapes.
The use of TIF to fund public transportation in also vertically equitable to the extent that 
low-income people with lower ability to own an automobile are more likely to be dependent 
on public transportation. 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
The Wilson Yard TIF district has generated substantial revenues. The impact of the 
economic and real estate downturn has been minimal, with slight revenue dips in 2007 
and 2009 (see Table 18). Overall, annual revenues have grown more than twofold, from 
approximately $3 million in 2002 to $7 million in 2010.
Table 18. Annual Revenues from the Wilson Yard TIF District
Year
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Revenue ($) 3,149,560 2,353,252 4,668,195 5,204,329 6,242,206 5,773,569 6,817,006 6,066,563 6,979,897
Year-to-Year 
Change (%)
 –25a 98 11 24 –8 18 –11 15
a The decrease in revenue is due to the fall in total assessed value of the property. The value decreased as a result of 
land acquisition and the removal of dilapidated structures.
Source: Data for 2002–2008 are from 2002–2008 Wilson Yard TIF Annual Reports, http://www.aldermanshiller.com/
content/view/576/170/.
Data for 2009–2010 are from the 2010 Annual Report,  http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/dcd/
tif/10reports/T_110_WilsonYardAR10.pdf.
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CENTRAL STREETCAR PROJECT, PORTLAND, OR
Overview
Planned and built in the 1990s and 2000s, the Portland Streetcar Project was intended to 
link Portland’s neighborhoods with quality transportation and to spur development along 
the streetcar lines. Four streetcar lines were built on the west side of the Willamette River 
in the 2000s in the Central Streetcar Project, which includes 46 stops in an eight-mile 
continuous loop.448 The streetcar lines were funded with a combination of funds, including 
TIF and SADs.449 
This case study discusses the use of both TIF (through URAs) and LIDs (SADs are called 
LIDs in Oregon) to fund this project.
Tax Increment Financing
History of Urban Renewal and TIF in Portland 
A 1951 state law authorized urban renewal in Oregon. The legislation authorizes cities to 
use federal funding and TIF revenues to revitalize inner-city areas.450 In 1958, Portland 
residents voted to create an urban renewal agency called the Portland Development 
Commission (PDC).451 
Creation of URAs
In Portland, URAs—which are called TIF districts in other states—are created when 
community organizations and the PDC recognize that an area is in need of improvements. 
The state requires a finding of blight, and the residents and the PDC must come to 
an agreement on the URA boundaries, taking into consideration ways to “maximize 
the effectiveness of planned projects and programs” as well as “economic, legal, and 
political considerations.”452  The financial plans are developed for the URA, legal analysis 
is conducted, and community input is considered before the City Council approves the 
urban-renewal plans.453  
Funding for URAs has completely changed since they were first created after World War II. 
URAs today are funded through TIF, after federal funding for urban renewal was cut back 
in the 1970s.454 At that time, the Oregon legislature increased the applicability of URAs 
by expanding the definition of blight. However, funding was restricted two decades later, 
in 1991, when Oregon passed legislation that capped the property-tax rate. Measure 5, 
which places a tax ceiling of one percent on real market value, required many URAs to 
reduce tax rates.455  
The URAs are created for a finite period, after which they expire and normal taxing rules 
apply. For example, the North Macadam URA was created in 1999 and will expire in 2020. 
Since its creation, the PDC has created 20 URAs, 11 of which are currently active.456
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Enabling Legislation
Oregon’s legislation allows TIF to be used for transportation capital investments, enabling 
Portland to fund a significant portion of its streetcar lines with it. Other Oregon cities have 
taken advantage of this legal provision as well—for example, Eugene used TIF to construct 
a transit center.457 The TIF funds must be used only for capital expenditures and are 
prohibited from funding operations and maintenance. The following uses are permissible 
under the Oregon law:
• Permanent public improvements such as transportation facilities, lighting, trees, 
parks, utilities
• Financial and technical assistance for private reinvestment, including storefront 
grants, home repairs and improvements, and commercial rehabilitation incentives
• Funding partnerships for new housing and mixed-use developments
• Land acquisition (typically for key redevelopment sites or public projects)
• Planning of capital projects (including development of urban-renewal plans) and 
general administrative costs related to the activities of the URA458
URA Funding of the Central Streetcar Project 
A total of five URAs have funded the Central and Eastside Streetcar projects. These URAs 
are highlighted by arrows in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Urban Renewal Areas in Portland, OR
Source: PDC, “Current Projects,” http://www.pdc.us/currentwork/default.asp (accessed July 16, 2011).
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Three URAs funded the Central Streetcar Project: North Macadam, South Park Blocks, 
and River District. Funding for initial capital expenditure came from TIF-backed bonds, 
which were paid back with revenue collected from the three URAs.459
The North Macadam URA was created in 1999. At that time, the North Macadam area 
was largely underutilized and vacant, with some brown-field developments. It also lacked 
transportation access. Since then, North Macadam has turned around and has become a 
central city hub with new employment centers, housing, parks, and transportation options. 
A new biosciences facility currently in the planning stage is expected to bring new jobs. 
The area’s successful transportation improvements have helped improve accessibility and 
spur growth.460
Created in 1985, the South Park Blocks area consists of several neighborhoods. Some of 
the major development goals for the area include supporting and expanding the downtown 
retail area, assisting the advancement of Portland State University, and preserving the 
West End mixed-income neighborhood.461
Created in 1988, the River District includes what is known as the Pearl District (the former 
location of the Burlington Northern rail yards), Old Town, Chinatown neighborhoods, and 
the Union Station area. The district has sought to create a new neighborhood at the site of 
the former rail yards, connect neighborhoods to the waterfront, and develop infrastructure, 
such as parks, the streetcar, and parking. The district is intended to be a “24-hour,” dense, 
urban area with a mix of residential and commercial uses oriented toward the Willamette 
River.462
Annual TIF Revenues Dedicated to the Central Streetcar Project
Portland’s Central Streetcar Project was developed in four phases and opened throughout 
the 2000s. TIF revenues were a major funding source.463 Details of the four lines are listed 
in Table 19. 
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Table 19. URA Funding of Portland Central Streetcar Project Capital Cost
Streetcar Line
Legacy Good Samaritan 
Hospital to Portland State 
University 
(Phase I and II)
Portland State 
University to 
RiverPlace
(Phase 3a)
RiverPlace 
to SW Gibbs 
Street
(Phase 3b)
SW Moody and 
Gibbs to SW Lowell
(Phase 3c)
Length/type of 
track 2.4 miles of double track
0.6 miles of double 
track
0.6 miles of 
single track
0.4 miles of double 
track
Service began July 20, 2001 March 11, 2005 October 20, 2006 August 17, 2007
Capital budget 
($ millions) 56.9 16.0 15.8 14.45 
Funds from 
URA ($ millions) 7.5 8.4 3.8 1.8 
Percent of 
capital budget 
from URA
13.18 52.50 24.05 12.46
URA involved South Park Blocks North Macadam North Macadam North Macadam
Source: Portland Streetcar, Inc., Portland Streetcar Capital and Operations Funding (September 2010).
Proportion of TIF Revenues Expended on the Central Streetcar Project 
For the North Macadam URA, the percentage of the total revenue expended on the streetcar 
was highest in FY 2002 through FY 2005, when the streetcar expenditures accounted for 
more than half of the URA budget (see Table 20).464 
Table 20. Percentage of North Macadam URA Expenditures on Portland Central 
Streetcar Project
FY 2000-01 
Actual
FY 2001-02 
Actual
FY 2002-03 
Actual
FY 2003-04 
Actual
FY 2004-05 
Actual
FY 2005-06 
Revised
Total expended on streetcar ($)     23,387     28,726   1,301,113  4,512,619  6,559,490    184,949
Total project expenditures ($)  2,040,059  1,683,925   2,503,041  6,382,047  8,500,280  14,871,392
Percent of total expended on streetcar       1.15       1.71      51.98      70.71      77.17       1.24
Source: PDC, Adopted Fiscal Year Budgets (2000 to 2006), http://www.pdc.us/budget/default.asp (accessed July 16, 
2011).
South Park Blocks URA revenues funded the streetcar line from Legacy Good Samaritan 
Hospital to Portland State University from 1998 through 2002. The funds spent per year 
are summarized in Table 21.
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Table 21. Percentage of South Park Blocks URA Expenditures on Portland Central 
Streetcar Project
 FY 1998-99 FY 1999-2000 FY 2000-01 FY 2001-02
Total expended on streetcar ($) 163,671 7,915,850 8,866 196,319 
Total revenue expended ($) 12,780,443 11,587,773 1,907,910 13,948,340
Percent of total expended on streetcar 1.28 68.31 0.46 1.41
Source: PDC, Adopted Fiscal Year Budgets (1998 to 2002), http://www.pdc.us/budget/default.asp (accessed July16, 
2011).
Legal Challenges to TIF
The use of URA funds for the Portland Streetcar Project has not encountered legal 
challenges to date.465 URA funds were previously used for other transit projects in the city, 
such as light-rail lines, so any legal challenges to the use of URA funds for transit were 
probably resolved in those projects.466 Additionally, the enabling legislation clearly allows 
the use of TIF revenue for transportation capital expenditures. 
It is important to note that URA funds have not been used to purchase rolling stock (rail 
cars). Since rolling stock is not used exclusively within a specific URA, the use of URA 
funds to purchase it was considered a legal grey area.467
Local Improvement Districts
Overview
Portland has used LIDs as funding sources to help finance all phases of the Central 
Streetcar Project. A new LID was created for each phase, sometimes using many different 
assessment methodologies.468 The LIDs are regulated by state and city laws. Formed by 
City Council resolution, LIDs are initiated by the property owners, one of the city’s bureaus, 
or the City Council.469 LIDs were approved for the Central Streetcar Project in 2000.470 The 
contributions of LID funds for the various phases of the project are detailed in Table 22.
Table 22. Total Costs of the Central Streetcar Project Funded by LIDs 
Phase Total Cost ($ millions) LID Total ($ millions) Percent LID Funded
Phase 1 & 2 56.9 9.6 17
Phase 3a 14.4 3.0 21
Phase 3b 15.8 2.0 13
Phase 3c 13.4 4.8 36
100.5 19.4 19
Source: E.D. Hovee & Company LLC, “Streetcar-Development Linkage: The Portland Streetcar Loop,” Prepared 
for City of Portland Office of Transportation (February 2008), p. 11, http://www.edhovee.com/streetcar_report.pdf 
(accessed December 10, 2011).
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Assessment Calculation Methodology 
The various phases of the Portland Central Streetcar Project used the methodologies 
outlined in Table 23 to calculate the assessments. The methodology adopted for a particular 
phase depends on a number of factors, including local circumstances and the types of 
properties within the LID.
Table 23. LID Assessment Methodology for Portland Central Streetcar Project
Phase Assessment Methodology 
Phase 1 and 2 $30 per foot of frontage + rate x property value; 2 zones; rate varies by land use and zone
Phase 3a Larger of: $6/$1,000 property value x total property value “or” $0.90/sq. ft. x land area; 2 zones; rate varies by zone 
Phase 3b $1.35 per square foot x land area x distance factor 
Phase 3c $3.23 per square foot x land area x distance factor 
Source: LID Petitions (Vicky Diede, personal communication, July 18, 2011).
The LIDs for Phases 1 and 2 contain a large number of owner-occupied residential 
properties, which increased the probability of property-owner opposition. Balancing the 
revenue loss and the possibility of such opposition, the city decided to exempt owner-
occupied residential properties from paying assessments.471 The decision was mainly 
political.
As defined in the Phase 1 and 2 LID petition memos, the LIDs extend 550 to 780 feet from 
the street abutting the streetcar line (hereafter called the streetcar street).472 The LIDs are 
divided into two zones. The first zone includes all properties within 200 feet of the streetcar 
street. Properties that abut the streetcar street are assumed to be zero feet away and are 
the properties deemed to benefit from the streetcar frontage. For these properties, the 
assessment is a sum of $30 times the linear feet of the property fronting on the streetcar 
street and property value times a base rate. The base rate varies by the principal land use 
of the property and the zone in which the parcel is located.
For example, an apartment complex in the first zone with a 100-foot streetcar street 
frontage and a value of $1 million will be assessed $8,500 ($30 x 100, or $3000, plus a 
$5.50 base rate x $1 million ÷ $1,000, which equals $5,500). A similarly valued apartment 
complex in the second zone will be assessed only $2,750 ($2.75 base rate x $1 million ÷ 
$1,000) because it does not enjoy streetcar street frontage and is further away than the 
apartment complex in the first zone.
As defined in the Phase 3a LID petition memo, the LID extends up to 720 feet (one-eighth 
of a mile) from the streetcar street.473 The properties pay assessments equal to a distance 
factor (a number that is inversely proportional to the quotient obtained by dividing the 
distance from a streetcar street by 720 feet) times the larger of (a) property value times $6 
per $1,000 of property value and (b) the parcel area of the property times $0.90 per square 
foot of parcel area. 
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For example, the assessments for a property with a value of $2 million and a land area of 
10,000 square feet that is 100 feet from a streetcar street is $10,320, computed as follows: 
value method: $6.00 ÷ $1,000 x $2,000,000 = $12,000; land-area method = $0.90 per 
square foot x 10,000 square feet = $9,000; distance factor = 1 – (100 ÷ 720) = 0.86. In this 
case, the value method applies, and the assessment = $12,000 x 0.86 = $10,320. 
As defined in the Phases 3b and 3c LID petition memos, the LIDs extend up to 1,320 feet 
(one-quarter of a mile) from the streetcar street.474 The properties are charged assessments 
equal to the land area times a base rate ($1.35 per square foot for Phase 3b and $3.23 per 
square foot for Phase 3c) times a distance factor (a number that is inversely proportional 
to the ratio resulting from dividing the distance from a streetcar street by 1,320 feet). 
For example, the assessment for a Phase 3b property with a value of $2 million and a land 
area of 10,000 square feet that is 100 feet from a streetcar street is $2,484, computed as 
follows: $1.35 ÷ $1,000 x $2,000,000 = $2,700, distance factor = 1 - (100 ÷ 1320) = 0.92. 
In this case, the estimated assessment = $2,700 x 0.92 = $2,484. 
The assessment for a similar property in Phase 3c is $5,943, computed as follows: $3.23 
÷ $1,000 x $2,000,000 = $6,460, distance factor = 1 – (100 ÷ 1320) = 0.92. In this case, 
the estimated assessment = $6,460 x 0.92 = $5,943. 
In Phases 3a, 3b, and 3c, all residential properties within the LID were assessed charges.475 
For phase 3c, Portland State University was charged a lump sum of $500,000. 
Use of Assessments to Fund the Central Streetcar Project
The city issued and sold assessment-backed bonds to pay for the construction of the 
streetcar. According to the Oregon state law, assessments cannot be levied until the proj-
ect is substantially complete. Furthermore, the property owners have the option of pay-
ing the assessments in full or over a five-, ten-, or 20-year period.476  Therefore, the as-
sessment funds are typically not available during the construction phase. The city issued 
assessment-backed bonds for the streetcar project to address this revenue-expenditure 
mismatch. The bonds were backed by the citywide LID construction fund.477 
Legal Challenges to SAD
Majority property owners supported the LIDs, as they believed that the streetcar would 
directly benefit their property.478 This support is evidenced by the fact that the LIDs were 
approved for all the phases of the Central Streetcar Project and later for the Eastside 
Streetcar Project.479 Furthermore, the PDC deliberately minimized the potential for legal 
challenges by exempting owner-occupied residential properties from paying assessments 
in several LIDs. 
TIF and LIDs: Major Revenue Sources for the Central Streetcar Project 
Portland has used TIF and LIDs to fund a large portion of the Central Streetcar Project. 
Funds from TIF and LIDs combined were used for 30 percent to 71 percent of the total capital 
costs of the project (see Table 24). The LID funding demonstrated the local community 
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support, which has been effective in leveraging federal and state investments. The project 
received significant federal and state funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, the Federal Transportation Fund, and Connect Oregon.480
Table 24. Percentages of Portland Central Streetcar Capital Expenditure Funded 
with TIF and LID Revenues
Legacy Good Samaritan 
Hospital to Portland State 
University
(Phase I and II)
Portland State University 
to RiverPlace
(Phase 3a)
RiverPlace to 
SW Gibbs Street
(Phase 3b)
SW Moody and 
Gibbs to SW Lowell
(Phase 3c)
Percent funded 
with TIF and LID 
revenues
30.05 71.25 36.71 45.67
Source: Portland Streetcar, Inc., “Portland Streetcar Capital and Operations Funding (September 2010),” http://www.
portlandstreetcar.org/pdf/%20capital_and_operations_detail_20100908.pdf (accessed July 16, 2011).
Portland cites three main success factors in the development of the Central Streetcar 
Project:
• The city documented the positive impacts of the streetcar and its philosophy of 
development-oriented transit. Development within one block of the streetcar 
increased rapidly after it was built, leading to developer and resident support for the 
project.
• The city interviewed developers and found them confident that investment in the 
streetcar would attract new development.
• LID revenues helped fund 10 percent of the streetcar—property owners believed 
that the streetcar increases property value and were therefore willing to back it 
financially.481
The LIDs used a relatively fair methodology for calculating the assessment charges. 
For most of the phases, the city calculated the assessment charge based on a parcel’s 
distance from the streetcar, as well as on the size or value of the property. This assessment 
methodology allows for lower-value properties to pay less (enhancing vertical equity) 
and also charges a lower rate to those further away from the streetcar line (enhancing 
horizontal equity).482
Case Analysis 
Enabling Legal Environment 
The state-level enabling legislation for both URAs and LIDs facilitated the use of TIF and 
LIDs. Oregon state law clearly identifies the potential uses for URA funds and allows LID 
formation through City Council resolution, among other mechanisms. 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
92 Tax Increment Financing
Stakeholder Support 
Portland received broad-based stakeholder support for URA and LID formation. Furthermore, 
the city was able to work with the stakeholders to find solutions when problems arose. 
For example, those living outside the underdeveloped North Macadam URA were initially 
concerned that their funds would be used to subsidize it. The city addressed this concern 
by creating the North Macadam Overlay, which helped specify the geography where the 
URA funds would be expended.
The city consulted with the stakeholders prior to the LID formation, thereby securing their 
strong support throughout the project. Furthermore, it revised assessments whenever 
mistakes were made in the assessment calculation process.483 
Finally, the city was strategic. In the Phase 1 and 2 LIDs, the city averted a potentially 
contentious political battle by exempting owner-occupied residential properties from paying 
assessments. 
Institutional Capacity 
LIDs and URAs both require significant institutional capacity. The bond issuance, 
preliminary studies, fee assessment, public relations management, and other activities 
involved in administering LIDs and URAs demand significant staff time and resources. The 
PDC is especially geared toward creating and administering URAs. As discussed earlier, 
cities that do not have an established and experienced redevelopment agency might find 
TIF time-consuming and taxing on the staff. Even greater institutional capacity could be 
needed if the TIF districts or LIDs are legally challenged. For Portland, the institutional 
capacity to administer the URAs and LIDs was in place.
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
Several steps were taken to make the LID assessment methodology vertically and 
horizontally equitable. Basing assessments on the size or value of the parcel advanced 
vertical equity. Distance and use-based charges advanced horizontal equity. 
The use of TIF funds for transit advanced horizontal equity, as the funds generated by a 
URA were used to fund capital expenditure within that URA. Furthermore, to the extent that 
lower-income people benefit more from transit than higher-income people, TIF funding for 
the Central Streetcar Project enhanced vertical equity as well. 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
URAs involved in funding the streetcar were impacted by the housing market downturn. 
This is especially true for URAs, such as the North Macadam and River District URAs, 
where condominiums constitute a large portion of the new development. TIF revenues in 
these areas have decreased as a result of the weakened owner-occupied residential real 
estate market. 
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In the case of LIDs, revenue is typically very stable and predictable. However, since not 
all the revenue is collected up front, there is always a possibility that property owners may 
petition for a downward revision of assessments during bad economic times. 
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V. JOINT DEVELOPMENT AND AIR RIGHTS
OVERVIEW
This chapter reviews the use of joint development and air rights to fund public transit in the 
United States, focusing on projects in which the transportation/public agencies have made 
significant use of air rights as a revenue source.
Joint development involves cooperation between private and public entities—often a transit 
agency/local government and a real estate developer—to develop a project.484 From a 
local-government perspective, joint development partnerships aim to raise revenue for the 
transit agency and/or increase ridership.485 Three features are unique to joint development:
• A joint development is a legally binding agreement between the two parties.
• The private party must compensate the public entity through payments or cost-
sharing arrangements.
• Agreements are voluntary for all parties involved.486
Joint Development Benefits to the Transit Agency
Joint developments can benefit transit agencies in a number of ways.487 First, private 
developers can compensate transit agencies for the right to develop on the agency land 
(ground-lease payments) or over the land (air-rights lease) or for the physical connection 
between their property and the transit station (station-connections fee). Furthermore, 
private developers can share the costs of construction and/or maintenance of stations and 
other facilities, such as heating and ventilation systems. 
Apart from the more straightforward revenue and cost sharing, joint developments can 
bring other benefits to transit agencies, including increased transit ridership by increasing 
station-area density or adding destinations on transit lines. The increased ridership can, in 
turn, raise the transit agency’s fare-box revenue.488 Transit agencies may also enter into 
joint agreements to promote economic development and job growth or to create affordable 
or transit-accessible housing.489
Typical Joint Development Arrangements
Four major joint development arrangements are in use, based on the ways in which the transit 
agencies and the developers can derive benefit:490 (1) revenue-sharing arrangements, (2) 
cost-sharing arrangements, (3) use of incentives, and (4) combinations of the three.491 
The lease or sale of property is the most common revenue-sharing arrangement. The 
transit agency grants developers the right to develop or occupy a piece of agency-owned 
land. 
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Operations and construction cost sharing is the second most common arrangement; in 
it, transit agencies and private developers jointly pay for construction and/or ongoing 
operations and maintenance.492 
The station-connection fee is the next most common; in it, tenants or landowners pay a fee 
to the transit agency to access the station.493 
Incentive agreements are the fourth most common arrangement. Developers are granted 
density bonuses or other benefits in exchange for contributing to the transit agency’s 
objectives. This type of agreement is most common in New York City, where density 
bonuses are extremely valuable to developers.494 Other arrangements, such as negotiated 
private contribution495 and equity participation, are less common and make up only a small 
percentage of joint development agreements nationwide.496 
In summary, the major revenue-sharing arrangements include the following:497 
• Leases (including air-rights leases, ground leases, and subterranean leases): The 
transit agency leases land or space on, below, or above the land (for example, 
space above a transit station) to the developer.
• Sale of land: The transit agency sells land to the developer.
• Station-connection fees: The tenant or property owner pays a fee to connect to the 
transit station.
The major cost-sharing tools include the following:498
• Incentive-based agreements (including negotiated private contributions): The 
transit agency grants the developer special privileges, such as a density bonus, in 
exchange for a fee that is typically used to fund transit infrastructure.
• Voluntary agreements (including construction cost sharing and operations cost 
sharing): Agreements to coordinate and fund planning, construction, or operations 
or other agreements that can reduce the costs to both the transit agency and the 
developer.
• Equity participation: The transit agency and the developer both contribute 
construction funds.499
Barriers to Joint Development
The most significant barrier to joint development is the prohibition by several states and 
counties—including Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Miami-Dade County, FL—of transit 
agencies engaging in land use activities and real estate development. With little control 
over the type and intensity of uses allowed on and near transit stations, the agencies are 
unable to create joint development proposals that are attractive to private developers. 
Even if they are allowed to undertake land use activities, transit agencies may face internal 
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opposition. Many transit-agency board members simply do not believe that their agency 
should be involved in real estate development.500 
Furthermore, transit agencies may have other policies that inhibit joint development. 
For example, BART has a one-for-one parking replacement policy that often requires 
construction of prohibitively expensive multistory parking garages to compensate for 
displaced surface parking.501
Furthermore, transit agencies may lack understanding of the complicated private real estate 
development process.502 Agencies have been known to mismanage and overestimate the 
value of their property.503 Furthermore, other public agencies, such as city governments 
or redevelopment agencies, may oppose joint development or may not view real estate 
development as within the purview of transit agencies and may not cooperate with them.504 
Private developers may also lack joint development experience. Additionally, public 
agencies may impose requirements that developers perceive as risky, such as requiring a 
mix of housing types or socioeconomic groups that, in the developers’ view, may negatively 
impact market demand.505 Other risks involved with large-scale joint development projects 
include the following:506
• The planning process and regulations can be highly complicated and place unknown 
and undue burdens on developers.507
• The request-for-proposal (RFP) process, often employed to choose the developer, 
is inherently risky for developers. 
• The unknowns of partnering with a transit agency may limit the expectations of 
developers in terms of what they can build.
• Other requirements imposed by the transit agency, such as a requirement to sell a 
certain number of units at below-market rate, may reduce profits.
Political opposition to joint development projects may also be a barrier. The surrounding 
communities may oppose them on a number of grounds, including traffic congestion, air 
and noise pollution, or the fear of lower-income residents moving in.508
History of Joint Development Projects
Joint development became popular in the United States in the early 1980s, when 10 new 
rail systems were completed.509 A 1990 study reported 117 joint development projects in 
24 cities throughout the country.510 A 2010 Government Accountability Office study reports 
166 such projects, of which just three agencies (Los Angeles Metro, Washington Metro, 
and Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit) were responsible for 58.511 Dallas, TX, San Diego, 
CA, and the San Francisco Bay Area have also used joint development extensively.512
Supportive federal policies contributed to the popularity of joint developments. The Young 
Amendment to the National Mass Transportation Act of 1974 allowed the use of federal 
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funding for joint development projects.513 Later, the Surface Transportation Act of 1978 
permitted the use of federal funds.514 During the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, 
the federal government began requiring transit agencies to receive more funds from 
local sources and to operate more efficiently, which led them to seek funding through 
nontraditional sources, such as joint development.515 Additionally, after a long period of 
decline, the real estate market began to revive in central cities in the 1980s and 1990s, 
attracting new investors and making joint development feasible in inner cities.516 
Overview of Joint Development Projects Nationally
Joint development projects are concentrated in a small number of urban areas. WMATA 
has been particularly active in joint development, with over 33 completed projects since 
the 1970s.517,518 It has used a diverse set of tools, including air rights, service-connection 
fees, and cost-sharing agreements.519 WMATA has been successful in joint development, 
in part, because it created a real estate development department that actively seeks 
out joint development opportunities. Furthermore, rather than trying to standardize the 
process, WMATA considers each opportunity on its own merits.520 It has devised a rating 
system to assess the potential of new sites and development guidelines to ensure project 
success. Seeking to attract new riders, increase revenue, and expand the tax base, these 
guidelines include maximizing the use of transit, linking land use to transit, mixing housing 
types and uses, and bringing vibrancy to urban spaces.521
New York City actively pursues joint development to renovate and redevelop existing transit 
stations,522 primarily using cost-sharing agreements.523 The regional transportation agency, 
the MTA, has worked with the planning department to provide incentives, such as floor-
area-ratio bonuses, while requiring property owners to improve subway facilities adjacent 
to their buildings. The city Planning Department has also incentivized joint development by 
relaxing station-area zoning laws, i.e., by creating special districts empowered with zoning 
flexibility while negotiating transit improvements.524
Miami-Dade County, FL, has used a different cost-sharing tool, the rapid-transit zone (RTZ), 
to encourage joint development.525 Created along rapid-transit lines,526 the RTZ lessens 
private developers’ risk by standardizing the zoning ordinances among all municipalities 
within the zone.527 Miami has also encouraged joint development along rail transit corridors 
outside of the RTZ with incentive-based agreements, such as density bonuses, and by 
supporting rail stations with new infrastructure.528
Completing five joint developments by 2011,529 Atlanta, GA, has encouraged joint 
development, especially along its Peachtree corridor, by modifying zoning ordinances to 
allow for greater density and taller buildings, which resulted in the construction of several 
new office buildings on or adjacent to Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) 
stations.530
In the San Francisco Bay Area, BART has used joint development to promote TODs near 
stations. Recent projects include the mixed-use CCC Transit Village and Fruitvale Station 
Transit Village. BART has also encouraged cooperation between other agencies and 
private developers to facilitate new growth at its Hayward Station.531 
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In the southern part of the San Francisco Bay Area, the Santa Clara Valley Transportation 
Authority (VTA), unhampered by policies such as BART’s one-to-one parking replacement 
policy, has been able to develop TOD projects in former surface parking lots.532
In Southern California, San Diego has used incentive-based agreements to encourage 
TODs.533 By streamlining the development process along transit corridors, the city has been 
able to prevent developers from building automobile-oriented developments or to require 
them to include affordable or senior housing in exchange for a streamlined development-
permit approval process.534
Other Considerations for Joint Development Use
Stakeholder Acceptance 
Joint developments must be acceptable to the transit agencies’ board members and other 
decision makers and to the local communities, other public agencies, and the city or county 
governments.
A clear joint development policy or even an unofficial internal consensus could garner 
significant acceptance for joint developments. For example, an agency should identify 
its key goals in pursuing a joint development. Should it primarily benefit the community 
(for example, through the development of affordable housing) or be devoted to the 
most profitable use? Agencies that lack clear policy objectives can get bogged down by 
disagreements or lack of direction. 
External stakeholder acceptance is important. Joint developments must win community 
support and obtain government approval. This is especially important for transit agencies 
operating in multiple jurisdictions. Such agencies might have to collaborate with several 
local governments and public agencies and win the support of multiple community groups. 
Real Estate Market Conditions 
Joint developments are impacted by market conditions. Weak real estate markets can 
reduce revenue yield. Many leases protect transit agencies from market risk by requiring 
minimum guaranteed lease payments.
Institutional Capacity 
The institutional capacity needed for joint developments varies, based on project type and 
size. Nonetheless, considerable institutional capacity is usually required to conceptualize 
developments, determine their scope, invite developers to partner in project development, 
review developers’ proposals, negotiate agreements with developers, and manage projects 
during and after construction.
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Equity Considerations 
The equity concern for joint development projects primarily revolves around whether 
the agreement benefits the involved parties in proportion to their stake and risk in the 
development (horizontal equity). Vertical equity concerns are few, because the concerned 
parties enter into joint development agreements voluntarily. 
Private developers and/or transit agencies typically finance joint developments and 
therefore bear the project risk. Horizontal equity should be considered in the lease structure 
or other financial arrangements that allocate joint development benefits, costs, and risks. 
Horizontal equity can be achieved if the benefits are in proportion to the costs incurred and 
risks taken. 
Criteria for Choosing Case Studies
The joint development projects examined in this study were chosen on the basis of the 
following criteria:
• The project must endow direct financial benefit to the transit agency through 
revenue- and/or cost-sharing arrangements.
• The value of transit service must be captured—in other words, the project was 
developed with the intention of using transit benefits, including increased real estate 
demand and transportation accessibility.
• The project is in, on, or contiguous to a transit station.
• Data on the project are available.
• The project is highlighted in the literature as a shining example of joint development.
• The project is in an urban area that is actively pursuing joint development.
• The project uses multiple joint development tools, including air rights.
The first three criteria excluded projects in which a public agency gained no direct financial 
benefit (for example, when TODs were subsidized in the hope that the development would 
increase transit ridership).
The following cases were chosen: Ground Transportation Center, Cedar Rapids, IA; 
Bethesda Metro Joint Development Project in Bethesda, MD (this is a WMATA project); 
Dadeland South Joint Development Project in Miami-Dade County, FL (this is a Miami-
Dade Transit [MDT] project); Resurgens Plaza, Atlanta, GA (a MARTA project); and CCC 
Transit Village in Contra Costa County, CA (this project is on BART property). Except for 
the CCC Transit Village, which has been discussed among the TIF cases, the projects also 
use air rights as a revenue source.
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GROUND TRANSPORTATION CENTER, CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 
Overview of Cedar Rapids, IA
Located 30 miles north of the state capital, Iowa City, Cedar Rapids is the second-largest 
city in Iowa. Its population in 2010 was 126,000.535 The three-county metropolitan statistical 
area is much larger, with a population of about 257,000.536 While not a large city, Cedar 
Rapids has grown steadily over the past 50 years, its population increasing by about 37 
percent since 1960.537 
The city has strong ties to agricultural production—a large corn and grain processing 
industry is the backbone of the city’s economy.538 Facilities of large agricultural companies, 
including Quaker Oats, Archer Daniels Midland, General Mills, and Cargill, are located in 
Cedar Rapids,539 and the railroad industry has also been important to the region.540
Overview of the Transit System in Cedar Rapids
Like many cities across the country, Cedar Rapids is sprawling, with residential and 
commercial activities located away from the urban core.541 Iowa is largely a rural state, 
with high automobile ownership.542 The Cedar Rapids public transportation system, Cedar 
Rapids Transit (CRT), reflects this characteristic, as many parts of the city are not served 
by transit (see Figure 14). 
As shown in Figure 14, CRT is a bus-only transit system with 14 routes. The agency has 
struggled to maintain ridership, a large proportion of which is generated by work trips 
from the residential areas to the downtown area.543 At the time the Ground Transportation 
Center (GTC) opened in 1984, ridership on the CRT system, mirroring the national trend, 
had been in decline for several years, and the decline continued.544  
Overview of the Ground Transportation Center
The GTC is the central bus depot serving Cedar Rapids. It is located in the southern part 
of the city, near the Cedar River, and is denoted by the bus icon in Figure 14. Twelve bus 
lines, including intercity buses, converge on the GTC, creating an easy transfer point. 
Prior to 1984, bus passengers waiting to transfer stood in the open in front of the local 
storefronts, and buses took up large amounts of on-street space.545 The city was in need 
of a public transit hub, which the GTC was intended to be. 
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Figure 14. Cedar Rapids, IA, Transit System Route Map
Source: Cedar Rapids Transit, “Routes,” http://www.cedar-rapids.org/resident-resources/Transit/routes/pages/default.
aspx (accessed July 31, 2011).
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The GTC development includes the following:
• An intermodal terminal with ticket offices, baggage storage, and parcel services
• Taxi stands, special minibus transit services, and car pickup/dropoff
• A 500-space parking garage connected to the GTC by a skywalk
• A 15-story, 160,000-square-foot office building
• A pedestrian mall/concourse that connects to the CBD
• A 96-unit housing project for the elderly and handicapped546
The GTC was developed as a joint development project. It was completed under the 
Urban Initiatives Program initiated by President Jimmy Carter.547 That program attempted 
to coordinate federal funding for inner cities and sought partnerships between the 
public and private sectors to revitalize them.548 As part of this program, the Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration (UMTA) was set up to distribute federal funding to selected 
urban transportation projects.549 To qualify for funding, the projects needed to (1) impact 
the local environment beyond traditional transportation by spurring economic development, 
(2) be transit-related, and (3) preferably be in areas the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development determined to be “stressed.”550
The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) examined projects across several cities 
throughout the state and determined that the Cedar Rapids GTC project would be a good 
candidate for federal funds, which were awarded in 1980. 
The city had two goals in mind when planning the GTC. First, it wished to spur economic 
growth in the downtown area and strengthen the transit system, and it believed the GTC 
would be a catalyst.551 Second, it sought to centralize all the modes of transportation, 
including the local and intercity buses, taxis, and paratransit.552 
The GTC is located just south of the CBD in an area that was previously run down and 
underutilized, containing warehouses and rail yards.553 The city noted that the GTC would 
spur economic development and growth around the CBD.554 
The GTC construction contract was awarded to three local firms.555 Initially, the project faced 
financial difficulty, as interest rates rose, and one of the firms—a real estate development 
firm—pulled out of the project after it was decided that a retail mall planned for the second 
story of the project was not feasible.556 The retail component was to be an extension of 
a nearby mall, but plans for the nearby mall were canceled and so were the plans for 
the extension mall at the GTC. A second developer, who was involved with the housing 
component of the GTC, withdrew shortly thereafter, citing economic reasons.557
The city scrapped the original agreement and created a new agreement with a single 
developer, an electrical contractor. The contractor took over the development rights for the 
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apartment tower and office building558 and agreed to pay the city an annual fee of $0.15 
per square foot of office tower space. The developer was given the option of selling the 
office space as condominiums, floor by floor,559 and the project was back on track after 
buyers were found for several office floors.560 
A portion of the funds needed to build the transit portion of the GTC ($10 million) came 
from the UMTA funding, and the remainder of the cost was borne by the Iowa DOT and 
by the city, using TIF funds.561 The office development was funded through industrial 
development bonds,562 and the housing portion was financed with loans from HUD and 
other conventional sources.563 The cost breakdown is shown in Table 25.
Table 25. Breakdown of Cedar Rapids, IA, GTC Building Costs
Component Description Cost ($ millions)
GTC 9,600 square feet              10.0
GTC 500 car ramp garage               2.5
Office space 13 floors;182,000 square feet; 40 units              15.0
Housing 200 units               3.0
Retail Proposed but never built
Total              30.5
Source: Forkenbrock et al., 1990, p. 44.
Use of Joint Development to Fund the GTC
Ground-lease Structure
Two intercity bus companies—Greyhound and Burlington Northern Trailways—leased 
the GTC bus bays. An initial 20-year lease was signed with Greyhound, and a five-year 
lease was signed with Burlington.564 Both companies were charged $7.20 per square foot 
annually, calculated by allocating the city’s cost of the GTC (20 percent total) to each 
carrier on the basis of square footage used, annualized at a 12-percent capitalization 
rate.565
Greyhound vacated the premises around 2005–2006, when it moved to its current airport 
location, and Burlington vacated the premises in 2009, after floods in 2008 inundated 
them. The space vacated by Greyhound is currently a staff parking lot, and the space 
vacated by Burlington is vacant. Both spaces are scheduled for major redesign in 2012.566
A Montessori school on the GTC premises pays an annual ground lease of $55,000 as 
part of a 10-year lease that was first signed in 1995. The lease was extended by two years 
to make up for time lost due to the floods. The school is in the middle of its first five-year 
renewal and has one additional five-year renewal option when the first option expires.567
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Air-rights Lease Structure
The air-rights lease revenues are paid by the office tower and the residential building, which 
were constructed on top of the GTC. Development rights were leased to the developer of 
the office tower for 50 years. The city receives $0.15 per square foot of office space.568 
The tower lease generates about $27,300 annually.569 The residential building generates 
approximately $3,000 annually.570
The annual air-rights lease revenues totaled $31,708 in 2011 and have remained constant 
since the leases were first signed. The lease agreements do not require time-bound or 
inflation-adjusted revenue escalation.571 
The entire financial burden of maintaining the GTC rests on CRT. Currently, the GTC’s 
maintenance costs exceed the revenue generated from the ground and air-rights leases. 
It is believed that the original lease payments, approved by the City Council in the early 
1980s, were highly favorable to the tenants, and the fact that the lease payments have not 
increased since has only added to CRT’s burden. It is very likely that the agency in charge 
of GTC maintenance—the City Bus Department (as the CRT was known at that time)—
was not involved in the original lease negotiations,572 leading to the present situation. 
Factors Supporting Joint Development 
The joint development required cooperation from local, state, and federal agencies and the 
private developers. 573 The funding from the federal grant was key to leveraging additional 
state, city, and private funds.  
The federal leadership, along with the leadership exercised by the Mayor of Cedar Rapids, 
played an important role in the development of the GTC. The Mayor had seen the power 
of joint development in previous projects executed using air rights on the north side of the 
city and foresaw the potential for joint development at the GTC site.574,575  He worked hard 
to convince private investors to invest in the underutilized warehouse district and rail yards 
and also used political connections to secure federal grant funds.576
Use of TIF to Fund the GTC
TIF Use in Iowa
Iowa began using TIF in 1958,577 and there were about 1,500 TIF districts in Iowa by 
1997.578 As is the case in most states, Iowa law requires TIF to be used only in blighted 
areas. 579  Iowa law does not prohibit TIF use for transit projects.580 
Cedar Rapids set up a TIF district and issued $4.5 million in TIF bonds to fund the GTC 
project.581 Of this amount, $2 million was used for the GTC building, and $2.5 million was 
used to pay for a parking-garage ramp.582
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TIF and GTC as a Catalyst for Downtown Redevelopment
The downtown area flourished after the GTC was built. While it is difficult to conclude that 
the GTC alone resulted in the downtown’s transformation, it was certainly an important 
positive influence.
The CBD has seen several significant investments since the GTC’s construction. A major 
office building was renovated, a warehouse was converted into a high-tech center, a new 
YMCA was created, and a data-processing company set up corporate headquarters. A 
new federal courthouse was also located downtown. The city built an $8 million library and 
a waterfront park, refurbished a historic firehouse, and built a new science museum.583 
These city projects were financed partly with TIF funds. The success of the Cedar Valley 
Montessori School in the GTC surprised many who were initially wary of locating a school 
at a transit station. The GTC has proved to be a convenient location, as many parents 
employed in the downtown area can easily drop their children at the school on their way 
to work.584 Many business leaders have attributed the downtown’s positive transition to the 
GTC and TIF.585   
Case Analysis 
Enabling Environment 
The federal government’s UMTA program triggered the development of the GTC, and 
city and state leadership took advantage of the program. The local investments were 
supplemented with TIF funds, and the state-level enabling legislation did not exclude TIF 
funding for transit. 
Institutional Capacity 
While the city had the required institutional capacity to create a TIF district, it lacked the 
capacity to negotiate financially viable lease terms. In all fairness, the city probably had little 
leverage in attracting tenants to what was at that time an undesirable location. However, it 
could certainly have negotiated a lease structure that would have allowed it to share future 
revenue streams in exchange for less lease revenue up front. 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The use of TIF advanced horizontal equity, because the GTC benefited the entire TIF 
district. As discussed earlier, the CBD area has improved significantly since the construction 
of the GTC. Not only has transportation infrastructure improved, several public services 
have been also provided, including a library, a museum, a fire station, and an elementary 
school.586 Furthermore, new infrastructure, including sidewalks, curbs, and landscaping, 
has improved the neighborhood and attracted new investment.587 
To the extent that lower-income people are more likely to take transit than higher-income 
people,588 they also benefit more from the GTC. Therefore, TIF funding for the GTC 
enhanced vertical equity as well. 
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As mentioned earlier, the equity concern for the joint development projects primarily 
revolves around whether the agreements benefit the involved parties in proportion to their 
stake and risk in the development (horizontal equity). Of particular concern is whether 
public sector agency interests have been protected.
An analysis of the lease structures (both the air and ground leases) shows that the city may 
have been unable to strike a favorable deal for its constituents. The lease revenues are not 
inflation-adjusted, nor do the leases allow the city to share future profits. Combined, these 
two factors have led to the current situation in which the lease revenues do not cover the 
maintenance costs. 
Stakeholder Support 
The GTC received support from three main stakeholders: private developers, the city, 
and property owners within the TIF district. The downtown property owners stood to gain 
from the GTC construction, and the city stood to achieve its transportation and economic 
development objectives. The project was a mixed bag for the private developers. When 
plans for a retail mall fell through, the private developers withdrew, but fortunately, another 
developer was interested in taking on the project after negotiating new terms. 
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
TIF and joint developments are effective when used together, because they can feed off 
each other. Public and private investments can revitalize a blighted area. The area, in turn, 
can produce tax revenues to pay for the public improvements, which can attract further 
investments into the area. Done right, a single major joint development like the GTC can 
set off an investment cycle. 
At the project level, the GTC has not generated significant revenue for the city. This is 
partly a result of flawed lease structuring and partly due to the ground realities. One could 
argue that the market for the office space and residential real estate may not be strong in 
smaller cities that are dependent on a manufacturing and agricultural economy. Hence, 
such cities might be limited in their ability to negotiate favorable lease revenues.
BETHESDA METRO JOINT DEVELOPMENT, BETHESDA, MD 
Overview of WMATA’s Public Transportation System 
Located approximately nine miles northwest of downtown Washington, DC, the 3.5-acre 
Bethesda Metro Joint Development (BMJD) is built above the Bethesda Metrorail subway 
station, on the Metro Red Line (see Figure 15).589 The station opened in 1984, and the joint 
development was constructed a year later.590
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Figure 15. Bethesda, MD, Metrorail Station Map
Source: WMATA, “Rail Map,” http://www.wmata.com/rail/maps/map.cfm (accessed May 4, 2011).
Overview of WMATA’s Joint Development Policy
WMATA has a long history of using joint development to spur economic growth, facilitate 
TOD development, and create a long-term revenue source for itself.591 Its projects are 
intended to create dense and pedestrian-friendly mixed-use communities that integrate 
transit with land use and reduce dependence on automobiles.592
As of 2010, 33 joint development projects had been developed at 27 Metrorail stations. 
The total lease revenues from these projects since the opening of Metrorail in 1976 exceed 
$250 million.593 Indeed, revenues from them have been a significant source of income for 
WMATA in recent years (see Table 26).
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Table 26. Revenue from WMATA Joint Development Projects
Fiscal Year
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Revenue ($ millions) 6.450a 9.848b 8.161b 8.8 10.5 7.8 4.71 3.47
Source: WMATA, Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 2009 and 2010, http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/
public_rr.cfm (accessed May 4, 2011); WMATA, “Monthly Financial Report, January 2005,” http://www.wmata.com/
about_metro/board_of_directors/%20board_docs/031005_IIa_Monthly_Financial_Report_-_Jan_2005.pdf (accessed 
May 4, 2011).
aWMATA, Approved in FY 2011 budget, p. III-1, http://www.wmata.com/%20about_metro/docs/FY2012_Proposed_
Budget.pdf (accessed July 6, 2011).
bWMATA, “Approved in FY 2011 budget,” p. III-1, http://www.wmata.com/%20about_metro/docs/FY2012_Proposed_
Budget.pdf%20-%20page%20III-1 (accessed July 6, 2011).
Despite the fact that joint development projects bring in revenues of several million dollars 
annually, this represents less than one percent of WMATA’s billion-dollar-plus annual 
operating budget (see Table 27).
Table 27. Percentage of WMATA Operating Budget Provided by Joint 
Developments
Fiscal Year
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
WMATA operating budget ($ millions) 1,358 1,360 1,200 1,130 1,040 940 909
Percent of operating budget revenue from joint 
development  0.73a 0.60a 0.73 0.93 0.75 0.50 0.38
Source: WMATA, “Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports, FY 2004-2010,” http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/
public_rr.cfm (accessed October 23, 2011).
aWMATA, “Approved in FY 2011 budget,” p. III-1, http://www.wmata.com/%20about_metro/docs/FY2012_Proposed_
Budget.pdf%20-%20page%20III-1 (accessed July 6, 2011).
Overview of the Bethesda Metro Joint Development 
Bethesda, MD, is an affluent suburb of Washington, DC. The BMJD, which sits on top of 
the Bethesda Metrorail station,594 contains one 17-story office tower with 368,000 square 
feet of office space, 41,600 square feet of retail space (including a 19,000-square-foot 
food court), a 390-room hotel, and a five-story garage with 1,305 parking spaces.595 
Bethesda Metro Center Limited Partnership (BMCLP), a Maryland-based organization, 
owned, operated, and maintained BMJD until 1999, after which the majority partner in 
BMPCL—CRI—sold its stake to the Meridian Group, Inc. At present, the Meridian Group 
owns and operates the BMJD.596
On December 1, 1981, the BMCLP entered into a lease agreement with WMATA, pursuant 
to which the BMCLP leased the land on which BMJD is built for 50 years. The lease can 
be renewed at the BMCLP’s option for an additional 49 years.597                                  
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Generating minimum annual lease revenue of $1.6 million, BMJD is WMATA’s most 
successful joint development project.598 Apart from air-rights lease revenues, WMATA also 
gains from sharing the construction and operations costs.599  The lease agreement requires 
the BMJD’s owner (earlier BMCLP, now Meridian Group) to pay WMATA a minimum annual 
rent of $1.6 million. Furthermore, since 1986, the owner has been obligated to pay WMATA 
additional rent in an amount equal to 7.5 percent of annual gross revenue in excess of $31 
million.600 
Case Analysis 
Enabling Environment 
Joint developments for WMATA are intended to work in tandem with the Metrorail system. 
This coordination is achieved by integrating land use with transportation through the 
development of TODs. The TODs are sought out not simply to increase revenue but to 
provide transit riders as well. 
Furthermore, WMATA has developed joint development policies and guidelines (last 
updated in 2008) that lay out the following:
• Roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders involved in the joint development 
process
• The procedure for selecting developers for the joint development projects
• Community involvement in scoping and developing projects, following guidelines to 
facilitate the success of TODs601
While these guidelines are in place to ensure project success, joint development projects are 
limited by zoning and community acceptance.602 WMATA operates in several jurisdictions, 
but it is unable to control the local zoning ordinances and is therefore able to engage in 
joint development only in locations with supportive local zoning.603
Institutional Capacity 
WMATA’s Planning and Joint Development Department manages the joint development 
program. The department staff proactively identifies joint development opportunities. 
WMATA also actively solicits potential developers through its request for qualifications 
(RFQ)/RFP process. The RFQ/RFP process is outlined in documents describing WMATA’s 
joint development policies and guidelines. These documents are available on WMATA web 
site.
In summary, by devoting significant staff and financial resources, WMATA has created 
substantial institutional capacity to identify, develop, and manage joint development 
projects. 
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Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
As mentioned earlier, the equity concern for joint development projects primarily revolves 
around whether the development agreements benefit the involved parties in proportion to 
their stake and risk in the development (horizontal equity). Of particular concern is whether 
the interests of the public sector agency, in this case WMATA, have been protected.
Analysis of the lease structure shows that WMATA may not have been able to strike a 
favorable deal for its constituents. First, the minimum guaranteed lease revenue ($1.6 
million) is not inflation-adjusted. For a long-term lease (a 50-year term followed by an 
option for another 49-year term), this results in progressively declining lease revenue, in 
constant dollars. 
Furthermore, apart from the minimum guaranteed revenue, WMATA shares BMJD revenues 
only when the annual gross revenue exceeds $31 million. For several years in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the gross revenue fell well short of $31 million (for some years, it was as low 
as $17 million). In those years WMATA had to settle for the minimum guaranteed revenue 
of $1.6 million. In hindsight, setting an inflation-adjusted minimum-gross-revenue target 
might have been to WMATA’s advantage. 
Stakeholder Support 
It is difficult to ascertain from primary sources whether the joint development encountered 
community or political opposition when it was developed. An in-depth search for newspaper 
articles did not reveal stakeholder opposition. In fact, a March 6, 1980, Washington Post 
article titled “Hotel, Commercial Complex Planned Atop Bethesda Metro Station” reported 
widespread support for the project, saying that it “won almost universal praise from county 
officials, business people and Bethesda residents, a surprise to many planners accustomed 
to hearing citizens oppose high-rise development near their homes.” Furthermore, the 
article cites the large buffer zone between the joint development project and the residential 
areas as key to the resident support.604
Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
The revenue yield from the BMJD is stable and substantial, as WMATA is guaranteed a 
minimum revenue of $1.6 million. However, the upside revenue potential is limited because 
WMATA shares only 7.5 percent of annual gross revenue in excess of $31 million, and this 
revenue sharing has occurred only sporadically over the last 30 years.
DADELAND SOUTH JOINT DEVELOPMENT, MIAMI, FL
Miami-Dade Transit Overview
Miami Dade Transit (MDT) provides transit service to Miami-Dade County, FL. Serving 
a population of nearly a quarter million people, MDT is the 14th-largest transit provider 
in the country and the largest in Florida.605 It operates four transit services: Metrobus; 
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a downtown Miami people-mover system, Metromover (an automated fixed-guideway 
system); a paratransit service; and Metrorail.606 
The Metrorail is a 22.6-mile-long elevated rapid-transit heavy-rail system (see Figure 16). 
The Metromover is a 4.4-mile-long elevated system that serves the downtown Miami area. 
The Metrobus has more than 90 routes, including the South Miami-Dade Busway, which is 
a fully separated bus rapid-transit (BRT) system running along U.S. Highway 1. More than 
326,000 riders board the combined MDT system on weekdays.607
Figure 16. Miami Dade Transit Metrorail System Map
Source: MDT, “Metrorail Map,” http://www.miamidade.gov/transit/rail_stations.asp (accessed December 5, 2011).
Overview of Dadeland South Station
Opened for service in 1984, the Dadeland South Station (hereafter called Dadeland South) 
is at the southern terminus of the Metrorail Green Line, currently the only Metrorail line. 
A new line, the Orange Line, is under construction. It will provide service to the Miami 
International Airport beginning in 2012.608 In addition to Metrorail, numerous bus lines 
serve Dadeland South.609
Joint Development Details 
The Dadeland South Metrorail Station joint development was MDT’s first joint development 
project.610 It includes office, retail, and hotel space, along with a shared parking garage 
that has 1,100 parking spaces for Metrorail riders.611 The project broke ground in 1982 and 
was built in four phases (the construction schedule is shown in Table 28).612
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Table 28. Phases of the Dadeland South Station Joint Development
Phase Year Opened Type of Development
Phase I and III 1984
Datran Center I & II – Class A Office buildings with 476,000 rentable square 
feet, 35,000 square feet of retail space (511,000 square feet total) and 35,000 
parking spaces, 1,100 designated as Park and Ride
Phase II 1984 Miami Marriott Dadeland Hotel and Conference Center with 302 luxury hotel rooms
Phase IV A 2005 Dadeland Centre I – 18-story 152,014 square feet Class A office building (8 floors offices, 9 floors parking) 
Phase IV B 2008 Dadeland Centre II – 15-story, 119,516 square feet, Class A office building with 8 floors of office space, 6 floors of parking and ground floor retail
Source: MDT, “Joint Development Projects,” http://www.miamidade.gov/transit/about_joint_dadeland_south.asp 
(accessed December 5, 2011).
The Dadeland South joint development began as a public-private venture between the 
Green Company and MDT.613 The Green Company, which owned the land where the 
parking garage is located, approached MDT with a joint development proposal at the time 
the Metrorail was being planned.614 The proposal required the Green Company to donate 
its entire six-acre property if MDT allowed it to retain air rights to the property.615 The 
developer prepared this proposal because a part of the land might have been acquired by 
MDT anyway (through eminent domain or other means) to provide a parking garage for 
the station (the line and the station are on land given to MDT by the Florida DOT. In turn, 
the DOT received the land from Florida East Coast [FEC], a rail company. The FEC land 
had been vacant since 1935, as the Dadeland South section of the rail road was not in 
use). Recognizing the significant land-development potential once the station opened, the 
developer approached MDT with a land-swap proposal under which the developer agreed 
to transfer land ownership to MDT in return for air rights. The developer gained in two 
ways: It secured development rights, and it did not have to pay property taxes on the land, 
which now belonged to MDT. Apart from the lease revenue payable to MDT, the developer 
would pay property taxes only on the value of the improvements on the land. 
Under the terms of the agreement, the air rights are to be maintained by a 99.5-year lease 
which began in 1982—a 55.5-year lease followed by the option to renew for an additional 
44 years.616 As part of the lease terms, MDT annually receives the greater of $400,000 or 
a percentage of gross revenue specified as follows: 4 percent of the gross revenue from 
Phases 1 and 3, 2 percent from Phase 2, 1.5 percent from Phase 4A, and 1 percent from 
Phase 4B.617 
In addition to the lease revenue, the county receives substantial property-tax revenue.618 
The annual-lease-revenue data for 2000–2010 are shown in Table 29.
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Table 29. Annual Lease Revenue from the Dadeland South Station Joint 
Development, 2000–2010
Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Lease 
revenue ($) 832,906 887,018 821,344 831,568 858,759 925,010 994,732 1,086,343 977,268 938,643 893,696
Source: Abel Lera (Miami-Dade Transit), interview with Shishir Mathur, October 04, 2011.
In addition to the revenue sharing, both parties entered into cost-sharing agreements, 
which included (1) sharing the excavation costs and the cost of constructing the station’s 
foundation; (2) sharing the cost of the parking garage; and (3) sharing some of the operating 
costs.619 The station and buildings also share a common ventilation system and auxiliary 
generators. The county attributes $4 million in savings to the cost-sharing measures.620  
Case Analysis 
Enabling Environment 
Even before the Metrorail became operational in 1984, the Miami-Dade Board of 
County Commissioners recognized coordination of land use and transportation as vital 
to a viable rail system.621 Therefore, it adopted Ordinance No. 78-74 (Fixed-Guideway 
Rapid Transit System—Development Zone) in 1978.622 Seeking to develop a cohesive 
transit-conducive zone along the heavy-rail corridors, the ordinance states: “The Board of 
County Commissioners for Miami-Dade County, Florida, hereby declares and finds that 
the uncoordinated use of lands within the County threatens the orderly development and 
the health, safety, order, convenience, prosperity and welfare of the present and future 
citizens of this County.”623 The ordinance removes zoning authority for areas that are in 
close proximity to the rapid-transit system from the local municipalities and hands it over 
to the county.624
Furthermore, the county’s Comprehensive Plan calls for the use of joint development. The 
transportation element of the Comprehensive Plan implores MDT to use joint development 
as a funding source for operating expenses.625 Furthermore, it calls for locating transit 
corridors and stations in areas conducive to joint development, stating “In the siting of 
transit stations in future rapid transit corridors, major consideration will be given to the 
opportunities for joint development and/or redevelopment of prospective stations sites, 
and adjacent neighborhoods, offered by property owners and prospective developers.”626
This policy framework called for a series of studies to explore the possibility of joint 
development called the Station Area Design and Development (SADD) studies. 
Conducted during the planning of the Metrorail system, the SADD studies were undertaken 
collaboratively by the county, MDT, and local municipalities. The studies set up guidelines 
for future development and inventoried existing uses around station areas.627
In spite of the clear policy direction, the next wave of joint developments did not occur until 
more than a decade later. Some commissioners felt that the MDT land should be used for 
social purposes, such as affordable housing, while the others believed that the land should 
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be developed to the highest and best use. Over time, the commissioners have come to 
realize the importance of joint developments making a profit for the private developers. 
Hence, recent joint development projects have been developed to their highest and best 
use.628 
Institutional Capacity 
MDT’s joint development program requires significant institutional capacity. The county 
set up a special office of leasing to conduct the SADD studies and to manage and market 
the development sites.629 Furthermore, the agency continues to employ staff to identify, 
negotiate, and manage joint development projects. 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The equity concern for the joint development projects primarily revolves around whether the 
joint development agreement benefits the involved parties in proportion to their stake and 
risk in the development (horizontal equity). Of particular concern is whether the interests 
of the public sector agency, in this case MDT, have been protected.
Analysis of the lease structure shows that MDT has been able to strike a favorable deal for 
its constituents. The minimum guaranteed lease revenue ($300,000) is inflation-adjusted, 
and for a long-term lease (55.5 years followed by renewal option for another 44 years), this 
results in progressively increasing lease revenue in nominal dollar terms. 
Furthermore, MDT has the opportunity to share joint development profits. It gets the higher 
of the inflation-adjusted $300,000 or four percent of the gross revenue. In fact, as shown in 
Table 29 above, the lease revenues were significantly higher than the minimum guaranteed 
revenue between 2000 and 2010. 
The joint development agreement has some weaknesses, however. First, it does not give 
MDT the power to penalize the Green Company for construction delays. In fact, the entire 
joint development took well over two decades (1984 to 2008). Second, the developer sold 
development rights to a third party for a much higher value, and the agreement did not 
require the Green Company to share the sale profits with MDT. These weaknesses were 
rectified by MDT when it crafted the agreement for the subsequent joint development, 
Dadeland North.630
Stakeholder Support 
The developer gained from the joint development agreement in two ways: It secured 
development rights to property that might have been acquired by MDT anyway, and it did 
not have to pay property taxes on the land, which now belonged to MDT. Apart from the 
lease revenue payable to MDT, the developer paid property taxes only on the value of 
the improvements on the land. Thus, the developer supported the joint development, and 
there is no evidence that the other major stakeholders—the local community and other 
public agencies—opposed the development.
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Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
Lease revenues for 2000–2010, though stable, were moderately impacted by the economic 
and real estate market downturn. The revenues peaked in 2007 at $1.1 million, then 
dropped to a little less than $1 million in 2008, before further declining to a little below 
$900,000 in 2010. However, the revenues are still above their 2004 levels. 
In addition to the lease revenues, the county receives property- and sales-tax revenues 
from this development. 
RESURGENS PLAZA, ATLANTA, GA 
MARTA provides regional and local transit in the Atlanta metropolitan area. It, along with 
others, operates a heavy-rail regional subway system that serves about 260,000 weekday 
passengers and a bus system that serves about 220,000.631
The MARTA rail system has four lines: Red Line, Gold Line, Blue Line, and Green Line 
(see Figure 17). The system opened in 1979, with lines running east-west. Two years 
later, a north-south line opened, followed by additional lines that opened in 1992, 1996, 
and 2000.632 Lenox Station, on the Gold Line, opened in 1984 and is the site of Resurgens 
Plaza.633
Overview
Completed in 1988, Resurgens Plaza is a 27-story Class A office building located in the 
dense business district within Atlanta’s upscale Buckhead district. The building’s north side 
is at street grade, and its south side is connected to the Lenox MARTA Station, with access 
from the building’s third floor. While MARTA’s current parking policy seeks to limit parking 
in its new TODs, Resurgens Plaza predates this policy. The building’s first ten floors are 
parking decks. A lobby on the third floor connects the building to the Lenox Station, while 
the remaining 17 floors contain offices.634 The building was 95 percent occupied until 2010, 
when it lost one of its major tenants, the law firm of Fisher & Philips. After that, default was 
imminent, and the building’s $82 million loan was transferred to a special servicer.635,636
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Figure 17. MARTA Rail Map 
Note: The Lenox Station is located on northeast section of the Gold Line. 
Source: MARTA, “Rail Map,” http://www.itsmarta.com/uploadedFiles/Schedules_And_Maps/Rail_Map/
MARTARailMap2010.pdf (accessed 8/20/2011).
Overview of MARTA’s TOD Policy
MARTA has a policy of promoting smart growth and TOD, in part because the transit system 
is expected to expand dramatically in the near future, with new streetcar, commuter-rail, 
light-rail, and BRT lines. The opportunities for TODs will therefore greatly expand.637
In 2010, the agency formalized its plan to develop areas near stations in order to take 
advantage of these TOD opportunities. The process of implementing a joint development 
starts with an evaluation of the potential opportunities in the agency’s inventory of station 
properties. When a potential development site has been chosen, MARTA staff meet with 
the local municipality and county officials to determine if the development is consistent 
with the local plans and zoning. If the finding is affirmative, MARTA commissions property 
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appraisal, taking into account any restrictions on the property. After the property is 
appraised, the agency selects a developer by issuing an RFQ. An RFP is released once 
qualified developers are chosen through the RFQ process. If more than one property is 
included in the RFQ, qualified developers can be awarded more than one development 
site.638 In some cases, MARTA will also consider unsolicited development proposals. It 
also has special provisions for working on proposals from other government agencies 
whereby it may bypass a competitive bidding process and work directly with the government 
agency.639
Once the developer is selected, MARTA and the developer negotiate a joint development 
agreement (JDA). The JDA “governs the legal and business” relationship between the 
agency and the developer and must be approved by the MARTA board.640 MARTA retains 
ownership of its joint development properties but may make exceptions for projects that 
cannot move forward without property sale.641
MARTA also has policy guidelines intended to create socially and environmentally 
responsible developments. For example, it includes a requirement for 20 percent of the 
development to consist of affordable housing in its RFPs for housing developments with 
more than 10 units. The agency places low priority on planning for automobile access to 
its stations, limits parking, and encourages sustainable building practices.642
Overview of MARTA’s Office Dealing with TODs
The Office of Transit Oriented Development & Real Estate is the arm responsible for 
overseeing MARTA’s joint development projects. The goals of the TOD development 
program include (1) increased revenue and ridership for MARTA; (2) acting as a catalyst 
for new development; (3) reducing dependence on automobiles; and (4) providing new 
services and amenities for customers.643 The agency seeks to develop high-quality, 
compact, viable, and sustainable development within one-quarter to one-half mile of 
the transit stations. MARTA has developed five successful joint development projects, 
including Lindbergh City Center, Resurgens Plaza, and St. Joseph’s Doctor Building.644
Air-Rights Details 
The deal between the developer of Resurgens Plaza, Resurgens Plaza South Associates, 
and MARTA provides MARTA with $120,000 annually, with increases based on the CPI. 
In exchange, the developer obtained the right to build over the station.645 By 2001, the 
air-rights lease totaled $177,000; it is currently estimated to be close to $200,000. The 
lease was signed for 50 years, with an option for 50 additional years, and includes only 
development rights over the station.646,647 
Factors Supporting Air-Rights Development 
The real estate market in Atlanta was booming during the 1980s, and the Atlanta 
metropolitan area added some 400,000 jobs between 1980 and 1988.648 Developers had 
many opportunities for less-costly development in the suburbs, which did not give MARTA 
much leverage in negotiating development deals. Other types of less-costly development on 
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MARTA property, such as ground development, were not allowed by the agency’s charter, 
which states that the agency cannot purchase land for non-transit-related purposes. This 
is why MARTA has pursued primarily air-rights joint developments.649 
More-Effective Air-Rights Development
MARTA has learned some lessons as it has gained experience with joint developments. Its 
policy on parking and automobile access has shifted since the booming real estate market 
period of the 1980s. Resurgens Plaza, while located on a transit station, devotes ten floors 
of the building to parking. Such a generous parking provision reduces building tenants’ 
incentive to use transit. Furthermore, it increases project cost. MARTA has taken steps to 
correct this problem with its new TOD development policy. 
Case Analysis 
Enabling Environment 
MARTA’s charter provides very strict joint development rules. It prohibits MARTA from 
using its condemnation powers to purchase property for anything other than transit-related 
purposes.650 In practice, the agency cannot pursue joint developments when land has to be 
purchased. Because the agency is new and does not own large tracts of undeveloped land, 
air-rights development over stations is the only type of joint development it can pursue.651
Institutional Capacity 
By devoting an entire office to joint development, MARTA has shown its commitment 
toward building significant institutional capacity to undertake such development. 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
The air-rights lease revenue ($120,000 annually) seems low for a project the size of 
Resurgens Plaza. Furthermore, unlike MDT (in the case of Dadeland South), MARTA does 
not share joint development gross revenue. On a positive note, the lease revenues are 
CPI-adjusted.
It is important to note that the rail system was new and had low operations and maintenance 
costs at the time the lease agreement was negotiated.652 The low cost of running the transit 
system allowed MARTA to lease air rights at a low price.653  
Stakeholder Support 
There is no published evidence of stakeholder opposition to the construction of Resurgens 
Plaza.
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Revenue Yield, Stability, and Growth 
The MARTA staff believed that the revenue yield, although small (approximately $200,000 
in 2010), would be stable and would grow with the CPI, even if the building went into 
foreclosure.654 The building indeed went into foreclosure on December 6, 2011.655
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VI. DECISION-SUPPORT FRAMEWORK
This report is intended to assist practitioners in gauging the suitability of VC mechanisms 
for meeting transit funding requirements. This chapter distills the findings from the case 
studies presented in Chapters 2 through 5, introduces a decision-support matrix, and 
provides a scenario to illustrate the application of the matrix.
IMPACT FEES
Enabling Environment 
The impact-fees cases analyzed in this report (San Francisco TIDF, Broward County transit 
concurrency fee, Aventura transportation mitigation fee, and Portland TSDC) indicate 
the usefulness of state-level acts and local-level ordinances enabling the use of impact 
fees (the case-analysis findings are summarized in Table 30 at the end of this section). 
These acts and ordinances specify the projects and expense types eligible for impact-fees 
funding. Several states do not allow impact fees to fund transit, while some (including San 
Francisco TIDF) allow impact fees to fund only capital expenditures. Another allowable 
expense type is found in Aventura, FL, where the fee can fund both capital and operating 
expenses, and a 3-percent surcharge funds administrative expenses.  
Strong and unambiguous legal provisions, accompanied by a robust nexus study, defend 
the fees in case of lawsuits. In summary, there is a strong need for an appropriate legal 
enabling environment.
Institutional Capacity 
All four cases demonstrate the need for moderate institutional capacity to design and 
charge impact fees. Institutional capacity is also frequently required to convince the political 
leadership and the community (especially the developer community) about the need for a 
transit impact fee. As seen in Aventura, legal challenges to the fee can stretch an impact-
fee-charging jurisdiction’s institutional capacity even further.
Stakeholder Support and Opposition 
Of the four major stakeholder groups—residents, the business community, developers, 
and public agencies—the developer community is most likely to oppose transit impact fees. 
This opposition was evident in Aventura and in San Francisco, where in 2010, developers 
were allowed to defer impact-fee payments for three years. 
In summary, local governments can expect a moderate level of stakeholder opposition to 
transit impact fees, primarily from the developer community.
Revenue Yield 
In Portland’s TSDC—the best-case scenario—the fee is expected to fund 25 percent of 
all transit projects’ capital cost over the next 10 years. This translates into funding 100 
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percent of the cost attributable to new growth. Broward County’s transit concurrency fee 
is expected to fund 17 percent of the capital costs for FY 2011. This percentage would 
be even higher if only cost attributable to new growth is considered. In the worst case 
(Aventura), the fee had generated only $47,000 as of the writing of this report.  However, 
it must be noted that Aventura has not seen permit activity since 2009. Therefore, the 
transportation costs attributable to new growth should be negligible, if not zero. In San 
Francisco, although the impact fee traditionally generates approximately $4 million to $5 
million annually, it constitutes less than two percent of the transit-agency operating budget.
An impact-fee revenue yield is dependent upon its geographical and property-development 
base. For example, the San Francisco TIDF was initially charged only in the downtown 
area but was later expanded citywide. Currently, almost all property types pay impact fees 
in San Francisco, except for government-owned buildings and properties within specific 
redevelopment areas. 
Broward County goes one step further by not exempting any properties. Similarly, apart 
from a few exceptions (such as affordable-housing developments), all properties pay the 
fee in Portland.
In summary, transit impact fees meet varying proportions of transit-funding needs, from all 
(in the case of Portland and Broward County) to very low (in the case of Aventura).
Revenue Stability 
The revenues from impact fees are likely to grow under the following scenarios: (1) the 
fee rate increases; (2) the magnitude of property development/redevelopment/expansion 
increases; and (3) the fee base (the geographical area or the fee-paying property-
development types) increases. The case study findings show that real estate market 
conditions dictate the probability of realization of any of these scenarios or combinations 
of them. 
In the cases of Broward County and Portland, the fee amount peaked at a little more 
than $10 million by the middle of the last decade before plummeting to $2 million by the 
end of the decade. Similarly, even though Aventura started charging the fee in 2010, only 
one development has paid it. Furthermore, the real estate downturn led San Francisco to 
institute a TIDF deferral program in 2010, resulting in a decrease in annual revenues from 
an average of between $4 million and $5 million to $2 million.
The case studies also suggest a few strategies to enable revenue growth. For example, 
San Francisco conducts periodic fee review to ascertain whether the fee meets the transit 
funding requirement. Its fee is also CPI-adjusted and therefore increases with inflation.
In summary, impact-fees revenues display low to moderate stability in the cases analyzed 
for this report. Jurisdictions with a consistently strong real estate market and ample green-
field or in-fill development opportunities are likely to see strong revenue growth and low 
volatility. 
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Potential for Horizontal Inequity 
The potential for horizontally inequitable impact fees is low to moderate in all the cases 
analyzed. In Broward County, the fee is levied in the eight districts where transit is a viable 
transportation mode, while impact fees are charged citywide in San Francisco, Portland, 
and Aventura because the fee revenues fund transit service citywide. 
In all the cases, the fee rate varies by property type. This variation reflects the properties’ 
differing transit impacts. For example a 1,000-square-foot industrial warehouse is likely to 
generate fewer transit riders than a similar-sized office building.
Horizontal equity is negatively impacted in San Francisco, where residential developments 
are exempt from paying the fee. It is highly unlikely that residential developments do not 
generate any transit riders. In fact, recent efforts in the city are aimed at expanding the fee 
to include residential developments. Similarly, exempting public buildings from paying the 
fee (as is the case in Portland) also impacts horizontal equity.  
Potential for Vertical Inequity 
The ability-to-pay (ATP) principle operationalizes vertical equity. The potential for application 
of vertically inequitable impact fees is low to moderate in all four cases. Users with low ATP 
(such as Portland residents living in affordable housing developments and small-business 
owners in San Francisco) are exempt from paying the fee. However, Broward County and 
Aventura do not provide such exemptions.
Finally, in three cases (Broward County, Portland, and Aventura), the fee paid by residential 
properties is charged on a per-housing-unit basis. Impact fees based on number of 
bedrooms or per square foot of living space would be more vertically equitable. The ATP 
of a household living in a one-bedroom condominium is clearly likely to be less than that 
of a household living in a five-bedroom mansion.
The findings of the case analyses are summarized in Table 30.
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TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
Enabling Environment 
All of the states except Arizona have TIF-enabling legislation.656 Most states require the 
finding of “blight” for TIF use, although some interpret the condition more liberally than 
others. Vermont has the most liberal legislation, allowing TIF to be used for development, 
job creation, or even simply to increase tax revenue. 
However, the mere presence of state-enabling legislation is often not sufficient. Some 
legislation, like Oregon’s, specifies permissible uses for TIF funds. Therefore, the enabling 
legislation should be closely examined to ascertain whether such a list exists and, if so, 
whether transit is included.
Institutional Capacity 
All the cases of TIF use examined here (CCC Transit Village, Wilson Yard, Portland 
Streetcar, and the Cedar Rapids GTC) demonstrate the existence of and need for 
significant institutional capacity to plan and create a TIF district. Institutional capacity may 
also be required to garner the support of the community and public agencies at the time of 
TIF-district formation.  
Furthermore, institutional capacity is required to track TIF usage for legal-compliance 
purposes. For example, none of the four cases used TIF funds to purchase rolling stock, 
as it was unclear whether a capital expenditure for items that are mobile (and hence 
likely to cut across TIF district boundaries) would be permissible under the TIF-enabling 
regulations. 
Ample institutional capacity exists in the case study cities and county. The Contra Costa 
County Redevelopment Agency is in charge of TIF in Contra Costa County, the PDC in 
Portland, the Housing and Economic Development Department in Chicago, and Economic 
Development Services in Cedar Rapids.
Stakeholder Support and Opposition 
Of the four major stakeholder groups, residents and other public agencies are most likely 
to oppose TIF. The surrounding community opposed TIF use in the CCC Transit Village 
and the Portland Streetcar Project. None of the cases faced opposition from other public 
agencies or local governments. 
In the case of CCC Transit Village, a civil Grand Jury recommended that the redevelopment 
agency not get involved with the project, citing agency indebtedness and opposition 
from neighborhood residents as the primary reasons. The Grand Jury noted that the 
redevelopment agency was interpreting its powers “liberally” by working with the transit 
agency (BART) to pay for construction of a garage.657
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In Portland, residents living outside the underdeveloped North Macadam URA were initially 
concerned that their funds would be used to subsidize it. However, the city was able to 
address this concern by creating the North Macadam Overlay. The overlay helped specify 
the geography where the URA funds would be expended.
In summary, the local governments in the case studies were met with low to moderate 
stakeholder opposition to TIF.
Revenue Yield 
In the best-case scenario, the Portland Streetcar Project, more than half of the TIF districts’ 
revenues were used. TIF funded approximately one-fifth of the total $103.5 million project 
cost. 
In the case of the CCC Transit Village, TIF funds ($60 million) constituted the entire public 
contribution and one-sixth of the entire $366 million project cost. TIF revenues of $3 million 
are earmarked for Wilson Yard Station renovation. Finally, TIF funded approximately 15 
percent of the $30.5 million Cedar Rapids GTC project cost.
In summary, TIF funded a moderate proportion of the case-study transit-project costs.
Revenue Stability 
TIF revenues depend upon property taxes, which in turn are impacted by real estate market 
conditions, the intensity of redevelopment of the TIF district, and the effectiveness of the 
redevelopment projects in improving the quality of the TIF district.
Data were available to analyze TIF revenue stability for three cases (CCC Transit Village, 
Wilson Yard, and Portland Streetcar). While the TIF revenues are very stable in the CCC 
Transit Village and Wilson Yard, the TIF districts involved in funding the Portland Streetcar 
have been impacted by the housing market downturn. This downturn is pronounced in the 
North Macadam and River districts, where condominiums constitute a large portion of the 
new development.  
In summary, TIF revenues can be expected to display a moderate to high degree of stability.
Potential for Horizontal Inequity 
TIF can cause horizontal inequity in two ways. First, horizontal inequity can result if the 
TIF-funded improvements do not accrue benefits to property owners within the TIF district. 
The potential for horizontal inequity for this reason is low in all four case-study projects. 
All of the projects benefit the property owners within the districts, even the CCC Transit 
Village, where the benefits from the BART parking garage spill outside the district. In this 
case, creation of the parking garage was a prerequisite to the development of the village, 
which has benefited the surrounding property owners by providing much-needed vibrancy 
to the area.658 The Cedar Rapids GTC acted as a catalyst in the redevelopment of its 
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surrounding area, the CBD. Finally, the surrounding community benefits from the TIF-
funded renovation of the Wilson Yard Station.
Second, to the extent that property taxes would have increased even without the use of 
TIF, the capture of the full property-tax increment by the TIF district results in less tax 
revenues for other taxing agencies, such as the school district, county, or city. Thus, TIF 
can negatively impact other essential services. Although we do not have pre-TIF-district 
empirical data for the case-study projects, anecdotal evidence suggests that at least two 
of the projects—the Cedar Rapids GTC and Portland Streetcar—were key to their districts’ 
revival. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that property taxes within these districts would have 
increased without the use of TIF.  
Potential for Vertical Inequity 
TIF use for transit enhances vertical equity to the extent that the transit projects benefit 
lower-income people more than higher-income people. However, TIF can cause vertical 
inequity if housing prices in the TIF district rise as a result of TIF investment, pricing out 
residents with low ATP. The TIF district for the CCC Transit Village addresses this potential 
vertical inequity be apportioning 20 percent of the TIF revenues for affordable housing.   
The findings of the case analyses are summarized in Table 31.
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SPECIAL ASSESSMENT DISTRICTS
Enabling Legal Environment 
State-level SAD-enabling legislation exists in the cases of the Seattle Streetcar, Portland 
Streetcar, and Los Angeles Red Line. Furthermore, the powers granted by the state-level 
legislation are operationalized through local ordinances. For example, in Seattle, the City 
Council passed a local ordinance (No. 122424) authorizing the activities required to finance, 
construct, and maintain the streetcar project. Similarly, the District of Columbia Home Rule 
Act provides the authority to levy special assessments. This authority is operationalized 
through the New York Avenue Metro Special Assessment Authorization Emergency Act of 
2001.  
In summary, a robust legal enabling environment is required for SAD formation. 
Institutional Capacity 
All the case studies demonstrate the need for significant institutional capacity to plan, form, 
and manage SADs and to garner community support. For example, Action 29 proactively 
advocated for the New York Avenue Metro Station. In addition to holding several community 
meetings, the group raised substantial funds. The city did not initially have adequate 
financial and analytical capacity, and as a result, when the landowners offered $25 million 
for station construction, the city was unable to recognize the possibility of negotiating a 
higher contribution. 
In summary, while the institutional capacity required to use SADs may not be as great as 
the capacity required to use TIF, it is still substantial.
Stakeholder Support and Opposition 
Of the four major stakeholder groups, residents are most likely to oppose SADs. In 
principle, any property owner (residential or non-residential) could oppose SAD if she 
or he believes that the benefits from the transit project are less than the assessments 
charged. However, the case analyses show that non-residential property owners are likely 
to appreciate the benefits of transit projects. In fact, the owners of brown-field industrial 
land championed construction of the New York Avenue Metro Station, and the business 
community welcomed Portland Streetcar. 
Some property owners initially opposed the SAD for the Seattle Streetcar Project, and 
several SADs formed to fund Portland Streetcar exempted residential property owners 
from paying assessments in order to preempt opposition from them. 
Several states require majority property-owner vote for SAD formation. Therefore, local 
governments considering SAD as a transit funding source must first examine their state 
and local legislation, and if such a vote is required, they can decide to not use SAD in a 
largely residential neighborhood, to conduct extensive community outreach to sense the 
resident sentiment toward a SAD, or simply to exempt residential properties from paying 
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assessments. However, equity considerations and project funding needs should weigh in 
the decision to exempt properties from paying assessments. 
Revenue Yield 
SADs funded substantial project cost in all four cases analyzed here. The Seattle Streetcar 
SAD, estimated to generate $25.7 million, would fund more than half (51.71 percent) of the 
project. The SADs for the New York Avenue Metro Station and Portland Streetcar would 
fund one-quarter and one-fifth of the project costs, respectively. Finally, although they 
funded only nine percent of the project cost, SADs for Los Angeles Red Line Segment 1 
led all four cases in terms of actual revenue, generating $130 million. 
In summary, a SAD can be expected to generate large sums of revenue for transit projects. 
However, as a proportion of project cost, SAD revenues might fund a small part of capital-
intensive transit projects, such as heavy-rail projects.
Revenue Stability 
SAD revenues are highly stable. Usually determined at the time of the SAD formation, 
the assessments are either collected up front (as in the cases of Portland Streetcar and 
Seattle Streetcar and the Los Angeles Red Line) or collected annually (as in the case of 
the New York Avenue Metro Station). 
In all four cases, the revenues have been collected according to the schedule. Indeed, the 
SADs for the Los Angeles Red Line were dissolved after they lasted their predetermined 
period and generated the required revenue. 
In cases where the assessments are to be paid over a long period (usually 15 to 30 years), 
property owners could successfully advocate for lower assessments, thereby making 
revenue growth a little volatile. 
Potential for Horizontal Inequity 
The assessment-fee calculation and collection methodology needs to be carefully designed 
to reduce horizontal inequities. Of the cases examined for this report, Seattle’s assessment 
calculation methodology ensures the greatest horizontal equity, as it bases assessments 
on the estimated benefit derived by each property. A less-sophisticated methodology was 
adopted in Portland, where gross indicators such as parcel size, value, property use, 
and proximity to transit are employed as proxies for the potential benefit derived by the 
properties. Still simpler methodologies are used for the Los Angeles Red Line and the New 
York Avenue Station. In the former, the parcel and building size are used to determine the 
benefit, and in the latter, the 2000 assessed property value is used.
Furthermore, apart from the SAD for Seattle Streetcar and a few SADs for Portland 
Streetcar, the SADs exempt residential properties from paying assessments. Moreover, 
public buildings are commonly exempt. To the extent that residential and public properties 
benefit from transit infrastructure, such exemptions cause horizontal inequities. 
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In summary, all properties that benefit from the transit infrastructure should, ideally, pay 
assessments. Furthermore, the assessments should be based upon the benefit received 
by each property. Less-sophisticated methodologies leave room for horizontal inequities.
Potential for Vertical Inequity 
The potential for vertical inequity is low to moderate in all the cases analyzed. In Seattle, 
users with low ATP, such as qualifying senior citizens, are exempt from paying assessments, 
and other qualifying low-income property owners can defer payments for four to five years. 
Similarly, in the cases of Portland Streetcar and the Los Angeles Red Line, property owners 
have the option of paying assessments over an extended period (five or 17 years in the 
Los Angeles Red Line case, and five-, ten-, or 20 years in the Portland Streetcar case) at a 
reasonable interest rate that often equals the rate of interest paid by the local government 
on long-term borrowing. Finally, exempting smaller properties enhances vertical equity to 
the extent that the owners are likely to have lower ATP than the owners of larger properties. 
In the case of the New York Avenue Station SAD, properties with areas of less than 10,000 
square feet are exempt from paying assessments.
The findings of the case analyses are summarized in Table 32.
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JOINT DEVELOPMENT AND AIR RIGHTS
Enabling Legal Environment 
While state- or local-level enabling legislation may not be mandatory to undertake joint 
development, a clear policy framework is helpful. At the minimum, a DDA forms the legal 
basis for joint development. For example, a DDA and the creation of the JPA formed the 
enabling framework for the CCC Transit Village joint development. 
WMATA and MDT have a long history of coordinating frameworks to guide joint development. 
WMATA has developed joint development guidelines, whereas local ordinances and a 
county comprehensive plan provide the guiding framework for MDT. Recently developed 
TOD guidelines provide a similar policy framework for MARTA. Of the cases analyzed, 
only Cedar Rapids lacks such a policy framework.
Institutional Capacity 
All the cases analyzed—WMATA’s Bethesda Metro joint development, MDT’s Dadeland 
South Station joint development, Contra Costa County’s CCC Transit Village, MARTA’s 
Resurgens Plaza, and the Cedar Rapids GTC—demonstrate the need for significant 
local-government/transit-agency institutional capacity to conceptualize, plan, create, and 
manage joint developments. Except for Cedar Rapids, and to some extent MARTA, the 
local governments in the cases had the requisite institutional capacity at the time of joint 
development construction. 
Project finance and real estate development expertise are critical to negotiate joint 
development terms, especially the lease structure. The lack of such expertise in Cedar 
Rapids and Atlanta led to simple lease structures that favor private developers.  
Stakeholder Support and Opposition 
Of the four major stakeholder groups, residents are most likely to oppose joint developments. 
They may fear that joint developments will increase traffic congestion and air/noise pollution 
and will change the character of the neighborhood. 
Resident opposition is well-documented in the case of CCC Transit Village and suspected 
in the case of Resurgens Plaza. In fact, resident opposition held-up development of CCC 
Transit Village for nearly two decades before a design charrette process finally drew 
consensus among the community.  The residential neighborhood to the south of Resurgens 
Plaza is suspected of having opposed the joint development.659 
Revenue Yield 
The revenue yield from joint development projects can vary widely. For example, CCC 
Transit Village is estimated to yield approximately $700 million to $1 billion over 100 years, 
providing the local government a seven percent return on investment. Similarly, Bethesda 
generates $1.6 million annually for WMATA. However, the lease revenues from all WMATA 
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joint developments (which totaled $10 million in 2010) constitute less than one percent of 
the agency’s $1.4 billion annual operating budget. 
If not structured well, lease revenues may be meager. The approximately $86,000 annual 
revenue from the Cedar Rapids GTC does not even cover the project’s maintenance 
expenses. 
In summary, transit agencies need to carefully negotiate and structure lease revenue 
agreements. Furthermore, consideration should be given to other, non-fiscal policy 
objectives (such as revitalization of blighted neighborhoods and transit-ridership 
generation).
Revenue Stability 
In all cases except Cedar Rapids, the public agency receives either minimum guaranteed 
revenue (Bethesda, Dadeland South, and CCC Transit Village) or CPI-adjusted fixed 
revenue (Resurgens Plaza). In two cases (Bethesda and Dadeland South), the transit 
agency also shares a percentage of the gross revenues. WMATA receives 7.5 percent of 
gross revenue when the annual revenue exceeds $31 million. MDT receives the higher of 
$300,000 (CPI-adjusted) or 4 percent of the gross revenue. Sharing of the gross revenues 
makes the lease revenue stream dependent upon economic conditions and therefore a 
little volatile. For example, the Dadeland South revenues peaked at $1.1 million in 2007 
before falling to $900,000 in 2010.  
At the other extreme, the revenues from the Cedar Rapids GTC are not CPI-adjusted, nor 
does the city share the gross revenues. Therefore, the lease revenues are declining in 
constant dollar terms. 
Potential for Horizontal Inequity 
The horizontal-equity concern for joint development projects primarily revolves around 
whether the joint development agreement benefits the involved parties in proportion to 
their stake in the development and their risk. Viewed from this perspective, CCC Transit 
Village, Bethesda, and Dadeland South are highly equitable, while Resurgens Plaza and 
the Grand Rapids GTC do not seem to benefit the public agency in proportion to its stake 
in the development.
Furthermore, the equity assessment becomes difficult when the benefits can be both fiscal 
(lease revenues) and non-fiscal (for example, neighborhood revitalization). 
Potential for Vertical Inequity 
The potential for vertical inequity is low. The private developer is usually the entity that must 
either pay lease revenue to the public agency or share the construction and maintenance 
costs. Furthermore, the public agency and the private developer voluntarily agree to 
participate in the joint development process and are unlikely to enter into a vertically 
inequitable agreement. 
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DECISION-SUPPORT MATRIX
Table 34 codifies the findings from the cases analyzed and from the overview of VC. This 
information can provide some insights for decision makers who must choose one of the 
VC mechanisms or a combination of them. 
In addition to the ten comparison criteria discussed above, two criteria need to be 
considered when choosing a VC mechanism: (1) whether the transit infrastructure is to be 
provided in a new or an existing urban area and (2) the geographical size of the area that 
will benefit from the transit infrastructure. For example, while TIF is most commonly used 
to revitalize existing blighted urban areas (hence the “E” in column 3 of the TIF row in Table 
34), impact-fee revenues are expected to be substantial for newly urbanizing areas (hence 
the “N” in column 3 of the Impact-fees row. 
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The following simple scenario illustrates application of the decision-support matrix. 
Scenario
A city would like to develop a light-rail transit system to serve its automobile-oriented inner 
core. The inner core is largely non-residential and not blighted. The real estate market 
cannot be considered strong, although it is not very weak either. The state-level legislation 
allows TIF and impact-fee funding for transit. Furthermore, the city is making several efforts 
to retain existing office and commercial development in its inner core and is hesitant to put 
an additional financial burden on the non-residential property owners. The city does not 
have well-developed joint development guidelines but has undertaken a few such projects 
in the recent past.
Decision Support Matrix Application 
The legal environment and the large transit-benefit area allow use of all five VC mechanisms. 
However, the inner-core is already developed, the real estate market is not strong, and 
the city does not want to financially burden property owners. As a result, impact fees are 
neither likely to generate significant revenue nor to be politically feasible. Therefore, the 
city can choose one or a combination of the remaining mechanisms—TIF, SAD, and joint 
development and air rights. It might want to assess property-owner support for SADs 
and TIF. If property owners are not opposed, then all the remaining VC mechanisms are 
available for use.
TIF and SADs are capable of generating revenues that can fund a moderate to large 
portion of the transit-system costs. Joint development and air rights can be used to 
generate additional revenue that can be used to fund station construction and increase 
station-area density. However, joint development alone cannot be a significant funding 
source for the entire transit system. The city might then want to assess whether other 
property-tax-supported agencies (such as the county government and the school district) 
are likely to oppose TIF. If strong opposition is likely, the city might want to go ahead with 
a SAD and joint development and air rights. However, if the opposition to TIF is weak 
or can be addressed (for example, by allowing other taxing governments a share of TIF 
revenue), then both TIF and SADs can be used as major funding sources (as was the case 
in the Portland Streetcar Project), with supplemental revenues generated from the joint 
development and air rights. 
CONCLUSION
As the trends of decreased federal funding and fiscal belt-tightening continue at all levels 
of government, transit agencies and municipalities need alternative revenue sources to 
fund transit projects. VC mechanisms can provide revenue for projects that may otherwise 
lack funding. Over the past several decades, VC has increasingly caught the attention 
of transit providers as an alternative source of funding. However, determining which 
mechanisms are suitable for a particular transit project can be difficult, especially since 
some mechanisms have not been widely used. 
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Our case studies of uses of VC mechanisms were evaluated using the following criteria: 
enabling legal environment, stakeholder support, institutional capacity, revenue yield, 
revenue stability, and equity. The decision-support matrix we have developed should help 
policymakers, local governments, and transit agencies decide which mechanisms would 
suit their particular needs.
Key findings of the study include the following:
• Revenue yield from TIF and SADs is likely to be the highest among the five VC 
mechanisms. 
• Local governments often use a combination of two VC mechanisms—for example, 
TIF and SAD fund the Portland Central Streetcar Project; TIF and joint development 
fund CCC Transit Village and the GTC in Cedar Rapids.
• The use of TIF requires significant institutional capacity, community support, and 
agreement among taxing agencies. 
• Transit impact fees are rarely used. Their use benefits from state- and local-level 
enabling legislation, robust nexus studies, a strong real estate market, and developer 
support. 
• Transit impact fees and SADs need to be carefully designed and implemented in 
order to minimize inequities. 
• Strong real estate markets, significant institutional capacity, and clear policy 
guidelines are needed to undertake joint development.
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APPENDIX A:  
STATES’ USE OF TRANSIT IMPACT FEES
In a 2008 study (Smith, 2008), 14 states were found to have state-level enabling legislation 
that prohibits by omission the use of impact fees for transit: Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Among the states with no impact fee legislation, the study 
found seven with unfavorable court decisions regarding the use of impact fees for transit: 
Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, and New York.  The 
same study found 20 states in which use of impact fees for transit is allowed: Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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APPENDIX B:  
PROJECTS FUNDED BY TSDC DURING 1999–2007
 
Source: Portland Bureau of Transportation. http://www.portlandonline.com/transportation/index.
cfm?c=46210&a=179039 (accessed December 10, 2011).
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APPENDIX C:  
TRANSIT-ORIENTED CONCURRENCY FEES, 2010
 
Source: Broward County. Transit Impact Fee Schedule Effective October 1, 2010. 
www.broward.org/Regulation/Development/Documents/TransitFees.pdf (accessed April 14, 2011).
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APPENDIX D:  
CONDITIONS FOR CREATION OF A TIF DISTRICT IN ILLINOIS
Illinois law requires that certain conditions be met before a TIF district can be created. 
The area must be either blighted, a conservation area, or an industrial conservation area. 
For improved land (land that is not vacant) to be considered a blighted area, five of the 
following conditions must be met:
• Dilapidation
• Obsolescence
• Deterioration
• Illegal use of individual structures
• Structures below minimum code standards
• Excessive land coverage and overcrowding of structures and community facilities
• Lack of ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities
• Inadequate utilities
• Excessive land coverage
• Deleterious land use or layout
• Environmental cleanup needed
• Declining equalized assessed value
• Lack of community planning
For the vacant land, two of the following conditions must be met:
• Obsolete platting
• Diversity of ownership
• Tax and special-assessment delinquencies
• Environmental contamination
• Declining equalized assessed value
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• Deterioration of structures or site improvements on adjacent land
Source: Illinois Tax Increment Association, “What Conditions Must Exist for an Area to Be Designated for TIF?” http://
www.illinois-tif.com/FAQ15.asp (accessed August 6, 2011).
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AGI Adjusted Gross Income 
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
ATP Ability to Pay 
BAD Benefit Assessment District 
BART Bay Area Rapid Transit District 
BCT Broward County Transit 
BMCLP Bethesda Metro Center Limited Partnership 
BMJD Bethesda Metro Joint Development 
BRT Bus Rapid-Transit 
BTP Beneficiary-To-Pay 
CBD Central Business District 
CCC Contra Costa Centre 
CDFA Council of Development Finance Agencies 
CIP Capital Improvement Plan 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
CRT Cedar Rapids Transit 
CTA Chicago Transit Authority 
CTIDF Comprehensive Transportation Impact Development Fee 
DDA Disposition and Development Agreement 
DOT Department of Transportation 
DSF Decision-Support Framework 
FEC Florida East Coast 
FY Fiscal Year 
GLA Gross Leasable Area 
GTC Ground Transportation Center 
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
JDA Joint Development Agreement 
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JPA Joint Powers Authority 
LACMTA Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority 
LACTC Los Angeles County Transportation Commission 
LED Light-Emitting Diode 
LID Local Improvement District 
LVT Land Value Taxation 
MARTA Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority 
MDT Miami-Dade Transit 
MFI Median Family Income 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
PBOT Portland Bureau of Transportation 
PDC Portland Development Commission 
PMSA Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area 
PPP Public-Private Partnership 
RCW Revised Code of Washington 
RDA Redevelopment Agency 
RFP Request for Proposal
RFQ Request for Qualifications 
RTZ Rapid-Transit Zone 
SAD Special Assessment District 
SADD Station Area Design And Development 
SAF Special-Assessment Factor 
SAFETEA-LU Safe, Affordable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act–A Legacy For Users 
SCRTD Southern California Rapid Transit District 
SDC System-Development Charges 
SFMTA San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency 
TCEA Transportation Concurrency Exception Area 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21St Century 
TIDF Transit Impact Development Fee 
TIF Tax Increment Financing 
TOD Transit-Oriented Development 
TRID Transit Revitalization Investment District 
TSDC Portland’s Transportation System Development Charge 
UMTA Urban Mass Transportation Administration 
URA Urban Renewal Area 
VC Value Capture 
VTA Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority 
WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
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